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During the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the English 
commonwealth was caught between competing concepts of the political. England’s 
political culture had traditionally combined monarchy with local autonomy, office-
holding, and a republican ethos that understood politics in terms of dynamic 
individual action and potentiality.  In the Renaissance, however, this plural and 
personalized political paradigm was increasingly at odds with the centralizing 
tendencies of the Tudor-Stuart monarchs.  The tensions that resulted led to both real-
world tumults (the Northern Rebellion of 1569, Essex Revolt of 1601, the Civil Wars 
of 1642-51) and more subtle expressions of political pessimism and anxiety across 
England’s literary and cultural discourses.  But this same period also saw a sudden 
surge of interest in heroism. In a moment when the political impotence of individual 
action was widely felt, many of England’s most prominent writers turned to heroic 
fictions that imagined personal potential triumphing over constituted political 
authority. 
Impossible Heroes argues that we can understand this paradox only if we 
recognize that heroism functioned in early modern England as a complex political 
fantasy, one that tried to suture symbolically the widening rift between individual 
action and the increasing abstraction and alienation of state power.  This political 
function is apparent across early modern English literature, from Spenser’s Faerie 
Queene to Davenant’s Gondibert and Dryden’s heroic tragedies.  But while these 
writers (and others) use heroism to reconcile the individual to the political totality of 
the state, Impossible Heroes focuses on four writers—Philip Sidney, Christopher 
Marlowe, George Chapman, and William Shakespeare—who deploy heroism to 
craft a different political fantasy.  All these writers worked during the final years of 
Elizabeth’s reign and the early years of James I’s, anxious decades when royal 
authoritarianism went hand-in-hand with a widespread sense of political alienation.  
But rather than using heroism to alleviate this alienation, they emphasized the 
growing incompatibility between a dynamic, action-oriented experience of political 
life and institutional situations that conspired (as the Earl of Essex put it) to 
“suppress all noble, virtuous, and heroical spirits.”  Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and 
Shakespeare portray heroism as impossible in practice.  But out of this practical 
impossibility, their work posits heroism’s potential as a utopian poetic and political 
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Heroism and Political Experience in Early Modern England 
 
I 
Heroism is a hard topic to talk about today, especially in an academic venue. 
From the ongoing flood of films based on 1950s comic books to the abundance of 
manifestos clamoring for moral regeneration by returning to “heroic” role models on 
the contemporary right, heroism is certainly alive in mass culture.1  But the figure of 
“the hero” is understandably something of a persona non grata in the academic world. 
Especially since the mid twentieth century, heroism has been dismissed by most left-
leaning intellectuals as a dated but dangerous vehicle of alarming ideological 
positions and projects—from Thomas Carlyle to modernist reactionaries like 
Wyndham Lewis all the way up to National Socialism itself (“heroic cruelty” is what 
Heinrich Himmler once instructed the S.S. to strive for in carrying out the Final 
Solution—no doubt heroism’s all-time nadir).2  Over the course of the last century, in 
                                                     
1
 For an instance of a relatively right-wing use of heroism to argue for moral regeneration, see Peter H. 
Gibbon’s A Call to Heroism: Renewing America’s Vision of Greatness (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 
2002). Gibbons’ study is a particularly thoughtful example of a more ubiquitous usage of heroism in the 
journalistic combat of various right-wing intellectuals against the putative de-moralization of society 
2
 The alarming quote from Himmler is taken from Jessica Stern’s Terror in the Name of God: Why 
Religious Militants Kill (New York: Ecco, 2003) p. 16. Two forgotten volumes by otherwise well-known 
intellectuals mark intellectual culture’s growing, mid twentieth-century skepticism toward the heroic: the 
theater critic Eric Bentley’s A Century of Hero-Worship: A Study of the Idea of Heroism in Carlyle and 
Nietzsche, with Notes on Wagner, Spengler, Stefan George, and D. H. Lawrence, 2nd. ed. (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1957) and the Marxist/pragmatist philosopher Sidney Hook’s The Hero in History: A Study in 
Limitation and Possibility (New York: John Day, 1943). For Carlyle on heroism see Thomas Carlyle, On 
Heroes, Hero-Worship, & the Heroic in History, ed. Michael K. Goldberg et al. (Berkeley and Los 
2 
 
short, heroism has become what Raymond Williams would have called a residual 
cultural form. Its tropisms toward masculinity and purity and other ominous 
abstractions rankle the reverence for diversity, tolerance and openness so central to 
the standard ideologies of contemporary academia.3    
In early modern Europe this was, of course, far from the case. Rather than 
being residual, heroism was a ubiquitous and distinctly dominant cultural form. 
Throughout the Renaissance, the figure of the hero provided a sort of axiological 
abbreviation for human positivity and possibility. It marked the human tendency 
toward seeking “ever the sublime … [of the] following, of the utmost greatness and 
worth.”4   And across the period’s literary discourse, as almost any reader knows, 
heroism is an almost omnipresent imaginative force—from epic and romance to 
popular theater and the (proto)novel; from Ariosto, Tasso, Camões, and Spenser to 
Cervantes to Corneille, Racine, and Dryden.5   
                                                                                                                                                              
Angeles: University of California Press, 1993). For Lewis, see The Lion and the Fox: The Role of the Hero 
in the Plays of Shakespeare (London: Grant Richards, 1927). 
3
 On the idea of dominant versus residual cultural forms see Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) pp. 121-27.  
4
 Giambattista Vico, “On the Heroic Mind” in Vico and Contemporary Thought (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: 
Humanities Press, 1979) p. 230. Vico, of course, worked and wrote in the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. But his thought still swims in the water of the previous era’s humanistic culture—a culture he 
endeavored, throughout his career, to defend from the creeping hegemony of Cartesian rationalism. See 
Donald R. Kelley, Renaissance Humanism (Boston: Twayne, 1996). 
5
 Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive history of heroism in Renaissance literature, although a good 
short synthetic summary is provided by Maurice Evans in his article on “The Hero” in The Spenser 
Encyclopedia, ed. A.C. Hamilton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).  
3 
 
But in spite of heroism’s early modern ubiquity, critics have largely ignored 
the heroic in recent years. In their groundbreaking study The New Spirit of Capitalism, 
the French sociologists Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello claim that one of the major 
markers of the cultural triumph of neo-liberal capitalism is the fact that nowadays 
“virtually no one, with the exception of a few allegedly archaic Marxists” even refers 
to capitalism any longer.6  Mutatis mutandis, one might say that something similar 
has happened to heroism in English Renaissance studies over the last few decades. 
Earlier in the twentieth century, heroism was periodically a hot topic, the subject of 
major monographs by top-tier scholars like Reuben Brower and Eugene Waith and 
others.7  But during recent decades, and in conjunction with the leftward drift of 
literary and cultural studies more generally, heroism has vanished from the radar of 
most Renaissance specialists—not just as a topic of extensive research but even as a 
name to critically conjure.8  Nowadays, the heroic preoccupations of Renaissance 
                                                     
6
 Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, The New Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Gregory Eliot (London: Verso, 
2005) p. ix.  
7
 For the standard traditional treatments of heroism see Eugene Waith, The Herculean Hero (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1962); Eugene Waith, Ideas of Greatness (New York: Barnes and Noble, 
1971); Reuben Brower, Hero and Saint: Shakespeare and the Greco-Roman Heroic Tradition (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1971); David Riggs, Shakespeare’s Heroical Histories (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971); and Richard S. Ide, Possessed with Greatness: The Heroic Tragedies of 
Shakespeare and Chapman (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
8
 Almost the only scholars who have continued to write about heroism in recent decades are feminist 
critics. A number of feminist scholars have both subjected heroism to gendered critique and rehabilitated 
the Renaissance’s rich discourse of female heroism as a distinct mode of female empowerment, separate 
from the sentimentalized notions of passive female chastity, silence, and obedience that would become 
dominant in the eighteenth century. A good instance of a feminist engagement with heroism that combines 
both these tendencies is to be found in Mary Beth Rose, Gender and Heroism in Early Modern English 
Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002). See also Lisa Hopkins, The Female Hero in 
English Renaissance Tragedy (New York: Palgrave, 2002) and the essays collected in The Female Tragic 
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texts are usually dealt with by being translated into other, sexier scholarly topics. A 
text may have explicitly heroic themes.  But one does not talk about heroism as such.  
One talks, instead, about militarism, masculinity, tragic subjectivity….9 
Impossible Heroes aims at reversing the marginalization of heroism in 
contemporary early modern studies.  It argues for heroism’s central place in the 
literary and political cultures of Renaissance England.  And in doing so, it maps a 
new approach to the heroic literature of the early modern period.  Earlier studies 
have analyzed heroism as a cluster of classical clichés or an ideological formation 
calling out for critique.  I approach it, by contrast, as a powerful form of literary and 
political fantasy10—one centered on what I want to call a dynamic model of political 
experience: a vision of personal potentiality trumping constituted political power, of 
individual action shaping collective existence.11   
                                                                                                                                                              
Hero in English Renaissance Drama, ed. Naomi Conn Liebler (New York: Palgrave, 2002). I return to 
issues of gender and heroism in my discussion of Sidney’s Arcadia in chapter 1.  
9
 For some influential instances, see Catherine Belsey, The Subject of Tragedy: Identity and Difference in 
Renaissance Drama (London: Methuen, 1985); Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy, 3rd ed. (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2003); and Dympna Callaghan, Women and Gender in Renaissance Tragedy 
(Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989). It also worth calling attention to some of 
the remarkable feminist work done on Shakespeare’s Roman Plays—plays that are crisscrossed by classical 
heroic notions. See, in particular, Janet Adelman, Suffocating Mothers: Fantasies of Maternal Origins in 
Shakespeare’s Plays (New York: Routledge, 1992) and Coppélia Kahn, Roman Shakespeare: Warriors, 
Wounds, and Women (New York: Routledge, 1997).  
10
 My use of the concept of fantasy in the following pages is informed by psychoanalytic uses of the term.  
I understand fantasy to mean not so much the realization of desire but, rather, a structure that “constitutes 
our desire, provides its coordinates … teaches us how to desire” (Slavoj Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies 
[London:  Verso, 1997] p. 7). 
 
11
 Subsequent pages will provide further evidence for the above generalizations. For now, though, it will 
perhaps be helpful to cite the generalization about heroism ventured by E.R. Curtius, at the start of the 
“comparative phenomenology of heroism” elaborated in his European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages. 
Throughout its various redactions, writes Curtius, the hero is an “ideal personal type whose being is 
centered upon nobility and its realization—hence upon ‘pure,’ not technical, values—and whose basic 
5 
 
The following chapters trace this fantasy through the work of four late 
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writers: Philip Sidney, Christopher 
Marlowe, George Chapman, and William Shakespeare. The work of each of these 
writers is permeated and powered by heroic concepts and conceits—the “well-
doing” glorified in Sidney’s New Arcadia (c. 1584), the bombastic over-reaching that 
propels Marlowe’s Tamburlaine (1587), the contrarian “cannibal valor” at the center 
of Chapman’s Bussy D’Ambois (c. 1603), the unyielding masculine-military heroism 
that drives Shakespeare’s Macbeth (c. 1606). But Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and 
Shakespeare are all also deeply ambivalent about the very possibility of heroism in 
the political worlds their texts portray. Each of them represents not just heroism’s 
positive ideality but its simultaneous inadequacy in the face of confusing, aleatory, 
and often alarming political conditions. From the civil war in the New Arcadia to the 
violent metaphysical meditations of Macbeth, each of the writers whose work I 
address imagines a heroic, action-oriented politics colliding with its own political 
impossibility. 
This joint fascination with and skepticism toward a politics of heroic 
singularity ties my four texts together. It echoes across the considerable formal and 
generic and ideological distances of Sidney and Marlowe and Chapman and 
                                                                                                                                                              
virtue is natural nobility in body and soul. The hero is distinguished by a superabundance of intellectual 
will and by its concentration against the instincts. It is this which constitutes his greatness of character. The 
specific virtue of the hero is self-control. But the hero’s will does not rest here, it presses on into power, 
responsibility, daring. Hence the hero can play the role of statesman or general, as in earlier times he played 
the role of warrior” (European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages, trans. Willard Trask [Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1953] p. 167). 
6 
 
Shakespeare’s writings, where we see a powerful, if polyvalent, fascination with an 
experience of political life caught between individual political action and its radical 
inadequacy. But it also links these writers’ portrayals of heroism with the broader 
political culture they inhabited and some of its deepest difficulties and complexities.  
The political culture of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England was a 
confusing and at times contradictory farrago of different understandings and 
experiences of collective life. Renaissance England was, of course, a monarchy; but 
while the Tudor and Stuart sovereigns and their spokespeople emphasized the 
monarchy’s absolute and god-given plenitudo potestatis, the realm they ruled lacked a 
centralized bureaucracy, a paid army, and the other administrative accoutrements of 
a seriously absolutist form of rule. As a result, the early modern English polity was, 
in practice, a horizontal distribution of authority, a “network of offices wielding 
political power derived from a coordinating centre by formal means,” as one recent 
historian writes.12   To maintain authority, the monarchs of early modern England 
had to rely on the consent and the participation of the elite enfranchised who were, 
as Sir Thomas Smith wrote, “participant of the common wealth” and entitled to 
“beare office” and act.13  Nor was this simply an institutional condition of the period. 
                                                     
12
 Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) p. 19. See also Wallace T. MacCaffrey, “Place and Patronage in Elizabethan 
Politics,” in Elizabethan Government and Society, ed. S.T. Bindoff et al. (London: Athlone Press, 1961) pp. 
95-126.  
13
 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England, ed. L. 
Alston (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1906) p. 32. There was, of course, one massive exception to 
the male dominance of political participation: Elizabeth herself, whose gender, posed serious problems for 
this civic, action-oriented model of the political. But although Elizabeth was in a structurally singular 
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The dispersal of authority and strong emphasis on local autonomy and office-
holding in English political life provided fertile ground for the development among 
England’s ruling elite of a semi-republican ethos—one that saw collective life 
through the lens of the classical ideal of the vita activa, as a way of living “in 
actione.”14  The baseline assumptions of this ethos are summed up nicely in the 
following passage, from a parliamentary speech by John Pym from the late 1620s: 
 
The form of government is that which doth actuate and dispose every 
part and member of a state to the common good; and as those parts 
give strength and ornament to the whole, so they receive from it again 
strength and protection in their several stations and degrees. If this 
mutual relation and intercourse be broken, the whole frame will 
quickly be dissolved, and fall in pieces, and instead of this concord 
and interchange of support, whilst one part seeks to uphold the old 
                                                                                                                                                              
position, aristocratic women were also “participant” in high-level politics, even if the theoretical 
frameworks available did not always clearly acknowledge them as being so. For one example of this, see 
Julie Crawford, “The Case of Lady Anne Clifford; or, Did Women Have a Mixed Monarchy?” PMLA 121, 
no. 5 (2006) pp. 1682-9. On Elizabeth and the politics of a female ruler see A.N. McClaren, Political 
Culture in the Reign of Elizabeth I: Queen and Commonwealth, 1558-1585 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999). 
14
 John Case, Sphaera Civitatis (Oxford, 1588) A3
r
. In recent years, a number of historians of English 
political thought have emphasized the centrality of republican civic culture to early modern England. 
Although J.G.A. Pocock famously dismissed a serious civic republican sentiment before the civil war, other 
scholars have emphasized how republican ideals co-existed with monarchical governance from the 
sixteenth century on, in what the late Patrick Collinson famously called a “monarchical republicanism.” For 
more on this see Patrick Collinson, Elizabethan Essays (London: Hambledon, 1994) pp. 1-58; Markku 
Peltonen, Classical Humanism and Republicanism in English Political Thought, 1570-1640 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Mark Goldie, “The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in 
Early Modern England,” in The Politics of the Excluded, c. 1500-1850 ed. Tim Harris (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001) pp. 153-94. 
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form of government, and the other part to introduce a new, they will 
miserably consume one another.15  
 
It is axiomatic, here, that the “form of government” is hierarchical. But rather than 
the rigidity of some sort of static catena aurea, hierarchy goes hand-in-hand with a 
dynamic sense of possibility.  For the common good to be guaranteed, the 
constituted power of the ruler must provide avenues for the constituent 
actualization of the different “parts” of the body politic.   
This vision of political life—as simultaneously hierarchical and dynamic, 
driven toward the actualization of individual potentiality—cuts across each of the 
texts taken up in the following chapters. It is everywhere in their emphasis on how 
heroism stages the triumph of individual “potentiality over limitation,” on the 
capacity of individual potential and energy to shape collective existence. 16   But 
Sidney and Marlowe and Chapman and Shakespeare’s simultaneous skepticism 
about this dynamic political ideal also ties them to the changes English political 
culture was undergoing during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—
changes in which a traditional, dynamic, and personalized model of politics was 
being gradually worn away by new political realities.  
                                                     
15
 Quoted in J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic 
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 358.  
16
 Waith, Ideas, p. 6. 
9 
 
Part of this attrition had to do with increasing tension between England’s 
plural civic culture and the increasingly authoritarian claims of the Stuart monarchs: 
Pym’s above-quoted statement, for instance, derives from a speech he made during 
Parliament’s 1628 attempt to impeach one of Charles I’s clerics—an early episode in 
the more capacious collision between the “ideals and experience of active 
citizenship” and the sovereign claims of the Stuart crown that would eventually 
precipitate the English Civil Wars.17  But the shifts in political culture that occurred 
during the later English Renaissance went beyond specific institutional conflict. 
Historians have long noted that the later European Renaissance in general saw the 
emergence of a sharp sense of anthropological and political pessimism as, across 
elite discourse, an optimistic view of human beings as (to quote Richard Hooker) 
“somewhat in possibility” gave way to an increased appreciation of their 
enmeshment (to quote Montaigne) in the “mire and shit of the world.”18  In England, 
this pessimism had a particularly political inflection: the late sixteenth and 
                                                     
17
 Michael Braddick, God’s Fury, England’s Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars (London: 
Penguin, 2008) p. 112). For more on republicanism and the English Civil Wars see Pocock, Machiavellian 
Moment; David Norbrook, Writing the English Republic: Poetry, Rhetoric, and Politics 1627-1660 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Blair Worden, “Republicanism, Regicide, and 
Republic: The English Experience,” in Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe, ed. 
Quentin Skinner and Martin van Gelderen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp. 307-26. 
18
 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed. A.S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) p. 66; Michel de Montaigne, “Apology for Raymond Sebyond,” in Complete 
Essays, trans. M.A. Screech (London: Penguin, 1987) p. 505. On the erosion of philosophical optimism in 
the Renaissance see Herschel Baker, The Dignity of Man: Studies in the Persistence of an Idea (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1949); Herschel Baker, Wars of Truth: Studies in the Decay of Christian 
Humanism in the Early Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953). See also 




seventeenth centuries saw an increasingly bleak view of collective life start to 
predominate among the commonwealth’s elites. This is partially evident in the 
history of the period’s political thought, where we see the displacement of a positive 
Ciceronian civic humanism by harsher varieties of political thought infused by 
Tacitism and Stoicism and emphasizing security and raison d’état, and which 
downplayed individual initiative and increasingly saw power as de-personalized 
and totalized.19  But these theoretical shifts point to a broader sea change in the 
period’s collective life: the confrontation between a dynamic model of political 
existence and an increasingly alienated experience of this existence—taking that 
term not in an existential or economic but rather the political-ontological sense of a 
fundamental fissure between the constituted power of individual becoming and the 
constituent power of static state-form.20   
Such an experience of alienation runs through all the texts I take up in the 
following pages. Sidney’s work, for instance, idealizes and valorizes “well-doing” 
and “praxis” in its portrayal of heroism, but by the New Arcadia his vision of political 
life increasingly sees individual agents as being “like tennis balls tossed on the 
racket of the higher powers,” their own capacity to control their political 
                                                     
19
 See Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989); Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the 
Language of Politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992) and J.H. Salmon, “Seneca and Tacitus 
in Jacobean England,” in The Mental World of the Jacobean Court, ed. Linda Levy Peck (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University press, 1991) pp. 168-88.  
20
 On the tension between constituent and constituted power in the modern European state, see Antonio 
Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. Maurizia Boscagli (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
11 
 
circumstances seriously called into question.21  Marlowe’s Tamburlaine models the 
material-mental aspiration of human minds, but in his later Doctor Faustus, he sees 
heroism not as a concrete becoming but as a set of self-imposed delusions and 
virtualities that amount to “nothing at all.”22  In his French tragedies, Chapman’s 
heroic vision of over-reaching and “aspiring” runs up against a degraded political 
world of realpolitik and courtly corruption.23  In Macbeth, Shakespeare shows the 
spectacular collision of traditional military-aristocratic virtue with political forces 
and dynamics outside its ken and control. Each of these texts is engaged, then, with 
a broader alienation of individual, dynamic political action in the later English 
Renaissance. But while this thesis might, at first glance, seem like a standard exercise 
in historicist contextualization, I also want to use it as a way of rethinking such 
historicist practice—of rethinking how we think about the relationship between 
literature, history, and politics. And this thread of my argument hinges on the term 




                                                     
21
 Philip Sidney, The Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia, ed. Maurice Evans (London: Penguin Books, 1978) 
p. 817. 
22
 Christopher Marlowe, Doctor Faustus 9.40-1, quoted from The Complete Works of Christopher 
Marlowe, ed. Roma Gill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987) 
23
 George Chapman, The Conspiracy of Charles, Duke of Byron, in The Conspiracy and Tragedy of 




Talking about political experience—or, for that matter, any type of 
experience—is an odd, and almost awkward, move to make in a contemporary 
literary- or cultural-critical project. The reasons for this are not hard to discern. The 
concept of experience has been persistently (and persuasively) problematized over 
the course of the last century, described as both an irretrievable casualty of urban 
modernity and a conceptual category whose inherent humanism and metaphysical 
baggage makes little more than “ideology’s homeland.”24  The way that I use the 
term experience, as we will see, defines it not as a site of individual affective 
plenitude but, instead, as both collective (bound up in political life, never reducible to 
a subjectivity that is bounded and autonomous) and contradictory (always fractured 
by the contradictions of collective existence). 25  But still, the term itself carries a kind 
of anachronistic, contrarian charge—one that I deploy advisedly and indeed 
polemically. For Impossible Heroes not only aims at outlining a new reading of the 
texts just mentioned. It also aims at parting ways with a dominant contemporary 
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feature of how today’s early modern scholars deal with the relationship between 
politics and literature, and—by implication—literature and history.   
This is the tendency of historicist critics to de-emphasize the subjective and 
experiential features of literary texts in favor of mapping their enmeshment in the 
concrete coordinates of production, distribution, and reception.26  Understanding 
this tendency requires traversing the well-travelled terrain of the history of 
American 27  early modern studies over the last few decades—particularly the 
fortunes of the historical study of Renaissance literature during, and in the wake of, 
New Historicism.28   Renaissance scholars have, of course, always done various sorts 
of historical work. But what made New Historicism unique and exciting when it 
burst on the disciplinary scene in the 1980s was its radical rupturing of the firewall 
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separating text and context, textuality and historicity. 29   The New Historicists 
variously argued that the two were indissociably connected, and they made this 
argument with both a methodological-theoretical panache and a sense of political 
purpose (with their focus on topics like power, representation, and resistance) that 
spoke strongly to various threads of post-1960s culture.30  But while the decisive 
gesture of New Historicism was extra-literary—its highly political collision of 
literature with history—most New Historicist scholars remained focused on the 
ultimately subjective dynamics that literary texts staged. Such a focus could take 
various forms: the gymnastics of self-fashioning in the face of centralized power, the 
anxieties produced in male elites by a female monarch, or the various ways in which 
political subjects were constituted by the ideologies of Jacobean rule….31  But, in all 
these cases, for the New Historicists, early modern literary texts provided an arena 
in which the dialectical back and forth of political and social power and supposedly 
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autonomous subjectivity was revealed in all its experiential complexity (however 
much most of them would have disavowed the term “experience”). 
In subsequent years, however, this subjective emphasis underwent a gradual 
attrition as Renaissance studies subtly but perceptibly shifted away from a focus on 
the subjective dynamics staged by literature and toward, instead, its objective 
coordinates and contexts. The most obvious form of this was the methodological 
critique, launched by a number of critics in the mid-nineties, of the putative socio-
symbolic idealism of New Historicist work: these critics urged a (re)emphasis on 
“materiality” as a corrective to such idealism—whether this pliable term signaled 
the multiplicity of textual variants or the material remnants of Renaissance culture.32  
But this emphasis on materiality was only one part of a broader shift in the 
methodological leanings of early modern studies. It went hand-in-hand with a more 
subtle shift in professional common sense that Marjorie Garber describes in noting 
how New Historicism was paradoxically “eroded by its success”: while the 
movement’s early proponents stressed “that history, or histories, could not be 
understood as determinative or lineal causes but rather as complex networks of 
cultural effects,” this point, she suggests, was gradually lost in subsequent years as 
more and more critics found their way back to a methodological paradigm where 
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context could fully explain text.33  New Historicism, as another commentator puts it, 
has been gradually displaced in the US by “a ‘new materialism’ which appears 
indifferent to the large-scale historical issues (on the nature of modernity, the 
historicity of selfhood, for example) which were central in founding new historicist 
(and cultural materialist) works”; by a “historicism so finely textured and detailed” 
that any longue durée developments are “occluded” and a premium is placed on 
increasingly specific, increasingly archival modes of knowledge.34   
I do not mean to dismiss this archival and thick-descriptive turn, or its re-
entry to the field’s forefront. No doubt, the critical turn to the archive and toward 
more contextually rich thick descriptions of historical contexts—and accounts of 
how literary texts, of various sorts, interact with them—has been salutary: it greatly 
increased knowledge of the historical (and especially the political) particulars of the 
period, particulars that were often glossed over by New Historicist accounts which 
left the historical heavy lifting to the historians.35  But as with all shifts in emphasis, 
something got lost in Renaissance studies’ archival turn. In this case, what was lost 
was the older focus on the subjective side of political life, on its “experiential” 
dimensions. As I have already suggested, such subjectivity is, of course, never 
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singular, never autonomous—the insufficiency of autonomous models of selfhood 
and aesthetic production to account for literature’s complex imbrications in politics 
was one of the major arguments that New Historicism made. But the subjective side 
of collective life nevertheless has its own dimensionality, what we might describe 
(using Martin Heidegger’s terms) as an ontological thickness in excess of its ontic 
embeddedness, which cannot always be retrieved through strictly archival-
contextualizing work.36  It is this ontological level that I want to foreground in 
focusing on the category of political experience. In the pages that follow, political 
experience marks the way in which collective life occurs and unfolds not only in the 
particulars of individual events and institutional transformations, but also within the 
complex ligature of reality and unreality, of external input and fantasmatic filtering, 
which are as much a part of politics as the factual practicalities to which the term is 
typically tied. 37   
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Specifically, Impossible Heroes argues that the plays, prose, and poems of 
Philip Sidney, Christopher Marlowe, George Chapman, and William Shakespeare 
use heroism as a way of imagining a fundamentally fissured political experience, one 
caught between a personalized politics of individual action and an alienated and 
abstracted politics increasingly organized and oriented around political power 
detached from personal initiative. In Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman, and Shakespeare 
heroism, in other words, emerges not as the pure fiction of autonomy and power, of 
(as Freud famously put it) “His Majesty the Ego” impervious and impermeable to 
external forces, enacting his will on the world.38  It emerges instead as a site where 
both the potentiality of human agency to act and shape its socio-political surround 
and the negativity, the impossibility that haunts any attempt to do in an increasingly 
complex and abstract and modern society go hand-in-hand.39   
However I also want to argue that Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and 
Shakespeare do not just passively reflect the complexities of political experience in 
their own period. Each of them, also, self-consciously transforms the experience of 
political impossibility they stage via heroism into a sense of the increasing potential 
of literary practice itself. This claim, of course, opens itself up to the obvious 
objection that the term and concept of literature did not exist in the late sixteenth 
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and early seventeenth centuries. But while, as Raymond Williams writes, the 
“concept of ‘literature’” in its “modern form … did not emerge earlier than the 
eighteenth century and was not fully developed until the nineteenth century,” still 
“the conditions for its emergence had been developing since the Renaissance.”40  
These conditions were various. As we will see in the following chapters they 
included the rise of vernacular languages, the collapse of traditional modes of 
(chiefly clerical) authority, and the emergence of print technology and culture.41  But 
all of these ontic dimensions of the period’s literary production went hand-in-hand 
with the ontological element of what Williams describes as an increasing emphasis on 
literary creativity; what Shakespeare describes in A Midsummer Night’s Dream as 
poesy’s power to produce “shaping fantasies,” its capacities to “apprehend” more 
than “cool reason ever comprehends”; and what Philip Sidney describes in the 
Defense of Poesy as the poet’s capacity to create an autonomous fictional world over 
and above things as they are; his belief that  
 
only the poet, disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up 
with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect another 
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nature, in making things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, 
quite anew, forms such as never were in nature, as the Heroes, 
Demigods, Cyclops, Chimeras, Furies, and such like: so as he goeth 
hand in hand with nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of 
her gifts, but freely ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit.42 
     
In their various portrayals of the first of Sidney’s “forms that never were,” the hero, 
each of my writers engages in this increasing sense of literature’s fantasmatic power 
and autonomy—a sense that emerges precisely out of political failure. For Sidney, 
heroism emerges as an ethical ideal in the Defense of Poesy, but it assumes, in the New 
Arcadia, a different form: it models an ethical and political transcendence in the face 
of increasingly contingent political conditions. Marlowe’s portrayal of heroism in 
Tamburlaine and Doctor Faustus first embraces but later recoils from heroism’s 
imbrications in the fantasmatic virtuality of poetic wit.  And Chapman and 
Shakespeare, in developing the genre of heroic tragedy in the early seventeenth 
century, both stand ambivalently between heroism’s political impossibility and its 
aesthetic potential. For all these writers, the contradiction between individual 
dynamic potentiality and the static structures of constituted state power is not a 
antinomy or impasse but, instead, heroism’s fissile core. For each of them, political 
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impossibility is the source of heroism’s poetic power. Like Hegel’s Owl of Minerva, 
literary heroism spreads its wings only when the sun sets on the possibility of real-
world heroes.   
 
III 
Such is the basic argument of Impossible Heroes, and later on in this 
introduction I will return to Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare and their 
place in the literary and political cultures of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. But before doing this I want to discuss heroism a little more broadly. For 
heroism, of course, is not a uniquely Renaissance phenomenon, and its instantiations 
in the texts I discuss below cannot be understood in isolation from its broader 
history. This history is vast, and giving it any kind of comprehensive coverage is far 
beyond the scope of this introduction. But still I want to provide a partial, literary-
political history of heroism—one that will frame the particular political uses to 
which heroic fantasy is put in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England. 
Heroism’s association with what I have been calling dynamism—with 
individual potentiality shaping and directing collective life—stretches far back into 
the pre-historic origins of the heroic, origins that comparative philologists and 
anthropologists have traced into the deep roots of Indo-European culture. 
Specifically, it can be traced back to what Georges Dumézil called the “warrior” 
22 
 
function in Indo-European culture. 43  We see a relatively primitive and “pure” form 
of heroism as military dynamism in the competitive aristocratic world of Homer’s 
epics. The fictional worlds of the Iliad and the Odyssey are, of course, not simply 
military. But their portrayal of the Greek aristocracy centers on a militarily-inflected 
model of competitive pursuit—seeking after timé and kléos, honor and distinction. 
The Greeks called this competitive drive thumós, and it finds its paradigmatic 
classical example, of course, in Homer’s Achilles, who lives between 
 
… two sorts of destiny toward the day of my death. Either, 
if I stay here and fight beside the city of the Trojans, 
my return home is gone, but my glory shall be everlasting; 
but if I return home to the beloved land of my fathers, 
the excellence of my glory is gone, but there will be a long life 
left for me, and my end in death will not come to me quickly. 44 
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We see here both a dynamic drive toward action and a sense of the need for this 
action to be transformed into honor and reputation. From the outset, in other words, 
the figure of the hero is bound up in the ism of representation. However—as the Iliad 
shows—the very drive also comes into conflict with the forces of political power, 
stability, and rule.    
The sort of active, dynamic heroism Achilles modeled had a long life in Greek 
culture, and beyond.45  The ideal of the “god-like hero man” (as Hesiod put it) 
persisted in various Hero Cults, as well as the praise poetry of writers like Pindar.46  
But this ideal was also politically problematic, for although heroic poetry treats 
positively of “action, and appeals to the love of prowess” (as one critic puts it), the 
prowess it staged was profoundly at odds with the emergent culture of the Greek 
(especially the Athenian) polis, with its emphasis on political stability, plurality, and 
the rule of law.47  This tension runs through Greek tragedy, which pits the norms 
and laws of the polis against the individual dynamic drives of heroic figures (like 
Oedipus or Ajax) who cannot be accommodated to its order.48  And it is captured by 
Aristotle, who sees heroism—the “heroic (heroiken)” and “divine sort of virtue” 
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embodied by a figure like Homer’s Hector—as the paradoxical flipside of bestiality: 
like both the “beast” and the “god,” he claims, the hero cannot be accommodated 
within the confines of the city.49  For Aristotle, the hero is an instance of the broader 
category of the “great-souled man,” the megalopsychos who is “so pre-eminently 
superior in goodness that there can be no comparison between the goodness and 
political capacity which he shows … and what is shown by the rest,” and who, thus, 
can “no longer be treated as part of a city”; to whom an “injustice” will be done if he 
is treated as partaking of the equality that grounds the plurality of the polis.50   
But while the Greek ambivalence toward the figure of the hero has been well-
known and observed as far back as Hegel, the political contradiction it embodies—
between the dynamic drive to personal prowess, performance, and distinction and 
the constituted constraints of collective life—is not unique to the Greeks.51 This 
tension runs through the weft of western heroism in general. It stands—to take one, 
prominent example—at the forefront of what would become one of the dominant 
literary wellsprings of Renaissance English heroism: Senecan tragedy. Written 
centuries after the work of Sophocles and Aeschylus and Euripides, Seneca’s closet 
dramas nevertheless stage a similar collision between heroic prowess and political 
circumstance. But while Greek tragedies are concerned with the clash between the 
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heroic arête elaborated by Aristotle and the requirements of the (Athenian) polis, 
Seneca projects heroism into different political circumstances. Particularly, his 
heroism emerges from the frisson between the drive to honor and distinction and 
autonomy bound up in Roman aristocratic models of virtue (virtus) and a political 
situation in which, to quote Tacitus, “all power” (omnem potentiam) had been 
consolidated into the one personage of the emperor, and collective life was 
experienced, ut alienae, “as alien.”52   The contradictions of the imperial political 
climate in which Seneca wrote, as Gordon Braden has argued, infuse the central 
basic plot of all of Seneca’s tragedies—the explosion of a heroic passion and ira 
(anger) onto and into an “unexpecting and largely uncomprehending world, an 
enactment of the mind’s disruptive power over external reality.”53   Anger and 
heroism are obviously linked as far back as Achilles: anger is, in fact, the Iliad’s very 
first word. But for Seneca, heroic anger takes on a new, particularly powerful and 
peculiarly intense form. In, for instance, Hercules’s desire to rush upon and destroy 
everyone he encounters (ruat…in omnes) in Hercules Furens, or Medea’s irrepressible 
lust for vengeance against Jason and his children, we see a bleak version of heroic 
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dynamis lashing out in the face of the tyranny of constituted political authority of the 
most corrupted and degraded sort.54   
Seneca’s vision of heroism had a long life in the Renaissance: I will return to it 
more extensively in our discussion of Bussy D’Ambois. For now, though, it is 
important to emphasize that although—from Homer to the Greek tragedians to 
Seneca—heroism was often at odds with political power the heroic impulse was 
also, in various ways, reconciled to political authority outside of and beyond itself in 
classical literature. The most canonical and influential instance of such reconciliation 
is provided in Virgil’s Aeneid. Here, the heroism of the text’s protagonist is a heroism 
less of thumós than of pietas. Aeneas is militarily capable, of course. But he is also—
and more importantly—a figure of endurance. Take, for instance, the following epic 
simile from the Aeneid’s fourth book: 
 
 As when among the Alps, north winds 
will strain against each other to root out 
with blasts—now on this side now that—a stout 
oak tree whose wood is full of years; the roar 
is shattering, the trunk is shaken, and 
high branches scatter on the ground; but it 
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still grips the rocks; as steeply as it thrusts 
its crown into the upper air, so deep 
the roots it teaches down to Tartarus; 
no less than this, the hero [ heros ]; he is battered [ tunditur ] 
on this side and on that by assiduous words; 
he feels care in his mighty chest, and yet 
his mind cannot be moved; the tears fall, useless.55 
 
This simile is meant to describe Aeneas’s withstanding of the pleas of Dido’s sister, 
Anna, for him to stay in Carthage and give up his mission to settle Italy. But the 
passage is also paradigmatic of heroism’s articulation in the Aeneid more broadly. 
The heroisms of Homer and the tragedians and Seneca all variously hinge on a 
dynamic ideal that refuses to give up on its self-reflexive immanence. Virgil’s heroism, 
by contrast, is a heroism of transcendence: of the reconciliation between personal 
action and capacity and the higher horizons of divine imperial fatum.   
Virgil’s version of heroism would, of course, be immensely influential in 
subsequent centuries (and millennia)—Sidney’s Defense, for instance, sees Virgil’s 
hero as emblematic of heroism’s capacity to inflame the desire to “be worthy.”56   But 
it also models a broader shift in the structure of heroism as a literary and political 
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fantasy—one that would be solidified in the following centuries by classical Latin 
culture’s suffusion with the influence of Christianity. From Saint Paul’s injunction to 
put “on the full armor of God so that you can take your stand against the devil’s 
scheme” to Prudentius’ vision, in the Psychomachia, of the good Christian’s “war 
against the ungodly tribes,” heroism is repeatedly referenced in Christian writings—
again and again it provides a fantasmatic means of imagining what Michel Foucault 
called the “art of existence dominated by self-preoccupation” that Christianity 
introduced into Western culture.57   And—in conjunction with the stoically-tinged 
heroism we see implicit in Virgil and which is more extensively elaborated by later 
writers like Boethius—Christianity moved heroic fantasy in the direction of an 
emphasis on inner ethical self-control rather than the outwardly-directed drive to 
actualize one’s potentiality. This ethical transformation of heroism was codified in 
Isidore of Seville’s definition of heroism in terms of both fortitude and sapience.58  
And it continued on into the Middle Ages, as heroism was transformed by its 
encounter with new, more parcellized forms of political organization and culture. In 
the Middle Ages, heroism continued to function as a marker of dynamic activity, 
becoming associated with the feudal-military ideal famously summarized in the 
Song of Roland’s adjectival heroic hendiadys of being both “proz” and “sage,” brave 
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and wise.59  But, especially in the later Middle Ages, heroism was also yoked to the 
cultivation of courtesy, refinement, and inner ethical-political control. This is 
particularly evident in the various late-medieval transformations of the heroic ideal 
we see in writers and texts like Chrétien de Troyes, Romance of the Rose, and 
Raymond Lull’s discussions of chivalry.60  By the cusp of the early modern period 
heroism had once again come to encompass fantasmatic and political possibilities 
that were both immanent and transcendent. It had come to model both a dynamic 
individual potentiality and the reconciliation of this potential to broader political 
totality.  
These two poles are central to heroism’s life in the English Renaissance—and 
its place in mediating this period’s own political transformations. The work of 
Sidney and Marlowe and Chapman and Shakespeare—as I have suggested—
presents one particular instance of how heroism served such a mediatory function. 
But to fully understand their use of heroism we first need to turn to another and 
indeed opposite way that heroic fantasy functioned in the shifting political climate 
of early modern England: as a way of symbolically suturing an emergent sense of 
national English identity. This emergent sense is famously captured in the 
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prosopopoeic projection of England’s integrity and essence in Shakespeare’s Richard 
II (1595): 
 
This royal throne of kings, this scepter'd isle, 
This earth of majesty, this seat of Mars, 
This other Eden, demi-paradise, 
This fortress built by Nature for herself 
Against infection and the hand of war, 
This happy breed of men, this little world, 
This precious stone set in the silver sea…61 
 
In these lines, we see a combination of a number of common threads of the emergent 
early modern discourse of English nationhood: an emphasis on monarchy, for 
instance, and on England’s unique place as an island. 62   We also, however, see the 
degree to which emerging notions of national identity were bound up with a sense 
of military facility. Here, England is the “seat of Mars,” and indeed throughout 
proto-nationalist literature more broadly military heroism becomes a key way of 
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consolidating the emerging “imagined community” of England.63  Various instances 
of this can be adduced. Take, for instance, the classical scholar Christopher 
Occland’s Anglorum Praelia (1580), a Latin epic that was commissioned by the 
government to replace heathen literature in the school curriculum and where a 
classical ideal of heroism is consciously sutured to a sense of the English nation as a 
whole: the opening lines of the poem, for example, talk about the how the 
gens…Britanni, the “English people,” have again and again discharged themselves 
heroically in battle against their various enemies.64  This same use of heroic fantasy 
to both constitute and valorize the emergent English nation is also evident a few 
years later in Philip Stubbes’ Anatomy of Abuses (1583), where he speaks of the 
English as a “strong kind of people, most audacious, bolde, puissant, and heroicall, 
and of great magnanimitie, valiancie, and prowes, and of incomparable feature of 
body, of an excellent complexion, and in all humanitie, inferiour to none under the 
Sunne.”65   Nearly a half century later, John Milton would again draw on this trope 
in the Areopagitica (1644), where he writes of England as a “noble and puissant 
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nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible 
locks.”66   
As these instances show, the idea of England as a heroic nation was part of 
the commonplace political-national language of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. But it finds its extensive elaboration not in political theory but, instead, on 
the popular stage—particularly in the period’s history plays. A good instance of this 
is provided by Shakespeare’s first tetralogy. Although, as Phyllis Rackin writes, the 
“episodic plots… large cast of characters, and the rapid whirl of events” in the Henry 
VI plays “all work to frustrate any attempt by the audience to discover a clear 
principle of causality” or even overall political coherence, a few key moments 
provide evidence of heroism’s central place in an emergent sense of integrated 
national identity.67  One particularly powerful instance of this occurs in the scene 
(from the first Henry VI play) where Talbot—Shakespeare’s paradigmatic heroic-
aristocratic warrior—is captured by the Countess of Auvergne. The Countess 
expresses surprise at how puny Talbot is in person, compared to his fearsome 
reputation: while she expects a “second Hector” she gets a “dwarf.”  But this 
disappointment, according to Talbot, is misplaced: his individual heroic valor, he 
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proclaims, is precisely a function of the heroic military community to which he 
belongs: 
 
These [ his troops ] are his substance, sinews, arms and strength,  
With which he yoketh your rebellious necks,  
Razeth your cities and subverts your towns  
And in a moment makes them desolate.68 
 
What Talbot explicitly posits, here, is the fantasy of a cross-class heroic community 
forged in the crucible of heroic combat and shared military belonging. But when 
viewed in the broader context of its theatrical medium, this passage points to the 
place of the institution of theater itself in the construction of such community. In his 
Apologie of Pierce Pennilesse (1592), Thomas Nashe famously reflects on the theatrical 
power that Talbot presented on the English stage, asking rhetorically “[h]ow would 
it have joyed brave Talbot, the terror of the French, to think that after he had lain 
two hundred years in his tomb, he should triumph again on the stage, and have his 
bones new embalmed with the tears of ten thousand spectators at least (at several 
times) who in the tragedian that represents his person imagine they behold him 
                                                     
68




fresh bleeding?” 69   For Nashe, Shakespeare’s portrait of Talbot is not simply 
historical representation: it is the active production of a community, the “ten 
thousand spectators,” whose tears newly embalm Talbot’s heroically fallen corpse. 
This dynamic would, indeed, become even more explicit in Shakespeare’s own 
hands in the meta-theatrical meditation that precedes Henry V (1599). Here, the 
Prologue’s invocation of the “imaginary puissance” sutures the political and the 
poetic as theater itself becomes an engine for imagining the national communities 
whose bloody heroic actualization the plays portray.70   
Heroism’s place in projecting and consolidating national community was, 
however, not confined to history plays—or even to just to the popular stage. It is also 
at the center of Spenser’s Faerie Queene (1590/6)—arguably the period’s most 
extensive literary engagement with heroism. Spenser’s vision of the place of heroism 
in forging loyal political subjects comes through with particular clarity in the “Letter 
to Raleigh,” where he lays out the Faerie Queene’s overall plan and purpose: 
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The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a gentleman or 
noble person in virtuous and gentle discipline: Which for that I 
conceiued shoulde be most plausible and pleasing, being coloured 
with an historicall fiction, the which the most part of men delight to 
read, rather for variety of matter, then for profite of ensample: I chose 
the historye of king Arthure, as most fitte for the excellency of his 
person, being most famous by many mens former works, and also 
furthest from the daunger of enuy and suspition of present time.71 
 
For Spenser, the heroic-historical fiction of Arthur—the central thread running 
through the Faerie Queene’s immensely complex narrative weft—is a far more 
powerful way of “fashioning” political subjects. Far more than simple political-
ethical “matter,” it is—he hopes—capable of producing the political subjects proper 
to the centralized Elizabethan state apparatus the poem quite explicitly symbolically 
mediates. Heroism in the Faerie Queene, then, is also engaged in the project of 
projecting and consolidating national entity. Its heroic ideal of 
 
The noble hart, that harbours virtuous thought, 
And is with childe of glorious great intent, 
                                                     
71
 Edmund Spenser, “Letter to Raleigh,” in The Faerie Queene, ed. A.C. Hamilton, 2nd ed. (London: 
Longman, 2001) p. 715.  
36 
 
Can neuer rest, vntill it forth haue brought 
Th’ eternall brood of glorie excellent.72 
 
strips heroism of any centrifugal or autarkic impulse and instead makes it an ethical 
vessel of producing self-disciplining of monarchical authority.73 
But, as any reader soon realizes, Spenser’s actual portrayal of heroism is far 
from univocal or straightforwardly ideological in the way that the “Letter to 
Raleigh” promises. As the text proceeds, Spenser seems to become more and more 
ambivalent about heroism’s place in, and consequences for, the national project in 
which the “Letter” enlists it. This ambivalence finds a complex culmination in the 
Faerie Queene’s fifth book, where the gap between the heroic ideality of Arthur and 
the heroic brutality of his semi-eponymous half-brother Artegall (along with his 
“yron page,” Talus) seems almost intentionally extreme. Shakespeare—by the time 
he composed Henry V—also registers a strong cynicism about heroism’s place in the 
production and maintenance of national community. The play’s prologue, as we saw 
a moment ago, provides an explicit statement of the function of heroic fantasy in the 
symbolic production of a national community. But as with the Faerie Queene, there is 
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a striking caesura between this theoretical statement and Shakespeare’s actual 
portrayal of heroism’s place in the political realm—a portrayal in which the 
ideological use of heroic community, of the fantasy of a heroic “band of brothers,” is 
revealed as part and parcel of ethically-ambiguous monarchical ambition.   
Indeed, Spenser and Shakespeare—writing in the last years of the 1590s—
point to a broader disenchantment of heroic politics that occurred in the closing 
years of the sixteenth century, and which provides the context for the different but 
equally pessimistic presentation of political heroics that we find in the work of 
Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman, as well as in Shakespeare’s own later tragic plays. It is 
something of a historiographical cliché that fin-de-siècle moments tend to be times of 
anxiety. But in the case of the sixteenth century, the verity turns out to be true.74  The 
final years of Elizabeth’s reign and the early years of James I’s were decades during 
which the penury of the state, the increasing authoritarianism of the crown, and both 
the Queen’s lack of a successor and uncertainty about the Scottish monarch who 
eventually filled the role resulted in a situation where “the anxiety of courtiers fused 
with the poverty of the crown and the competition for patronage to kindle 
factionalism, self-interest, and instability which—in the shape of Essex’s frustrated 
ambition— sparked an attempted coup.”75  And these particular political and social 
                                                     
74
 See Margreta de Grazia, “Fin-de-Siècle Renaissance,” in Fin-de-Siècle: English Poetry 1590, 1690, 
1790, 1890, 1990, ed. Elaine Scarry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996) pp. 37-63.  
75
 John Guy, “Introduction,” in The Reign of Elizabeth I: Court and Culture in the Last Decade, ed. John 
Guy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 1. See also Paul F.J. Hammer, The Polarisation of 
Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597 (Cambridge: 
38 
 
tensions were also bound up in a more ephemeral but nonetheless significant crisis 
in political experience itself—one in which, as we already noted, a broadly-based 
faith in the civic function of (elite) individual action was coming under increasing 
skepticism. This is not to say, of course, that earlier traditions of civic humanism and 
republicanism went away during the last years of the sixteenth century—they would 
persist into the English Civil War. Nor is it to say that the positive visions of national 
identity we just discussed somehow fell by the wayside. But the later years of the 
sixteenth century and the early years of the seventeenth were, in England, a period 
when the constituted power of the state was seen increasingly seen as being in 
opposition to an active political life.76  They were a period when an experience of 
political alienation—of a contradiction between the compulsion to (as Essex himself 
put it) “be active” and an institutional situation that conspired to “suppress all 
noble, virtuous, and heroical spirits”—was particularly prominent.77   
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Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare are all engaged with this 
alienation of political experience. The work of Sidney—who was, like Essex, a 
member of England’s aristocratic stratum—demonstrates a perspective on political 
experience parallel to that of Essex: by the end of the New Arcadia, Sidney is 
preoccupied by the inadequacy of aristocratic activity in collective life. And while 
Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare all occupied a different place in the social 
structure of the period, their texts also grapple with a political experience fissured by 
the discontinuity, the contradiction, between individual “action and capacity” and 
the harsh realities of political life. But while all of these writers use heroism to 
imaginatively work through the transformations political experience was 
undergoing in their own time, they also transform this collective crisis into the basis 
of a new sense of the autonomy of poetic production itself.  
In each of the chapters that follow, I want to trace this complex dialectic of 
political and poetic (im)possibility by tracking a particular key term in each writer’s 
work. In each of their texts, one particular signifier comes to function both as an 
object of heroic fantasy and a locus of that fantasy’s failure. Out of this failure, however, 
out of each writer’s encounter with heroism’s political impossibility, comes a newer 







In my first chapter—on Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia—the key term I focus on 
is virtue. In the Defense of Poesy, Sidney extols heroism as poetry’s greatest product, 
its most powerful way of leading “a man to virtue,” in the term’s Renaissance sense 
not only of conformity to moral norms but the possession of “divinely endowed gifts 
and powers,” of “properties” that “if cultivated by education” could “carry the 
authority of example and … change the world.”78  But although this coupling of 
heroism and an active, dynamic virtue runs through Sidney’s theoretical manifesto, 
his fictional writings reveal a remarkable ambivalence about the very possibility of an 
action-oriented and virtue-driven heroic practice in the real political world. Such 
skepticism is hinted at in earlier efforts like the so-called Old Arcadia and the sonnet 
sequence Astrophil and Stella. But Sidney’s doubts about the possibility of an 
heroically-active virtue only become undeniably and acidly corrosive in the New 
Arcadia, the vast and variegated prose romance he left incomplete at his 1586 death. 
In the New Arcadia we see the same dynamic drive, the same dynamic desire for 
action, that propels Sidney’s earlier writings. But increasingly—across the text’s 
almost Ariostoan abundance of character and incident—active heroism is portrayed 
as an impossible experience, undercut by a pervasive sense of alienation from the vita 
activa and of the aleatory and contingent character of a political world that seems 
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more and more outside the mastery of any individual agent. This progressive 
disenchantment culminates in the New Arcadia’s elevation of the Princess Pamela as a 
new heroic model, embodying a heroism where the dynamic activity of virtue is 
coupled with a constancy and passivity that internalize political potentiality in the 
face of collective life that no longer seems its unproblematic playing field.  
In the New Arcadia, then, Sidney confronts dynamic heroism’s impossibility 
by turning to a new, withdrawn, and passively powerful heroic form. But while 
scholars have often taken this late watershed in his work as being simply a symptom 
of the spread of withdrawn neo-stoic visions of ethics and politics in Europe’s late-
Renaissance elites, I argue that Sidney’s turn to Pamela at the end of the New Arcadia 
has another implication. 79   In the Defense, Sidney claims heroism is not only 
exemplary of how the poet can foster ethical action but also an indication of how the 
power of poetic creativity, “disdaining to be tied” to the tether of things as they are 
and “lifted up with the vigour of his own invention,” can “grow in effect another 
nature,” can pass from the “foolish world” of actuality into the pure potentiality of 
creative imagination.80  And I would argue that Pamela— although she certainly 
functions as an ethical exemplum (so much so that, as we will see, Charles I 
supposedly quoted her on the scaffold)—also embodies this poetic power: in her 
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aggressively aestheticized resistance to torture and bad luck and fortune she 
emerges not just as an ethical model of “conquering … doing with … suffering” but 
an aesthetic apparition of the autonomy fantasy from reality, of the poet’s “zodiac of 
wit” from the “truth of a foolish world.”81    
But while Pamela’s presentation in the New Arcadia suggests Sidney’s belief in 
the power of poetic imagination to transcend the limits of the political world, my 
second chapter, turns to a pair of texts—Marlowe’s Tamburlaine and Doctor Faustus—
where heroism’s confrontation with the imaginative and fantasmatic virtuality that 
results from its political impossibility is cast in a much bleaker light.  Although 
Marlowe’s plays—and his literary career in general—have long been read through 
the lenses of cultural marginality and otherness emphasized by the New Historicists, 
I start by suggesting that we should also read Marlowe’s life as characteristic of late 
sixteenth-century England’s substantial class of “alienated intellectuals,” the London 
lumpenliterati who had been trained, in the grammar schools and universities, for a 
gentlemanly life of participation in the polity, but whose hopes for translating their 
learning into political practice, their meditatio into praxis (as Gabriel Harvey wrote), 
faded in the later years of Elizabeth’s reign. 82   In his erotic epyllion Hero and Leander 
Marlowe speaks of these men as “fruitful wits” who, “aspiring” without an avenue 
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for ascent, “[s]hall discontent run into regions far”—and in fact the word wit, I 
suggest, serves in Marlowe’s work as a marker of the alienation of learning and 
poetic and political potentiality from actualization in collective life.83  But while 
many of Marlowe’s contemporaries tried to resolve this dilemma by portraying 
prodigal wit that actively retreats from political participation and responsibility (the 
prodigal wit of Robert Greene, say, or John Lyly’s Euphues),84 Marlowe organizes 
Tamburlaine around the fantasmatic reunification of wit and political life, of wit and 
the absolute action and absolute political becoming that the play dubs sovereignty. 
Tamburlaine, in other words, attempts an imaginative sublation of wit into sovereignty; a 
creative suturing of the split between potentiality and actuality, expectation and 
reality that beset Marlowe’s milieu. But as Marlowe realizes in Doctor Faustus, the 
attempt to enact this sublation is itself undeniably the product of a marginalization, 
of the negativity of political frustration. For Marlowe, in other words, heroism’s 
autonomous poetic power and its alienation from political life go symptomatically 
hand-in-hand. 
My third chapter takes up George Chapman’s Bussy D’Ambois, where we see 
a similar ambivalence between heroism’s political impossibility and its poetic power. 
Chapman had a lifelong preoccupation with the heroic, as evident as his three-
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decade project of translating Homer’s complete works. But he also had a strong 
skepticism toward the active and dynamic experience of the political initially 
embraced by Sidney and Marlowe, toward the “Actiue” men—as he puts it 
sneeringly in one later poem—who “consume their whole lifes fire, / In thirst of 
State-height, higher still and higher,” a skepticism that often leads him to try to strip 
the Iliad and Odyssey of their concrete political content with allegorical gymnastics 
that often baffle revved-up readers of Keats.85  But what is awkward in the Homer 
translations becomes the central and propulsive paradox of Bussy D’Ambois, a play 
whose portrayal of its titular lead-character oscillates (at times dizzyingly) between 
awe-struck admiration of his almost Herculean prowess and a harsh and satiric 
skepticism about such an identity’s hypocritical dissonance with both Bussy’s 
behavior and the Machiavellian milieu of the French royal court in which he rapidly 
ascends. In Chapman’s play, this central ambivalence orbits around the term policy, a 
marker of both political disenchantment and a dynamic heroic transcendence of it 
that are the play’s major and never-resolved alternatives. In Bussy D’Ambois, in other 
words, we see a productive tension between heroism as a spellbinding fantasy of 
dynamic potentiality—of a “complete man,” whose flames will join in the firmament 
with those of Hercules and “th’aged sky / Cheer with new sparks of old 
humanity”—and the comic absurdity of this figure’s real-world. 
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But while Chapman ultimately acknowledges the imaginative power of 
heroism, a harsher view of the heroic is evident in the text my fourth and final 
chapter examines: Shakespeare’s Macbeth. Taking up Macbeth at the tail end of a 
study of heroism is a somewhat counterintuitive move. When one thinks of 
Shakespeare and heroism the Scottish play does not usually spring to mind, and 
indeed Macbeth lacks any overt thematization of the heroic. But I argue that while 
Macbeth does not overtly thematize heroism, the play’s titular protagonist fully 
embodies the heroic ideal of violent action. At the same time, however, Macbeth also 
stages this ideal’s absolute failure. While other Shakespearean heroes (Hamlet, 
Brutus, Coriolanus) experience heroic action as being at odds with their 
circumstances, Macbeth presents individual heroic action as being essentially—
ontologically—inadequate. The play portrays a realization of the deep metaphysical 
inadequacy of human action to shape its political surroundings. In Macbeth, action 
can never exist as a “be-all” and “end-all.”  Instead, action is essentially ecstatic, 
displaced from itself. My final chapter traces these two themes of action and ecstasy 
through Shakespeare’s play. While critics have read Macbeth in terms of monarchy, 
witchcraft, and other contextual connections that hover on the play’s margins, I 
argue that Macbeth’s seemingly ahistorical philosophical preoccupations with action 
and free will actually position it as a final elegy for a political culture of action that 
was declining in the English Renaissance. 
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Macbeth, then, provides a fitting conclusion to Impossible Heroes—a final 
gesture toward  an understanding of heroism as both politically problematic and 
poetically powerful, as both speaking to the deep drives for individual autonomy 
and self-actualization that run through political life and posing a threat to the 
stability of collective existence. In the decades that followed Shakespeare’s play, 
heroism would be successfully tamed and incorporated into a state-based 
understanding and experience of the political: in a text like William Davenant’s 
Gondibert, for instance, heroic poetry is said to provide “collaterall help” to 
monarchical governance through its capacity to fashion militarized monarchical 
subjects.86   For Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare, however, heroism 
provides a much more complex nexus of both political impossibility and poetic 
potential, a final imaginative apparition of individual “action and capacity” at the 
cusp of political modernity where collective life would be increasingly mediated 
through the totalities of state, sovereignty, and representation. 
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Although it goes without saying that all of the writers taken up in the 
following pages were preoccupied with heroism, Philip Sidney is the only one them 
who has ever himself been described as heroic.  Prominent bardolaters of various 
stripes—from Carlyle to Wyndham Lewis to Harold Bloom—have seen Shakespeare 
as a kind of artistic/intellectual hero. And of course Marlowe has seemed, to some 
modern sensibilities, like his own sort of intellectually heroic critic of the tempora et 
mores of late Elizabethan England, a poet of otherness and inchoate ideology 
critique. But only Sidney has been attributed the traditional heroic hendiadys of 
sapience and fortitude and portrayed as a figure combining cultivation and literary 
élan with the military valor that was retroactively attributed to him after he was 
struck down by a Spanish bullet near the Dutch town of Zutphen in 1586. Sidney’s 
death was not, in itself, especially glorious or glamorous: he slowly withered away 
from gangrene over the course of a month, as a result of an accident in a skirmish in 
a largely fruitless war.1  But, like Byron and Jesus (and Janis Joplin and Jimi Hendrix) 
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Sidney attained in dying a stature he never would have been able to in life. He 
became the English Protestant military hero par excellence, a reputation that was 
consolidated in the so-called “Sidney Legend” that started with his lavish funeral, 
was further fostered by a slew of near-hagiographical memorial volumes and 
biographies published well into the seventeenth century, and persisted in England’s 
patriotic lore well after the Renaissance (Shelley, for instance, called Sidney “a spirit 
without spot” while Yeats cast him as a “perfect man”).2    
More recent scholarship on Sidney’s life, however, has uncovered a political 
career far more frustrated and fraught with complexities and difficulties than this 
older hagiographic tradition suggests.3  Born the son of a gentleman, Sidney was 
also the distaff nephew of and, for much of his life, heir presumptive to Robert 
Dudley, Earl of Leicester, one of Elizabeth’s most highly-placed and influential 
courtiers.4  While he was not fully aristocratic in lineage Sidney, throughout his early 
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education and continental tour (1572-75), was seen (and saw himself) as an up-and-
coming player in England’s politics, an aristocratic agent “born”—in the words of 
one contemporary writer—“for command.”5  But nevertheless, for almost all of his 
brief life Sidney was deeply frustrated in his ambitions and deprived, as his friend 
and later biographer Fulke Greville would write, of a “fit stage” for his “eminence to 
act upon.”6  Like many of England’s aristocrats in the late sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, Sidney’s political career was characterized by a lack of opportunities for 
“Action and Honor.” 7   It was characterized by a contradiction between the 
aristocratic impulse to “be active” and an increasingly authoritarian political 
situation that conspired to “oppress innocency, cancel merit … bury freedom, usurp 
sovereignty” and “suppress all noble, virtuous and heroical spirits.”8  I quote here, 
again, from the letters of Robert Devereux, second Earl of Essex, whose botched 1601 
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rebellion was the period’s most violent symptom of this contradiction. But Sidney’s 
own life was characterized by a similar tension, a similar sense of the alienation of 
aristocratic virtue from the vita activa that it demanded. 
The following chapter charts this alienation across Sidney’s writing by 
focusing on the place of virtue in his lifelong literary engagement with heroism. 
Throughout its complex history in classical, medieval, and early modern political 
culture, virtue marked a vision of collective life that was understood and 
experienced not through the abstract totalities of sovereignty, state, and 
representation but, instead, as the site of individual action on a heroic scale. Jointly 
derived from the Latin vir (man) and vis (power, strength), the term encompassed 
both a masculinized, militarized violence and a more capacious civic ideal of 
individual potentiality and excellence. 9   These two senses run through virtue’s 
polymeric history in political thought, from classical Latin representations of virtus 
through Machiavelli’s princely and republican virtù. 10  And they filter into the 
classicized aristocratic humanism of Sidney’s own milieu, a milieu where, as 
historian Blair Worden writes, virtue marked not just an adherence to moral norms 
but also, and more importantly, “the possession of divinely endowed gifts and 
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powers”—“properties” that, “if cultivated by education” could “carry the authority 
of example and … change the world.”11    
Such an understanding of virtue runs across Sidney’s work, from the 
extolling of “gallant activity” in his early masque The Lady of May to the Old Arcadia’s 
“praise of honourable action” and an active life through which the “mind should 
best know his own good or evil by practice” (MW 11, OA 113).12   This active version 
of virtue, however, is treated with increasing skepticism in Sidney’s later writings—
a skepticism that fundamentally alters his attitudes toward and representations of 
heroism. In the Defense of Poesy, Sidney sees heroism as the poetic form most capable 
of cultivating virtue, of blasting away “foggy desires” with a magnanimous vision of 
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virtuous action capable of remaking the world through its “well-doing” (MW 231). 
But in Sidney’s most intensive and extensive fictional portrayal of heroism—the 
revised version of the Countess of Pembroke’s Arcadia that was left unfinished at his 
death in 1586—virtue is represented as increasingly inadequate and impotent in a 
collective world Sidney increasingly sees as being beyond the control of individuals 
who are knocked about “like tennis balls tossed on the racket of the higher powers” 
(NA 817).  
But the New Arcadia’s attitudes toward virtue and heroism are not completely 
negative. Even as Sidney’s text becomes increasingly skeptical of an actively- and 
outwardly-oriented politics of virtue, it also articulates a new vision of virtue, not as 
an active principle of “well-doing” but rather as a passive strength in the face of 
uncontrollable contingency. This new version of virtue is at the core of his portrayal 
of the Princess Pamela. In the New Arcadia, Pamela embodies a heroism where the 
calamities and contingencies of an aleatory, alienated vision of politics are portrayed 
as the “exercise” rather than the “overthrow of … virtue” (464). And, in doing so, 
she models a new mode of political experience—one in which the alienation of an 
active political impulse is dialectically overcome through the internalization of 
dynamic, heroic individual potential.  Scholars have long seen Sidney’s portrayal of 
Pamela as signaling a watershed in Sidney’s idea of the heroic. Some critics have 
called her a “complete study” in the “reconciliation” between the traditional heroic 
binary of active military feats versus passive constancy, while more recent writers 
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have wanted to read Pamela as reflecting shifts in Elizabethan and Jacobean high 
culture away from a Ciceronian ideal of public participation and into a more 
withdrawn stoic perspective of political disenchantment.13   But while my analysis 
draws on both approaches, I claim that Pamela’s transfiguration and transformation 
of virtue and heroism should be ultimately understood in terms of the internal 
dynamics and dialectics of Sidney’s own work. It should be understood as the final 
moment of Sidney’s lifelong use of heroism to come to grips with the contending 
concepts of the political at play in late sixteenth-century English culture. 
Thus, to fully understand the New Arcadia’s presentation of Pamela’s heroism 
I first need to turn to Sidney’s work more broadly. Particularly I need to deal with 
the fact that the New Arcadia is not a stand-alone composition but, rather, a kind of 
literary palimpsest, one that Sidney constructed on the foundation provided by the 
first three books of an earlier composition critics commonly call the Old Arcadia (c. 
1579-81). Composed in the late 1570s and early 1580s, the Old Arcadia is a tightly-
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structured prose romance interspersed with verse eclogues, indebted in foreconceit 
to continental writers of pastoral romance like Jacopo Sanazarro.14  It circulated 
privately, but was never published. Instead, in the mid-1580s Sidney decided to 
revise and expand the text—a project that ended when he was fatally wounded in 
battle in 1586. In the wake of Sidney’s death, these two versions of the Arcadia had a 
complex, gnarled publishing history: both Sidney’s sister Mary, Countess of 
Pembroke, and his friend Fulke Greville published rival and different versions of the 
revised Arcadia. 15   But for our purposes the particulars of this history are less 
important than the fact that the original Old Arcadia—not discovered in its entirety 
until 190816—reveals a vision of the political and political experience sharply at odds 
with the view of collective life and of heroism that emerge in the New Arcadia. And it 
is with this earlier vision of politics and heroism that I want to begin. 
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First, though, I want to provide some preliminary plot summary, as both the 
Old and the New Arcadia have an almost Ariostan abundance of accident and 
character that are so difficult to keep track of that even readers in Sidney’s own day 
had to resort to dramatis personae and summary overviews.17    
The story of the Old Arcadia is set in a semi-historical Greece and begins when 
the ruler of Arcadia, Duke Basilius, seeks the advice of the Delphic Oracle about the 
future. He is informed that his older daughter, Pamela, “shall from thy careful face / 
By princely mean be stolen”; that his younger daughter, Philoclea, “shall with 
nature’s bliss embrace / An uncouth love”; that “with thy wife adult’ry thou shall 
commit”; and—finally—“in thy throne a foreign state shall sit” (OA 5). 
Understandably upset with this prediction, the Duke decides to retire to a rural 
existence with his family, placing the care of his kingdom in the hands of his 
“friend” and counselor, Philanax. Meanwhile two foreign princes—the cousins 
Pyrocles and Musidorus—are traveling through Arcadia when Pyrocles, after 
chancing across a portrait of Philoclea, finds himself incapacitated by sudden love 
for her. Though reprimanded by Musidorus, Pyrocles discovers the location of the 
royal family’s rural retreat and decides to disguise himself as an Amazon named 
(appropriately enough) Cleophila, to get closer to the Princess. Musidorus 
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disapproves, but ends up following Pyrocles into Basilius’ rural retreat, disguising 
himself as the shepherd Dorus, and before long falling in love with the other 
princess, Pamela.  
This complex set up soon leads to an even more contorted series of events. 
Philoclea starts reciprocating the feelings of the disguised Pyrocles (with much 
confusion ensuing, since she still thinks he’s a woman). Gynecia, the mother of the 
princesses and the wife of Basilius, falls for the disguised Pyrocles (whom she 
realizes is not a woman). And, to top it all off, Basilius falls for the disguised 
Pyrocles, too (thinking that he is a woman). This comic situation forms the nexus of 
the Old Arcadia. But in the text’s later books, it leads to tragic results. The princes 
decide to defy parental and paternal authority, each absconding with the sister with 
whom he is enamored. And this results in a chain reaction that ultimately ends up 
with Basilius apparently dead, the princes, princesses and Gynecia imprisoned, 
major unrest among the nobility and the people, and, ultimately, the arrival and 
temporary elevation of Euarchus, the King of neighboring Macedon, and the father 
of Pyrocles, to preside over the fallen royals’ trial and dispose the disjoined and 
disheveled Arcadian polity.  The Old Arcadia’s last two books focus on the trial, 
which results in the Princes being sentenced to death. This tragic conclusion, 
however, is ultimately avoided when Basilius (only apparently dead) comes to and 
all is set right.  
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As this short summary demonstrates, the plot of the Old Arcadia is complex, 
and most critics have understandably approached this complexity in terms of 
Sidney’s borrowings from and adaptations of earlier Spanish, French, and Italian 
pastoral romances. But in terms of the Old Arcadia’s engagement with politics, I 
would argue that equally important is Sidney’s use of Terentian comedy as an 
overarching generic framework. Sidney’s text explicitly emphasizes its debts to 
Terentian comedy: the Old Arcadia’s five “books” are also referred to as “acts,” and 
the narrator repeatedly turns to theatrical tropes to describe the action he portrays, 
claiming in the first book, for instance, that “love had purposed to make in these 
solitary woods a perfect demonstration of his unresistable force, to show that no 
desert place can avoid his mark” and that “fortune had framed a very stage-play of 
love among these few folks” (OA 45, 49).  Commentators have noted this debt to 
comedy’s generic framework, but have read it largely as a literary-historical 
phenomenon. 18   I want to argue, however, that the Old Arcadia’s Terentian 
framework cuts to the core of the text’s assumptions about the political and about 
political experience. 
But first, a basic point about how comedy was understood when Sidney 
wrote. Renaissance writers understood comedy through a theoretical framework 
that derived from classical commentaries on the texts of the Roman playwrights, 
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particularly Terence.19  This tradition’s most influential text was Donatus’ fourth-
century fragment De Comoedia et Tragoedia, where comedy is seen as being structured 
around the fundamental binary of desire and social norm. “Comedy,” Donatus 
claims, is a form of “drama containing the various designs of public and private 
individuals’ desires.”20  Through seeing such desires unfold, comedy’s audiences 
learn “what is useful in life and what, on the other hand, ought to be avoided.”21  
Comedy, that is to say, has a profoundly pedagogical function—a pedagogical 
function based in the norms of community, in the imperative to communal political 
stability. Indeed, Donatus suggests that the primal “motive and origin of comedy” 
came from the ancient Athenians’ wish “to preserve the propriety of Attica and 
brand those who were living an immoral life” by publically performing and thus 
rebuking the vices of those in the community.22  And while the idea that comedy is 
based in the dialectic of desire versus norm is, of course, ubiquitous across the 
comedic writing of the English Renaissance (from Shakespeare’s portrayal of how 
Mistresses Page and Ford thwart Falstaff’s intrusion on the communal stability of 
Windsor to Jonson splaying and scourging of the “humorous” excesses of London), 
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Sidney’s Old Arcadia gives it a unique political inflection.23   Particularly, the Old 
Arcadia uses its Terentian framework to present the traditional aristocratic model of 
political experience and political organization that the New Arcadia will go on to 
radically undermine.24   
In the introduction I argued that traditional English political culture balanced 
political-theological hierarchy with an emphasis on the dynamic participation, the 
dynamic action, of the enfranchised elite. The monarchical “form of government,” as 
John Pym wrote in the 1620s, was meant to “actuate and dispose every part and 
member of a state to the common good; and as those parts give strength and 
ornament to the whole, so they receive from it again strength and protection in their 
several stations and degrees.”   This notion of politics as involving a kind of dynamic 
reciprocity between ruler and ruled was particularly important in England’s 
aristocratic political culture, a political culture that was, as historian Mervyn James 
puts it, “essentially pluralistic,” had “little room” for concepts of abstract, alienated, 
and absolute sovereignty, and orbited—above all—around an ideal of politics-qua-
personal self-actualization.25  It conceived political life as an aristocratic vita activa in 
which nobility could find an avenue of self-actualization, in which it could chart an 
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active, dynamic, “forward”-moving “virtuous course.”26  From the point of view of 
this understanding of the political, kingship was less about absolute rule than it was 
about fostering well-doing and virtuous activity. Good kingship entailed a model of 
rule that Sidney sums up well in his portrait of the Macedonian king Euarchus, 
whose very name (meaning “good rule” in Greek) signals his exemplarity: 
 
Euarchus did not further exceed his meanest subject with the 
greatness of his fortune than he did surmount the greatness of his 
fortune with the greatness of his mind; in so much that those things 
which oftentimes the best sort think rewards of virtue, he held them 
not at so high price, but esteemed them servants to well doing, the 
reward of virtue being in itself; on which his inward love was so fixed 
that it never was dissolved into other designs, but keeping his 
thoughts true to themselves, was neither beguiled with the printed 
gloss of pleasure nor dazzled with the false light of ambition. This 
made the line of his actions straight and always like itself, no worldly 
thing being able to shake the constancy of it … and [he] never forgot 
that his office was to maintain the Macedonians in the exercise of 
goodness and happy enjoying their natural lives. (OA 309) 
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Here, monarchy is not an absolute “greatness” overawing its subjects. It is, rather, a 
mode of exercising virtue and allowing subjects to do the same. But while this is the 
baseline political ideal of the Old Arcadia, what the text actually shows is the erosion 
of this ideal by sexual desire. Erotic passion is what distracts Basilius from his 
monarchical duties in his fearful flight from the Delphic oracle as well as in his 
pursuit of the disguised Pyrocles. It is what distracts Gynecia as well as the 
disguised Princes from their own political duties. And while at first, in the early 
books of the Old Arcadia, passion’s triumph over political norms is treated with a 
fairly gentle levity, the result of this triumph is treated with increasing bleakness in 
the later sections of Sidney’s text.  
The consequences of aristocratic passion run amok start to become clear at 
the end of the Old Arcadia’s second book, where Arcadia’s peasants, upset by 
Basilius’ absentee monarchy, rebel. Significantly, Sidney juxtaposes this rebellion 
with what is probably the most egregious example of the two Princes’ failure to live 
up to their aristocratic social roles. This is the scene when Musidorus, overwhelmed 
with desire, decides to rape Pamela. In Sidney’s description of this decision, political 
and military metaphorics are ubiquitous. Desires, he writes, 
 
… did so tyrannize over Musidorus’s affects that he was compelled to 
put his face as low to hers as he could, sucking the breath with such 
joy that he did determine in himself there had been no life to a 
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chameleon’s, if he might be suffered to enjoy that food. But each of 
these having a mighty working in his heart, all joined together did so 
draw his will into the nature of their confederacy that now his promise 
began to have but a fainting force, and each thought that rase against 
those desires was received as but a stranger to his counsel, well 
experiencing in himself that no vow is so strong as the avoiding of 
occasions; so that rising softly from her, overmastered with the fury of 
delight, having all his senses partial against himself and inclined to his 
well beloved adversary, he was bent to take advantage of the 
weakness of the watch, and see whether at that season he could win 
the bulwark before timely help might come. (OA 177) 
 
Amidst his own crisis of conscience, Shakespeare’s Brutus observes that in moments 
of ethical confusion the “state of man” is like “to a little kingdom” that “suffers” an 
“insurrection.”27  And here, inner psychomachia and outward civil strife also go hand 
and hand. The triumph of sexual desire over moral restraint is framed as the 
triumph of a “confederacy” of libidinal forces over the Princely superego. For 
Sidney, however, the political inflection of Musidorus’s internal crisis is not merely 
metaphorical. For almost immediately after he attempts to rape Pamela, a real-world 
rebellion interrupts him as a “dozen clownish villains, armed with divers sorts of 
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weapons” and in the process of rebelling against the Arcadian government arrive on 
the scene and promptly capture the Princess and the disguised Prince (177). 28 
Musidorus’ failed rape and the peasant rebellion with which it coincides (and 
which is, we should remember, caused by Basilius’ absentee rule) set into motion the 
turn from Terentian comedy to tragedy that runs through the Old Arcadia’s last two 
books.29  In these books, the consequences of letting passion trump reason are driven 
home with great force, and the concluding restoration of order suggests a final 
endorsement of what Jeff Dolven has recently dubbed the “stoic note” that sounds 
throughout the Old Arcadia’s ethical thinking: an ultimate acceptance of the 
combination of rational autonomy and devotion to public duty folded into Cicero’s 
category of officium—an idea of almost immeasurable influence in the Ciceronian 
popular philosophy so dominant in the political culture of later sixteenth-century 
England.30  Sidney’s ultimate acceptance of this Ciceronian framework, I would 
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 Indeed, the Old Arcadia’s second eclogues, which follow and explicitly comment upon this peasant 
rebellion, provide the text’s most extensive elaboration of the philosophical and ethical problematic of 
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Cambridge University Press, 2006). I borrow the notion of “Ciceronian Popular Philosophy” from Hegel, 
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suggest, is the basic political postulate of the Old Arcadia. This is not to say that 
Sidney’s text can be reduced to a simple, standard Ciceronianism. From Blair 
Worden’s work on the Old Arcadia’s topical political allegory to Debora Shuger’s 
analysis of its complex engagement with issues of judicial equity, Sidney scholarship 
has shown the thick multiplicity of the text’s political investments and 
engagements.31  But I want to emphasize that the Old Arcadia’s baseline political 
point of view defines the political in terms of the horizon of a polity understood in 
terms of offices, duties, and roles.32    
However, the text also hints at another important component of Sidney’s 
political understanding and his work’s preoccupation with political experience. This 
is what I have earlier called a dynamic political experience—which is connected with 
a dynamic model of virtue. Such a model of virtue is emphasized very early in the 
text. When Pyrocles first falls in love with Philoclea, he has a debate with Musidorus 
about the traditional topos of the active versus the contemplative life. During this 
                                                                                                                                                              
whose discussion is perhaps less valuable than the coinage itself: see Hegel, Lectures on the History of 
Philosophy, vol. 3 (London: Routledge, 1955) p. 113. 
31
 See Worden, Sound of Virtue, and Debora Shuger, “Castigating Livy: The Rape of Lucretia and The Old 
Arcadia,” Renaissance Quarterly 51 (1998) pp. 526-48. 
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 For reasons of space I am shunting the rather complicated issue of just where Sidney’s opinion finally 
falls on the matter of the Princes’ condemnation. Shuger sees Euarchus’ condemnation as a flagrant 
violation of the expectation that Princes deserve equity for their sexual peccadilloes—a reading also 
endorsed by David Norbrook, for whom “Sidney clearly expects his readers to feel the injustice of treating 
nobles and magnanimous princes in the same way as anyone else” (Poetry and Politics in the English 
Renaissance, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002] p. 101). Even if we accept this point, 
however, I would argue that Euarchus is still set up as an ideal ruler: there is not the faintest whiff of irony 
in the praise that is heaped upon him, in both the Old and the New Arcadia, and that the issue of equity is 
ultimately peripheral to the basic kingship-based political understanding that undergirds the Old Arcadia. 
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debate, Musidorus provides a compact summary of Sidney’s concept of a political 
vita activa, organized and oriented around political virtue: 
 
A mind well trained and long exercised in virtue, my sweet and 
worthy cousin, doth not easily change any course it once undertakes 
but upon well grounded and well weighed causes; for being witness 
to itself of his own inward good, it finds nothing without it of so high 
a price for which it should be altered. Even the very countenance and 
behaviour of such a man doth show forth images of the same 
constancy by maintaining a right harmony betwixt it and the inward 
good in yielding itself suitable to the virtuous resolutions of the mind. 
(OA 12) 
 
The Old Arcadia thus establishes this vision of virtue early on. However, the rest of 
the text portrays the negation of this active model of political experience by the forces 
of desire. But when Sidney turned to revise the Old Arcadia, he went back to this 
dynamic vision of the political. This is particularly true in the New Arcadia’s second 
book, where Sidney elaborates the back-story of Pyrocles and Musidorus, filling in 
(through the retrospective accounts of several narrators) the heroic exploits the 
Princes engaged in before entering Arcadia and falling in love with Basilius’ 
daughters—exploits that the Old Arcadia’s humbler narrator claimed was “for a 
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higher style than mine” (OA 37). In the New Arcadia’s retrospective narration, Sidney 
demonstrates the concrete playing-out of a dynamic model of political experience. In 
the rest of the New Arcadia, however, he goes on to stage the failure of this heroic 
model of political experience and the understanding of virtue on which it is based, 
while also putting forward a new model of heroism and a new model of virtue in the 
form of his revised version of the Princess Pamela.  
 
III 
Sidney starts his retrospective narration of Pyrocles and Musidorus with an 
account of their education. The two Princes, we learn, are the heirs to different Greek 
kingdoms, but they grew up together at the Macedonian court, where they were 
schooled in princely, heroic virtues. Sidney describes such schooling in great detail, 
and his account draws heavily on the long line of education-of-rulers literature that 
goes back as far as Plato’s Republic and Xenophon’s Cyropaeidea and which found 
Renaissance variations in texts like Thomas Elyot’s Book of the Governour and 
Spenser’s Faerie Queene.33  But while oftentimes this sort of writing tries, in fictional 
and semi-fictional forms, to stage the particulars of how ideal rulers are trained and 
brought up, Sidney’s truncated account of princely education focuses less on 
particulars and more on the subjective scene of their training. In it, he provides a 
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 On education and Sidney’s Arcadia, see Jeff Dolven’s account of both redactions of the text in Scenes of 
Instruction. On the Cyropaeidea’s impact on Sidney’s account of the Princes’ education more particularly 
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sketch of a fully dynamic and fully heroic form of political experience—precisely the 
experience that the Princes will go on to actualize in the world (but whose 
inadequacies Sidney also eventually suggests). 
Sidney begins his account with his own heroic-aristocratic version of what 
Lacan called the mirror stage. 34   Even as pre-linguistic infants Pyrocles and 
Musidorus are bombarded with practical knowledge regarding the rudiments of 
aristocratic public life—with “images of battles and fortifications” (NA 258). But they 
are also bombarded with powerful and passion-raising exempla, stories of “worthy 
princes” aimed at both teaching them how to “do nobly” and giving them the 
impetus to put that knowledge into practice. In The Defense of Poesy, Sidney speaks of 
the ways in which heroic poesy directs desire at the “beauty of virtue,” of fully 
heroic actualized potentiality. And this proper channeling of desire is what is 
fostered by the Princes’ education, a process that comes through in the following 
passage: 
 
… almost before they could perfectly speak, they began to receive 
conceits not unworthy of the best speakers, excellent devices being 
used, to make even their sports profitable: images of battles and 
fortifications being then delivered to their memory, which after, their 
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 See, of course, Jacques Lacan, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience,” in Écrits: A Selection, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: Norton, 2002) pp. 3-9. 
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stronger judgments might dispense, the delight of tales being 
converted to the knowledge of all the stories of worthy princes, both 
to move them to do nobly and teach them how to do nobly; the beauty 
of virtue still being set before their eyes, and that taught them with far 
more diligent care than grammatical rules; their bodies exercised in all 
abilities both of doing and suffering, and their minds acquainted by 
degrees with dangers; and in sum, all bent to the making up of 
princely minds… (NA 258-9) 
 
The first thing to notice, here, is Sidney’s striking departure from his usual stylistic 
tendencies.  The “Arcadian Rhetoric” that characterizes Sidney’s prose across his 
entire career is usually characterized by a patterned balance similar to other 
rhetorical schools (Ciceronianism, Euphuism). But it also puts far less emphasis on 
“blocked out … parallel clauses of more or less equal length” and more emphasis on 
what Jonas Barish calls “logicality”—that is, “treating a piece of discourse as 
argument …  tracking effects back to causes … discovering consequences from 
antecedents, elucidating premises, proposing hypotheses, and the like.” 35   This 
tendency is evident everywhere in Sidney’s writing. It shows up (to take a semi-
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 The first of these quotations is from Frances Yates’s description of the style Sidney instituted in John 
Florio: The Life of an Italian in Shakespeare’s England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934) p. 
226; the second is from Jonas Barish’s brilliant Ben Jonson and the Language of Prose Comedy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960) p. 23. Barish is not talking specifically about Sidney, 
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random instance) in the letter that Basilius’ advisor, Philanax, writes to him early in 
the New Arcadia, in a failed attempt to persuade the King not to abdicate his throne 
in order to prevent the Delphic Oracle’s prophecy from coming true: 
 
I would then have said that wisdom and virtue be the only destinies 
appointed to man to follow, whence we ought to seek all our 
knowledge, since they be such guides as cannot fail; which, besides 
their inward comfort, do lead so direct a way of proceeding as either 
prosperity must ensue, or, if the wickedness of the world should 
oppress it, it can never be said that evil happeneth to him who falls 
accompanied with virtue. (NA 80) 
 
The sinews of Sidney’s prose, here, are logical. His clauses are balanced and 
symmetrical as Sidney has Philanax put forward a model of virtue based on 
prudence, reflection, and mental-moral constancy. But both this stylistic structure 
and the model of virtue it uses to advocate are pushed aside in the New Arcadia’s 
account of the Princes’ education. Take, for instance, the one long sentence that 
constitutes his description of the Princes’ upbringing just quoted. In it, we see a 
breathless forward momentum that is facilitated by a sloppy and at points confusing 
use of present participles (“being used…” “being then…” “being converted…” 
“being set before their eyes…”) to coordinate the sentence’s subsections. Sidney’s 
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writing, here, reads less like the Arcadia’s usual sentences and more like the 
“exploded periods” that appear in later, seventeenth-century prose writers like 
Robert Burton. 36   With each clause, the tabulae rasae of the young Princes are filled 
with an ever-ripening knowledge and capacity. And this hurtles forward, on the 
syntactic level, toward the ultimate teloi of action and agency as the two of them are 
 
brought up so that all the sparks of virtue which nature had kindled in 
them were so blown to give forth their uttermost heat, that, justly it 
may be affirmed, they inflamed the affections of all that knew them. 
(NA 258) 
 
What Sidney sketches here—in other words—is a vision of virtue as both the origin 
and the terminus of a fundamentally dynamic experience of political life.    
In the rest of the New Arcadia’s retrospective narration of Pyrocles and 
Musidorus, this model of political experience is at the core of their heroic exploits. 
Sidney’s portrayal of these heroic exploits is interesting, particularly his initial 
account of their educations. At one point, the narration notes that the Pyrocles and 
Musidorus are instilled with a “habit of commanding” that makes them opposed to 
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“tyranny” (NA 259). In its immediate context, this mention of tyranny seems 
puzzling, strange, and almost asyndetic. But in the rest of Sidney’s narration of the 
Princes’ active, heroic adventures will, in fact, repeatedly juxtapose their heroic 
political experience with tyranny. Tyranny becomes the dialectical opposite of virtue 
throughout the New Arcadia’s second book, and by tracing the Princes’ encounters 
with tyrannical regimes we can trace the way in which Sidney both elaborates and 
extols an active model of virtue based in a dynamic mode of political experience. 
This is evident in the first of their adventures. Toward the end of their 
education, Pyrocles and Musidorus develop the desire to embark “to the practice of 
those virtues which they before learned,” and so they depart from Macedon by sea 
(259). Before long, however, they encounter a storm and are separated after their 
ship sinks. This storm delivers “sweet Pyrocles into the stormy mind” of a tyrant, the 
tyrannical king of Phrygia who, fearing some sort of Macedonian invasion of his 
territory, decides to execute the Prince (266). The story that follows, as many readers 
would have known, presents the Princes through the lens of the famous story of 
Damon and Pythias and their encounter with the tyrant Dionysius—a myth that was 
often read as exemplifying both friendship (in the classical Aristotelian-Ciceronian 
tradition) and opposition to tyranny.37  In the classical tradition, from Aristotle to 
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Aquinas, tyranny was seen as being opposed to both friendship and virtue.38  And 
Sidney reworks this classical legacy in his portrait of the Princes’ conflict with the 
Phrygian king to emphasize the binary distinction between the constituent power of 
virtue and the frozen, dead, constituted power of tyranny.39 
The King of Phrygia is described as “a prince of melancholy constitution of 
both body and mind; wickedly sad, ever musing of horrible matters; suspecting, or 
rather condemning all men of evil, because his mind had no eye to espy goodness” 
(265), and Sidney’s emphasis on melancholy here is significant. This humoral 
affliction is, of course, a familiar concern in the early modern period broadly, from 
the Florentine Platonists to the malcontents of the English popular stage.40  But one 
particularly frequent feature of how melancholy was understood in the Renaissance 
was as being a state-of-mind prone to the total negation of human virtue. Shades of 
this appear throughout the great melancholic writers of the period—for instance 
Montaigne, who saw classical concepts of virtue as an heroic activity and 
actualization of human potential as patently absurd in the face of the inherent 
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fragility and weakness of human subjects.41  And this sense of melancholy is also 
present in Sidney’s account of Phrygia’s nameless king. In Sidney’s portrayal of the 
king, tyranny is presented as a repression of potentiality, of the dynamic becoming of 
virtue. The Phrygian king lets “nothing pass which might bear the colour of a fault, 
without sharp punishment: and when he wanted faults, excellency grew a fault; and 
it was sufficient to make one guilty, that he had power to be guilty” (265). He is a 
perfect fictional embodiment of the common classical, medieval, and early modern 
idea that tyrants, as Thomas Aquinas wrote, “always suspect the good rather than 
the wicked, and are ever afraid of virtue”; that  
 
They seek always to hinder their subjects from becoming virtuous, 
and from growing in magnanimity of soul, lest they become restless 
under unjust government: they prevent them from establishing ties of 
friendship and from enjoying the benefit of fraternal peace, so that 
being always suspicious one of the other they can never combine 
against the tyrant’s power.42    
 
In Aquinas’ account, tyranny represses the constituent power, the dynamic 
becoming, of virtue.  And indeed this is how Sidney understands tyranny 
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throughout his work. Scholars of Sidney’s work have long noted his preoccupation 
with tyranny, and have especially emphasized Sidney’s personal and intellectual 
connections with a number of continental Protestant intellectuals—most 
significantly Hubert Languet—who were at the forefront of an anti-tyrannical 
discourse of resistance theory which argued for the right and power of aristocrats to 
resist monarchical power, especially on issues of religion.43   It is beyond doubt that 
Sidney was familiar with this particular political theory, and with the skeptical view 
that (as Languet wrote to him in an early letter) “virtue is more often the cause of 
ruin than vice for men of high rank” under monarchical forms of government.44  But 
despite Sidney’s obvious sympathy to continental Protestant activists, I would argue 
that his understanding of tyranny is differently inflected than the vision of tyranny 
that we see emerge in Languet’s letters, or in the influential anti-tyrannical tract 
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos which many modern scholars conjecture Languet at least 
partially authored.45  Thinkers like Languet were concerned with the ways in which 
tyranny could serve as a theoretical justification for the autonomy of the Protestant 
aristocracy throughout continental Europe.46 But Sidney’s political assumptions (as 
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Martin Ratiere has persuasively argued) came out of a more conservative English 
political culture, one that assumed the necessity of monarchical governance and was 
less concerned with overthrowing monarchical regimes than it was with preserving 
aristocratic enfranchisement, activity, and virtue.47 
This set of assumptions colored Sidney’s own view of tyranny—as becomes 
clear in his most extensive elaboration of the concept, the so-called “Ister Bank” 
eclogue that appears in the Old Arcadia. “Ister Bank” interrogates the origins of 
political authority and the relation between aristocracy and monarchy by way of an 
Aesopian beast fable. Once (the story runs) the world was inhabited solely by 
animals. But while this pre-human political order was fairly placid, eventually a 
desire emerged among the animals for a single ruler. So the “multitude” presented a 
suit to Jove “for to have a king” (OA 223). Reluctantly, the god plucked properties 
from each animal kind: craft from the fox, melancholy from the cat, and so forth, 
eventually creating man. But man quickly started behaving not like the benevolent 
monarch he was intended to be. Instead, “when his seat so rooted he had found” 
that the origins of his power in the animal aristocracy were forgotten and the beasts 
“now skilled not how from him to wend” man turned into a tyrant, murdering, 
pillaging, and sowing dissent among his subjects (223). Sidney’s fable ends with an 
admonition to the animals to “Deem it no glorie to swell in tyranny” and that they 
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should “in patience bide your hell / Or know your strengths, and then you shall do 
well” (OA 225).  
“Ister Bank” paints a fairly conventional portrait of the origins of political 
authority as involving a fall from a more equal golden age.48  We see a similar 
account of the pre-historic origins of political authority, for instance, in one of his 
friend Fulke Greville’s sonnets from his sequence Caelica: 
 
The Golden-Age was when the world was yong,  
Nature so rich, as Earth did need no sowing,  
Malice not knowne, the Serpents had not stung,  
Wit was but sweet Affections ouerflowing.49  
 
For Greville as much as Sidney, this golden age is an inaccessible utopian past, 
opposed to a postlapsarian political present that requires monarchical rule. In “Ister 
Bank” the issue is not ultimately whether there should be monarchical governance 
but, rather, whether such monarchical governance generates a situation in which the 
individual potentialities, the individual virtues, the individual “strengths” of those 
subject to monarchy are repressed. This failure of such “strengths” is what happens 
in the fable, and this—for Sidney—is the definition of tyranny. In the face of such 
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tyranny, “Ister Bank” concludes by advocating that the fable’s animals “know their 
strengths” while patiently enduring the “hell” of their repression. But in the New 
Arcadia’s retrospective narrative, Sidney provides another version of how active 
virtue can relate to political repression: one in which virtue allows for the restitution 
of proper monarchical governance embodied by Pyrocles and Musidorus (who are 
themselves monarchical, the children of monarchs and the heirs to kingdoms who 
have been trained to “command” and “rule”) rather than its more radical rejection. 
We see the contrast between proper and tyrannical monarchy with particular 
clarity in the contrasting character sketches Sidney provides of the king of Phrygia 
and Musidorus (who, at this point in the narrative, has arrived on the scene to try to 
save Pyrocles). When he arrives, Musidorus seeks refuge with a Phrygian nobleman 
and decides to offer himself up to take the place of his cousin on the scaffold. In 
setting up the dramatic pre-execution scene that ensues, Sidney begins by describing 
the tyrant. His initial description of the Phrygian king emphasizes his choice of 
“terribleness” over “nobleness”—a term that, in Sidney’s milieu, had a similar set of 
associations as “virtue” and marked a political practice based in a “forward”-
moving “virtuous course.”50  Instead of pursuing this course of action, however, the 
Phrygian tyrant 
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… having quite lost the way of nobleness … strave to climb to the 
height of terribleness; and thinking to make all men a-dread to make 
such one an enemy who would not spare nor fear to kill so great a 
prince, and lastly, having nothing in him why to make him his friend, 
he thought he would take him away from being his enemy. (266) 
 
An aristocratic ethical life of friendship and virtuous “well-doing” is displaced, here, 
by a grim, almost proto-Schmittian version of politics as a sphere of constant 
antagonism bordering on the brink of bloodshed.51  For Sidney’s unnamed tyrant, 
power is totally constituted, walled off from what it rules over. We see, here, the polar 
opposite of the model of monarchy earlier embodied—in the Old Arcadia—by 
Euarchus. And unsurprisingly, Sidney’s portrait of the nameless tyrant contrasts 
strongly with his portrait of Musidorus: 
 
… the princely youth, of invincible valour yet so unjustly subjected to 
such outrageous wrong, carrying himself in all his demeanour so 
constantly, abiding extremity, that one might see it was the cutting 
away of the greatest  hope of the world and destroying virtue in his 
sweetest growth. (266) 
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At the core of this moment of ethopoeia is a vision of virtue as the site of a dynamic 
becoming that cannot be thwarted even by extremely adverse circumstances. Even 
under the shadow of “outrageous wrong” and imminent death, Musidorus is still an 
exemplary vision of dynamic heroic becoming—such that his pending execution will 
signal the “cutting away of the greatest hope” of the world, a suffocation of virtue’s 
“sweetest growth”—an organic metaphor that further foregrounds the contrast 
between the dynamic, almost biological vitality of Musidorus and the deadened, 
frozen authority of Phrygian tyrant. 
The subsequent events of Sidney’s story bear out this opposition between 
these two figures. On the verge of execution—“acknowledging themselves subject to 
death” and “meaning only to do honor to their princely birth”—Musidorus and 
Pyrocles join forces in a near-suicidal final stand against the military forces of the 
Phrygian king. After doing “such wonders beyond belief” in their “just rage and 
desperate virtue,” they force the king to flee (NA 270). Eventually he is killed, and in 
the ensuing tumult the Princes are forced to dispose of the Phrygian government. 
Here, Musidorus and Pyrocles further prove their princely bona fides by steering 
Phrygia away from a “popular license” that Sidney equates with its own form of 
“many-headed tyranny” (270). After they manage to restore order, Musidorus is, in 
fact, offered the Phrygian crown. However, he installs an estranged (and thus 
unsullied) cousin of the king on the throne. Richard McCoy writes that this episode 
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shows the Princes engaged in something like “a systematic test of political wit,” of 
their capacity to rule.52   But Sidney’s emphasis, I would argue, is still on the kinesis 
of heroic exploits rather than the stasis of governmental procedure.  
Here, the difference between the Old Arcadia’s emphasis on monarchical 
governance and the New Arcadia’s emphasis on dynamic heroic becoming is made 
clear. And this difference of emphasis is made even clearer in the next episode of the 
New Arcadia’s retrospective narrative. Following their deeds in Phrygia, the two 
princely “tyrant-killers” hear that the two servants with whom they set out from 
Macedonia have subsequently washed ashore in the nearby country of Pontus (270). 
The servants, on encountering that country’s (also unnamed) tyrant, are first favored 
but later viciously and arbitrarily executed. Pyrocles and Musidorus’s response to 
this news is immediate and decisive. “Making forces in Phrygia (a kingdom wholly 
at their commandment by the love of the people and gratefulness of the king),” they 
“entered his country, and wholly conquering it, with such deeds as at least fame said 
were excellent.” Once again, they overthrow and eventually execute the king (272-3). 
And subsequently, events in Pontus prove similar to those in Phrygia: Pyrocles 
might “quietly have enjoyed that crown by all the desire of the people,” we are 
informed, but instead the Princes locate a “sister of the late king’s” and so reinstitute 
a properly-derived aristocratic mode of governance (273). Once again, this episode 
echoes some of the political proposals and assumptions of the Old Arcadia—with its 
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emphasis on aristocratic inheritance and the righting of monarchical malfeasance. 
But again, the New Arcadia’s retrospective narrative’s emphasis is on the dynamic 
rather than the static, the heroic rather than the kingly. In their interventions and 
tyrant-slayings in both Phrygia and Pontus, Pyrocles and Musidorus demonstrate an 
unwillingness to forego their forward-moving, kinetic, and peripatetic style of 
heroism, their ongoing actualization of virtue. They show what the people of 
Phrygia describe as  marvelous “magnanimity” (270).   This term was understood, in 
the Renaissance, as a “greatnesse” characterized by a “puissant resolution to enter 
vppon the brauest enterprises”; it was seen as the “vertue,” as Pierre de la 
Primaudaye puts in The French Academy, of which “Heroical men” are “prodigall.”53  
And in these episodes from the New Arcadia’s second book, Pyrocles and Musidorus 
become avatars of magnanimity—of a politics of heroic greatness and becoming that 
vaults over any limits. The Princes, that is to say, demonstrate precisely the heroic 
ideal that Sidney had outlined in the Defense of Poesy … the “heroical” sort of Poesy, 
“whose verie name” daunts “all backbiters; which, through “champions” like 
“Achilles, Cyrus, Aeneas, Turnus, Tideus, Rinaldo” not only teaches and moves to 
truth “but teacheth and mooveth to the most high and excellent truth” and makes 
“magnanimity and justice shine through all misty fearfulness and foggy desires” 
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(MW 231). This particular vision of the heroic is summed up nicely when 
Musidorus—at this point narrating the Princes’ exploits—summarizes their heroic 
self-perception: 
 
And therefore having well established those kingdoms under good 
governors, and rid them by their valour of such giants and monsters 
as before-time armies were not able to subdue, they determined in 
unknown order to see more of the world, and to employ those gifts, 
esteemed rare in them, to the good of mankind; and therefore would 
themselves … go privately to seek exercises of their virtue, thinking it 
not so worthy to be brought to heroical effects by fortune or necessity, 
like Ulysses and Aeneas, as by one’s own choice and working. (274-5) 
 
But while these lines reveal a vision of heroism as a limitless process of 
personal becoming, they also—ironically—articulate an ideal that will never actually 
occur in the New Arcadia. The Princes’ tyrant-slaying is, after all, a result of the forces 
of “fortune and necessity.” And the adventures they engage in subsequently show 
the increasing inability of virtue to master the political world it encounters.54  This is 
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 We see this, for instance, in book 2’s next episode, which portrays their inconclusive attempt to intervene 
in a rebellion against the king of Patagonia by his bastard son Plexiturus (an episode from which 
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crystallized when they eventually encounter the Arcadian Princesses and are 
amorously waylaid from their heroic preoccupations. In the Old Arcadia, Sidney 
summarizes this distraction from “the exercise of virtue” (10) by having Cleophila 
(the disguised Pyrocles) recite the following lines: 
 
Transformed in show, but more transformed in mind, 
 I cease to strive, with double conquest foiled; 
 For (woe is me) my powers all I find 
 With outward force and inward treason spoiled.  
                                                                                                                                                              
       Erona’s story begins when she (at this point still the Princess of Lycia) falls in love with a man “of 
mean parentage” named, significantly, Antiphilus, and refuses to marry the royal husband to whom she is 
betrothed, Tiridates, the King of Armenia (302). Her obstinacy “so brake[s] the tender father’s heart” that 
he dies, and so Erona inherits Lycia’s throne, advancing her “affection” for Antiphilus to the “holy title of 
matrimony” (302). But Armenia’s king is still angered by the breach of the earlier marital contract, attacks 
Lycia, and is almost at the point of overcoming Erona’s forces when Pyrocles and Musidorus arrive on the 
scene. After various twists and turns of the plot, the Princes save the Queen and rescue her fiancé (who has 
been captured by the Armenians). But despite Pyrocles and Musidorus’ rather considerable exercise of 
heroic military virtue, Sidney suggests in this episode that a rift is developing between their heroic 
activities and the broader political venues in which they operate. In this particular episode, all this centers 
on Antiphilus. Due to the Princes’ actions he is “redeemed and (though against the consent of all her 
nobility) married to Erona; in which case the two Greek princes, being called away by another adventure, 
left her” (306). In the earlier episodes of the New Arcadia’s second book the Princes are on the side of 
aristocratic right and custom: in removing the tyrants of both Phrygia and Pontus, they rely on the 
assistance of the local nobility, and ultimately they make sure to keep the aristocracy firmly in charge of the 
post-tyrant political situations in both of these kingdoms. When they intervene in Lycia, however, their 
heroic military valor serves only to perpetuate a tyranny. And this tyranny, furthermore, only becomes 
more intense when the New Arcadia’s narration returns to Lycia some time later and we learn that 
Antiphilus, soon after marrying Erona and becoming Lycia’s king, grows easily into the etymological 
meaning of his name, imagining that the “true property of sovereignty” is “to do what he listed and to list 
whatsoever pleased his fancy” and making his “kingdom a tennis-court where his subjects should be the 
balls” (398).  
       The Erona episode, I would argue, anticipates the fate of Pyrocles and Musidorus’ active aristocratic 
heroism in the later portions of the New Arcadia. In portraying the failure of their praxis to master and 
transform a complex political reality that, as a result, lapses into tyranny, it suggests a major shift that will 
occur later in the New Arcadia: a shift, in Sidney’s understanding of the political, from seeing the collective 
world as a kind of primal matter on which individual heroic potential can impose its forms, and toward 
instead seeing it instead as characterized by inexorability and inevitability that are beyond any individual 
agent’s power to control. This increasingly bleak experience of the political world as the site of a kind of 
confrontation with inert and untouchable totality is, as the New Arcadia progresses, signaled repeatedly in 
Sidney’s increasing emphasis on tyranny.  
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     (OA 10) 
   
And indeed this neutralization of heroic “powers” is only further foregrounded in 
the New Arcadia, juxtaposed, as it is, with a concrete version of the Princes’ previous 
feats in active heroism. 
 In the New Arcadia’s later books, however, Sidney’s concern with the failure 
of an active heroism in the face of both internal and external obstacles is not mainly 
elaborated through Pyrocles and Musidorus. Instead, and somewhat surprisingly, he 
switches his emphasis to another heroic figure: Amphialus.  In the later portions of 
the New Arcadia, while the Princes are disguised and pursuing Pamela and Philoclea, 
it is Amphialus who violently and theatrically comes to embody the destructive 
failure of an active heroism.  It is Amphialus who becomes the vessel for Sidney’s 
increasing skepticism toward an active heroism, and who also sets in action a course 
of events that will allow Sidney to articulate an alternative form of heroism in the 
Princess Pamela.  
 
IV 
Amphialus is the son of Cecropia, probably the only unqualified villain in 
Sidney’s entire oeuvre.55  Before Basilius’ late-life marriage to Gynecia, Cecropia, we 
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 Cecropia has often been read by critics as an allegorical embodiment of Mary Queen of Scots. For a 
version of this argument – as well as a summary of previous redactions – see Barbara Brunbaugh, 
“Cecropia and the Church of the Antichrist in Sir Philip Sidney’s New Arcadia,” SEL 38 (1998) pp. 19-43. 
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learn, was the wife of the king’s brother, meaning that Amphialus stood to inherit 
Basilius’ crown upon his death—a necessity for Cecropia, who, being originally the 
daughter of a foreign monarch, violently refuses to see her and Amphialus’ “royal 
blood” degraded by a loss of royal status and the startling possibility that they might 
ever be seen as having been “born of the mud of the people” (446).  With Basilius’ 
marriage, however, and with the birth of his eldest daughter and “inheritrix” 
Pamela, Cecropia’s dynastic hope is displaced. Cecropia’s solution to this problem is 
to force a marriage between her son and Basilius’ daughter. And her plan to do this 
involves manipulating her son, who lacks her amoral tendencies. Amphialus, in 
Sidney’s account, is educated not by his mother but rather by his aristocratic and 
significantly-named relative Timoetheus (from the Greek tîme, “honor”). He is 
schooled in all the same noble and military virtues that Pyrocles and Musidorus are. 
But, as with the Princes, Amphialus’ heroic education is incapable of protecting him 
from the distractive power of eros, and he eventually falls in love with Philoclea and 
quickly ceases to be “courteous, noble, liberal”—a collection of “all heroical parts” 
(NA 122). Amphialus becomes, instead, a creature of his passions—passions his 
mother is able to play on as she pursues her dynastic ambitions and her desire for 
revenge against Basilius. She plots to play on Amphialus’ own desire for Philoclea 
and eventually succeeds in convincing him to rebel and kidnap the Arcadian royal 
family, along with the disguised Princes. 
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Amphialus, then, is a hero lead astray by love, just as the Princes are. But 
while, for them, love becomes its own triumphant tyrannical force—neutralizing 
their drive to enact virtuously their dynamic potentiality—Amphialus demonstrates 
a different relationship with tyranny, allowing desire to drive him to become a 
tyrant himself. Amphialus is first linked with tyranny in an early episode of the New 
Arcadia’s third book. At this point, he has just kidnapped Arcadia’s royals, retreated 
to his castle, and called a caucus of his allies to plot their course of action. Although 
the reader is well aware of Amphialus’ real motivations for having undertaken this 
course of action, Sidney nevertheless has him extensively justify himself through a 
long political speech. Here, he masks his impure motives in the language of the anti-
tyrannical Protestant resistance theory already mentioned. One of the major 
postulates of this school of political thought was that nobles and magistrates 
subordinate to a monarch, so-called “subaltern” magistrates, had the right to rebel if 
a ruler transgressed religious morality and foundational political rights. 56   And 
Amphialus—accusing Basilius of tyranny for his rural rustication and handing off of 
his kingly duties to subordinates—claims that he has, in rebelling,  acted on the basis 
of this fundamental right, the fundamental right of “being subaltern magistrates and 
officers of the crown” (NA 453).57  
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 However, Sidney ironically represents Amphialus as being himself a tyrant, in 
two ways. He is first of all (like the Princes) ruled by desire, by what the narrator at 
one point refers to as love’s “tyranny” (565). But he also acts tyrannically to his 
subjects and allies by plunging Arcadia into civil war, rather than protecting the 
common good—leading to a mode of political behavior that is repeatedly described 
as “tyrannical” (481). In this way, Amphialus emerges not just as parallel to the 
Princes but also as parallel to Basilius, and the isomorphism between the two 
characters is emphasized throughout much of book 3.  This is not to say that Sidney 
does not go to great lengths to draw contrasts rather than comparisons between the 
two characters. While Amphialus epitomizes a (misdirected) aristocratic prudence 
and ability, Basilius is a humiliating parody of this ideal—“desirous,” as Sidney 
writes at one particular damning moment, “that everybody should do valiantly but 
himself” (446). But they are united in their utter self-interest and lack of concern for 
the common good: each is “a notable example of how great dissipations monarchal 
governments are subject unto” (766).  
Such “dissipation” was—of course—the major political focus of the Old 
Arcadia as well. But while in this text monarchical normativity is embodied and 
ultimately restored by Euarchus, in the later books of the New Arcadia this political 
grounding is nowhere in sight. Euarchus becomes a minor and insignificant 
character, who cannot tame the ongoing war between the “Amphialans” and the 
“Basileans” that unfolds as Basilius and his allies lay siege to Amphialus’ castle. This 
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conflict is a war between factions captained by figures who have failed to uphold the 
basic virtues of good governance, and it degrades into a political and military 
quagmire in which Basilieus and Amphialus quickly find themselves inextricably 
caught. The siege of Amphialus’ castle, Sidney’s account suggests, will not be 
broken, and the portrayal of the war as it unfolds suggests a deep disenchantment 
with the vita activa so uncritically extolled in the Old Arcadia, and in the Defense.  
This disenchantment with an active, dynamic heroism becomes particularly 
clear in the third book’s portrayal of military violence. A number of critics have 
observed that Sidney’s stance on violence shifts in the New Arcadia’s last book, 
becoming an aestheticized spectacle stripped of the ethical depth of Sidney’s earlier 
efforts in this area.58   But, as with the resistance theory mentioned a moment ago, 
this heroic violence is also ironized in a way that is unprecedented in Sidney’s earlier 
work. In the Old Arcadia’s portrayal of the Princes’ crushing of a peasant rebellion, 
the Princes at one point turn their swords on a painter who has come to the battle 
looking to see real wounds to paint them, and Sidney writes, with perfect poise and 
symmetry, “And so the painter returned well skilled in wounds, but with never a 
hand to perform his skill” (381). Sidney’s language, here, betrays no sense of moral 
anxiety over this sort of violence. He comfortably submits this fictional occurrence to 
the subtle wit and courtly poise for which his prose is known. But the differences 
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 See McCoy’s account in Rebellion in Arcadia as well as Clare Kinney, “Chivalry Unmasked: Courtly 
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between Old and New Arcadia become clear if we compare this episode with another 
scene of military bloodshed in the latter text’s third book. Here, Sidney dexterously 
and decorously describes Amphialus’ double butchering of an aging squire named 
Aeschylus and the son who tries to defend him in terms of a transformation of 
“father and son” into “twins in their never-again-dying birth” (NA 470). On the 
surface, this seems similar to the just-mentioned moment from the Old Arcadia. But 
in context, they could not be more different. Immediately before his description of 
Amphialus’ brutal slaying of Aeschylus and his son, Sidney’s narrator notes that in 
his actions on the battlefield Amphialus is propelled by his desire to hold onto 
Philoclea more than anything else. His fighting—including the father/son slaying—
is described as a laboring “to make valour, strength, choler and hatred to answer the 
proportion of his love which was infinite” (NA 469). In other words, violence—
which previously in the New Arcadia served a privileged heroic medium for the 
actualization of virtue—has now been transformed into a perverse attempt to force 
the world to come into line with erotically-determined delusion. Earlier, violence 
contributed to an exemplary fantasmatic version of a dynamic experience of the 
political. But now violence is merely symptomatic of a degradation in political life, a 
conflict in which, as David Norbrook perceptively writes, “[b]attle is confined to a 
series of single combats, which can be described in terms borrowed from courtly tilts 
rather than in the language of sixteenth-century military science. The knights dress 
up in fantastic and colorful costumes; the field of battle becomes a ‘bloody 
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Teniscourt’ in which ‘the game of death’ is played; blood becomes a caparison 
‘decking’ Philautus’ armor. Violent action is blocked and displaced into spectacle.”59  
Sidney’s skeptical portrayal of heroic military violence suggests a broader 
breakdown of faith in heroic action’s ability to meaningful impact the political 
world.  We are no longer in the stable and traditional realm of the Old Arcadia, where 
duty entails action, a heroic action that—despite love’s distractions—is still very 
much possible. The New Arcadia’s final book has more combat, more action, more of 
the military vita activa that Sidney earlier extolled than any of his other writings. But 
it is, at the same time, presented as a hollow charade.  
The New Arcadia’s third book suggests a sudden and significant shift in 
Sidney’s attitude toward the dynamic, action-oriented model of heroism that is 
dominant across most of his other writings. His earlier works show a deep-seated 
faith in the political potentiality of aristocratic virtue. But these last books, as one 
critic writes, suggest a full-fledged “crisis in the political” insofar as they depict “the 
limits of the various modes of political action—counsel and warfare—open to men 
of Sidney’s ilk.”60  But this crisis, I would suggest, is not just a crisis in the postulates 
of political theory. It is also a crisis in political experience, in which Sidney’s 
narrative works through a fundamental alienation of virtue, of political activity, 
from political life. In the New Arcadia’s final book, virtue degrades from an 
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organizing principle of noble “well-doing” into an excuse for self-interested and 
ultimately tyrannical behavior. The portrayal of military and political activity here 
seems to point forward to the political pessimism that would eventually be 
expressed in the later writings of Sidney’s friend and biographer, Fulke Greville. In 
his early seventeenth-century Inquisition upon Fame and Honour, Greville describes 
human beings as “fraile,” prone to forget their own limitations, and inclined to 
chaotic and violent behavior that is only capable of being tamed by sovereign 
authority.61  It is out of the “womb of this frailty,” Greville writes, that the “Giant 
Creature in excess of Might,” the sovereign, emerges as the only preservation of 
“Religion, Honour, Natures Laws and Nations”—phenomena that are all “derived 
from that gift transcendent.”62   
But while Sidney seems to share Greville’s political pessimism in the final 
book of the New Arcadia, his solution is not a proto-Hobbesian embrace of absolute 
authority. Instead, the New Arcadia’s concluding pessimism puts forward a complex 
reconsideration of heroic action and political experience.  It is impossible to deny 
that Sidney’s account of the siege of Amphialus’ castle suggest a kind of negation of 
an active, military heroism. But if Sidney negates this earlier heroic paradigm he also 
(in Hegelian terms) negates this negation: his cancelling out of active heroism also 
involves the simultaneous attempt to “keep” and “preserve” heroism in a 
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dialectically transfigured form.63  More concretely, the New Arcadia’s third and final 
book shows a progressive deracination of the sort of heroism represented by 
Pyrocles and Musidorus and (later on) Amphialus. But at the same time, out of this 
negative movement, comes the positive presentation of the new, and very different, 
heroism represented by the Princess Pamela, a heroism that is not immanent to the 
political vita activa but rather constitutively located outside of it. To understand what 
Pamela does in the New Arcadia’s third and final book, however, we need to first turn 
back to Sidney’s initial presentation of the character in the Old Arcadia. 
 
V 
The politics of the Old Arcadia, as we have already seen, are focused on 
monarchical governance. The text’s plot hinges on a ruler, Basilius, whose failure to 
live up to these ideals sets into motion both the Old Arcadia’s initial comedy and its 
later tragic tumults. Amidst these tumults it is Euarchus, the King of Macedon, who 
ultimately emerges as a paradigmatic example of proper kingship, of the proper 
discharge of monarchical office. But in the Old Arcadia’s later books, Sidney also 
presents Basilius’ elder daughter Pamela as an exemplary embodiment of this 
political paradigm. While Euarchus exemplifies the arts of kingly rule, Pamela 
figures a principle of monarchical inheritance in her obstinate refusal to budge from 
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her position as the rightful “inheritrix” to the Arcadian throne. This refusal is 
represented in the Old Arcadia as a particular form of constant heroism, a heroism 
not of active “well-doing” but, instead, of an aristocratic magnanimity refusing to 
yield to uncontrollable circumstance. 
The nature of Pamela’s heroism in the Old Arcadia becomes clear from 
Sidney’s juxtaposition of her with her young sister Philoclea. The “tender Philoclea,” 
Sidney’s narrator claims, is unable to cope with the unfolding events of the Old 
Arcadia’s later books. Having “never lifted up her mind to any opinion of 
sovereignty” she is “apter to yield her misfortune, having no stronger debates in her 
mind than a man may say a most witty childhood is wont to nourish, as to imagine 
with herself why Philanax and the other noblemen should deal so cruelly by her that 
had never deserved evil of any of them” (OA 319). Pamela, by contrast, keeps her 
eyes trained on the sovereignty that—as the oldest child of Basilius—is rightfully 
hers.  Although she is 
 
endued with a virtuous mildness, yet the knowledge of herself and 
what was due unto her, made her heart full of a stronger disdain 
against her adversity; so that she joined the vexation for her friend 
with the spite to see herself, as she thought, rebelliously detained, and 
mixed desirous thoughts to help with revengeful thoughts if she could 




The initial emphasis in this description is on Pamela’s “virtuous mildness,” a phrase 
whose adjectival subordination of virtue to the weak abstraction of mildness seems 
to imply a kind of gentle passivity, a feminized acquiescence to circumstance.  But 
the start of Sidney’s description is deliberately deceptive. For this sentence quickly 
reveals that Pamela’s “virtuous mildness” goes hand-in-hand with a quiet un-mild 
and non-acquiescent “knowledge of herself.”   
Grasping the full significance of this phrase requires us to remember that self-
knowledge had a radically different sense in Sidney’s time than it has acquired in 
subsequent centuries, and carries in our own culture. 64   For most of us, self-
knowledge is bound up, in one way or another, with the idea of authenticity—with 
notions of individual identity, reflexivity, and essence that are often traced back to 
the Cartesian cogito but are more than anything else the product of the gradual 
incorporation of nineteenth-century notions of the self into the narcissistic mass 
culture of the twentieth century. But from classical antiquity well into the 
Renaissance, self-knowledge had a radically different sense. Shakespeare’s Polonius 
famously sums this sense up in his injunction “To thine own self be true”—an 
injunction that, in context, commands not a commitment to one’s own personal 
identity but rather to social expectations, particularly those attending to Laertes as 
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the son of a prominent Danish courtier.65  And Pamela’s self-knowledge falls into a 
similar category. It is not a knowledge of uniqueness or personality but rather of 
“what was due unto her.”  It is a self-knowledge grounded in the concrete social 
materiality of inheritance and rule and in a sense of the unrelenting claim of kinship 
within this social and political realm.  
Specifically, Pamela asserts the claims of a woman within this political realm. 
The “great lady of Tudor times,” as E.M.W. Tillyard notes in his account of the 
Arcadia, “was in her way as much a governor as her husband.”66  It is important, in 
reading how Pamela is presented in the Old Arcadia, to realize that Sidney was 
writing with this assumption. Contemporary complaints about Elizabeth’s gender 
notwithstanding, the late sixteenth century was a period that preceded the political 
and social transformations that would banish women from the political realm, 
domesticating them to the realm of the household and the private as opposed to the 
male public sphere.67  In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel described this shift in terms of 
the emergence of the two polarities of state and civil society. Before this political 
arrangement, however, he also suggests there was another mode of political and 
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ethical life, one in which the “immediate substantiality of spirit … has as its 
determination the spirit’s feeling of its own unity, which is” the “love” of kinship. 
Love, here, is not sentimental attachment but rather kinship-based belonging, in 
which one is a “member” of a broader, blood-based communal whole whose interest 
trumps his or her own interests.68  A number of feminist critics have emphasized the 
degree to which this kinship was a powerful and important mode of political 
enfranchisement.69  And we see such enfranchisement ascend honed into its own 
form of heroism in Pamela’s actions in the Old Arcadia. In constantly clinging to the 
prerogatives of family, Pamela projects a sort of semi-stoic political heroism. Like 
Antigone clinging to the laws of kinship in the face of Creon’s commands, she makes 
“her heart full of a stronger disdain against her adversity,” which she manages to 
restraint from developing into “revengeful thoughts.”  Pamela is presented by 
Sidney as embodying a heroism of constantly clinging to one’s sense of entitlement, 
to aristocratic/monarchical officium, and aristocratic greatness. 
However, this version of heroism only makes sense if the stability of a 
monarchical, kinship-based political order is a solid assumption. And while this 
assumption persists throughout the Old Arcadia, despite the state of emergency into 
which the Arcadian kingdom falls after Basilius’ apparent death, it has, by the third 
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book of the New Arcadia, been radically undercut. As we have just seen, Sidney’s 
presentation here of an unending civil war presents a kind of attrition of earlier 
models of aristocratic virtue, monarchical office, and political stability. And a 
profound sense that the bottom has fallen out from earlier assumptions about 
politics, virtue and political experience hovers over the other major narrative 
component of the New Arcadia’s final book: the so-called “captivity narrative” that 
encompasses the torture of Pamela and her sister by Cecropia. However, it is also 
here that Pamela comes to figure new models of heroism, virtue, and political 
experience—models that figure a distant dialectical engagement with the alienation 
of political life that the New Arcadia’s last book portrays. 
In the New Arcadia Pamela—to be sure—is still aristocratic; she still 
demonstrates the magnanimity appropriate to “a Prince’s daughter” and “princely 
disdain” still “sparkles” toward Cecropia out of her “princely eyes” (NA, 552, 546). 
But her heroic position is articulated and elaborated in relation to a different political 
situation: not the disruption of an ultimately stable monarchical system of 
governance, but, instead, a state of absolute subjection, imprisonment, isolation, and 
corporeal vulnerability. Like Giorgio Agamben’s archetype of the homo sacer, Pamela 
occupies a position of “bare life”: she is separated from any communal norms and 
protections, completely subjected to the sovereign fiats of Cecropia’s “tyrannical 
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authority” (NA 473). 70   In the New Arcadia’s captivity narrative, however, such 
exposure is not simply negative. Like Boethius’ nameless narrator in the Consolation 
of Philosophy, Pamela sublates her own bare life, her own exposure to the violence of 
sovereignty, into a paradoxical but powerful source of strength. As in Boethius, this 
transformation entails the redefinition of virtue. It entails the metamorphosis of 
virtue from an active and outwardly-oriented principle of political becoming into a 
fundamentally passive conservation of individual potential in the face of an 
inexorable political reality. Virtue, says Boethius’ Philosophia, is “so called because 
relying on its own powers (suis viribus nitens) it is not overcome by adversity.”71  
And we see a similar reconceptualization of virtue at the core of Pamela’s heroism in 
the New Arcadia. 
Consider, for instance, the first major statement Pamela makes during the 
captivity narrative: the prayer she speaks shortly after she has been imprisoned by 
Cecropia:          
  
O all-seeing light and eternal life of all things, to whom nothing is 
either so great that it may resist, or so small that it is contemned; look 
upon my misery with Thine eye of mercy, and let Thine infinite power 
vouchsafe to limit out some proportion of deliverance unto me, as to 
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Thee shall seem most convenient. Let not injury, O Lord, triumph over 
me, and let my faults by Thy hand be corrected, and make not mine 
unjust enemy the minister of Thy justice. But yet, my God, if in Thy 
wisdom, this be the aptest chastisement for my unexcusable folly; if 
this low bondage be fittest for my over-high desires; if the pride of my 
not-enough humble heart be thus broken, O Lord, I yield unto Thy 
will, and joyfully embrace what sorrow Thou wilt have me suffer. 
Only thus much let me crave of Thee … that Thou wilt suffer some 
beam of Thy majesty so to shine into my mind, that it may still depend 
confidently upon Thee. Let calamity be the exercise but not the overthrow, 
of my virtue. (NA 463-4; my emphasis).  
 
At first, Pamela’s prayer seems innocuous enough—an affirmation of the 
transcendent power of God. But read in the context of Pamela’s captivity, it takes on 
a particularly powerful sense. Pamela is—at this point and throughout the captivity 
narrative—totally subordinated to Cecropia’s power. While Pyrocles and Musidorus 
earlier overcame tyranny, Pamela is completely vulnerable to the “absolute 
tyrannies” to which Cecropia’s “abominable rage” carries her and Cecropia tries 
again and again to break Pamela and force her into marrying Amphialus. In the face 
of this total subjection, however, Pamela posits a different, a higher horizon of 
power. She posits an “all-seeing light” that trumps any particular worldly force, no 
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matter how “great.”  She posits a divine, transcendent force, an “infinite power” that 
overrides any worldly instantiation of power. And this transcendent plane Pamela 
posits is also—significantly—a site of “justice.”   
In her later arguments with and interrogations of Pamela, Cecropia will go to 
great lengths to deny the validity of this viewpoint. Throughout the New Arcadia, 
Cecropia espouses a kind of disenchanted, skeptical, and amoral “Machiavellian” 
philosophy that rejects all moral norms and divine groundings. “[T]here is no 
wisdom,” she claims at one point, “but in including both heaven and earth in 
oneself; and that love, courtesy, gratefulness, friendship, and all other virtues are 
rather to be taken on than taken in oneself” (NA 154). And in her discussions with 
Pamela, Cecropia asserts again and again that Pamela’s faith in a transcendent 
divine power is bogus; that “those powers (if there be any such) above” are moved 
neither by “eloquence” or by “prayers” (NA 488). Pamela, however, obstinately 
clings to this sense of a divine power that is higher than the chaotic, aleatory political 
world in which she has to exist.  
 The consequence of this transcendent attitude, however, is not a simple 
renunciation of the world. It is not a simple instance of the called “unhappy 
consciousness” into which men and women often slip— according to Hegel—in 
moments of unfreedom, fleeing the world into the “pure universality of thought” 
(and, we might add, faith).72  Rather, Pamela reasserts her own personal, dynamic 
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power in the face of her bodily abjection vis-à-vis her upward, transcendent 
orientation. Here we might look back, for a moment, to the just-quoted text of 
Pamela’s prayer—specifically the sentence that begins “Only thus let me crave.”  
Here Pamela passes from admiring and subordinating herself to the divine order 
into putting forward a kind of a Platonic metaphysic, where divine strength can pass 
into the world.  
Throughout the rest of the captivity narrative, this gesture becomes the basis 
of Pamela’s new model of virtue. Rather than an active principle of well-doing, 
virtue is now defined as a dynamic sense of self internalized into an inner ethical 
space. While earlier the Princes were compelled to dynamically actualize the “sparks 
of virtue” implanted in them divinely through well doing (NA 222),  Pamela’s virtue, 
derived from God, now moves into an inward position of simultaneous constancy 
and transcendence. Like the animals in “Ister Bank” the prayer shows Pamela 
learning to “know” her “strength.” 
 Earlier, I noted that this “inward” ethical turn is in a certain sense familiar. In 
England and across Europe the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw elites 
turning to political and ethical philosophies of withdrawal, constancy, and 
transcendence—traditions that had long been associated with passive, constancy-
based heroism. 73   And this broad turn in elite culture was also linked to a 
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redefinition of virtue, to an increasing tendency to view virtue not as an outwardly-
directed principle of worldly activity but, rather, as a turning of “Reason “to God 
and the Original of its Self” and being “Firm and immoveable in what is good”—to 
quote Justus Lipsius’ highly-influential late sixteenth-century stoic handbook De 
Constantia.74   But while Sidney was no doubt influenced by this broad shift in 
intellectual culture—he corresponded with Lipsius, who dedicated a book on Latin 
pronunciation to him—I want to argue that his transformation of Pamela’s heroism 
in the New Arcadia has a significance that goes beyond the late-Renaissance tendency 
to see fortitude as “more heroical” than action-oriented virtue.75 Pamela, I want to 
suggest, should be understood as signaling not just not just an ethical re-orientation 
but a fundamental shift in how Sidney’s work views the relationship between poetry 
and political experience. In his portrait of Pamela, Sidney shifts heroism from the 
realm of practical exemplarity into the realm of what we might call aesthetic autonomy. 
 The adjective “aesthetic” is, as the introduction has already noted, 
anachronistic anathema to the late sixteenth century—a product of ideological and 
cultural mutations that postdate the New Arcadia by more than a century. 
Particularly, as Terry Eagleton argues, the idea of aesthetics emerges when the legal, 
political, and economic transformations of the late seventeenth and eighteenth 
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centuries, where increasingly consolidated economic and political power was 
“translated into new kinds of spontaneous social practice” in which structures “of 
power must become structures of feeling and the name for this mediation from 
property to propriety is the aesthetic.”76  This transformation followed, by some 
time, Sidney’s portrayal of Pamela, and it would seem additionally risky to apply 
this particular set of concepts to Sidney’s portrayal of the Arcadian princess, since 
aesthetics, historically, went hand-in-hand with the banishing of women from public 
life and the simultaneous portrayal of women (in various forms of literary discourse) 
in terms of a moralized, passive sentimentality. Indeed Samuel Richardson’s novel 
Pamela (1740), one of the most influential examples of this in the English eighteenth 
century, takes the name of its heroine from Sidney’s character. But while 
Richardson’s Pamela models a kind of feminine heroism of chastity, silence, and 
obedience, Sidney’s Pamela is quite different. What she embodies ethically is an 
aristocratic magnanimity that turns inward in response to political alienation. And 
what she embodies aesthetically is the power of Poesy not just to engage with the 
particulars of political reality, but to rise above the contingencies, frustrations, and 
difficulties of the actual world into an increasingly autonomous sphere of poetic and 
political imagination. 
Coming back to the New Arcadia, we can see this dual agenda at another key 
moment later on in Pamela’s captivity.  At this point, Cecropia has resorted to 
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torturing the captive princesses. First, she scourges Philoclea, who begs for mercy. 
But when she turns to “using the like cruelty upon Pamela” (553) there is a different 
result:  
 
But if ever the beams of perfection shined through the clouds of 
affliction, if ever virtue took a body to show his else-unconceivable 
beauty, it was in Pamela. For when reason taught her there was no 
resistance—for to just resistance first her heart was inclined— then 
with so heavenly a quietness and so graceful a calmness did she suffer 
the divers kinds of torments they used to her, that while they vexed 
her fair body, it seemed that she rather directed than obeyed the 
vexation. And when Cecropia ended and asked whether her heart 
would yield, she a little smiled, but such a smiling as showed no love 
and yet could not but be lovely. (553) 
 
Pamela is presented, here, not just as an exemplary fictional persona but as an 
aestheticized embodiment of virtue. Unlike her sister, Pamela is able to see that there 
is no “resistance” to the position of abjection in which she has been placed. Her heart 
is inclined to such resistance. But she realizes the only path, here, is a “heavenly” 
quietness and calmness. But this is not a surrender, a pure passivity. Rather, Pamela 
suffers her torments, but although they “vex” her body this apparent negation of her 
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autonomy and integrity once again leads to its own negation, its own dialectical 
reversal—one made particularly clear in her response to Cecropia: 
 
 ‘Beastly woman,’ said she, ‘follow on, do what thou wilt and canst 
upon me, for I know thy power is not unlimited. Thou mayest well 
wreck this silly body, but me thou canst never overthrow. For my part 
I will not do thee the pleasure to desire death of thee: but assure 
thyself, both my life and death shall triumph with honour, laying 
shame upon thy detestable tyranny. (553-4) 
 
Pamela is here is able to “negate the negation” of her own corporeal abjection. Her 
body may be wrecked, but her inner potentiality—her inner virtue—cannot be 
overthrown. What seems like oppression actually becomes a venue for her to 
demonstrate a heroic “conquering” of outward “doing” with her own “suffering” 
(554). In her engagement with Cecropia, Pamela manages—paradoxically—to “have 
authority over tyranny” even though physically Cecropia’s tyranny has authority 
over her. And the way she is capable of doing that is by conquering with the “ fair … 







In Pamela, then, we see a transformed vision of virtue, heroism, and, I would 
argue, political experience. Political experience is no longer oriented toward an 
absolute enmeshment in the world of aristocratic well-doing: rather, it is marked by 
a fundamental sense of alienation from the vita activa, and a subsequent retreat into 
the resources of one’s own inner, dynamic potentiality. Similarly, heroism is no 
longer a simple incitement to worldly well-doing. It becomes a more complex 
species of what the Defense  (borrowing from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics) calls 
“architectonike”: “the knowledge of a man’s self, in the Ethike and Politique 
consideration, with the end of well doing, and not of well knowing only” (MW 
219).77  It is in fostering such self-knowledge that heroical poesy—in the last book of 
the New Arcadia—finds both its purpose and its preeminence as an instance of how 
the imaginative potential, the “erected wit” of the poet, 
 
disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour 
of his own invention, doth grow in effect another nature, in making 
things either better than nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms 
such as never were in nature, as the Heroes, Demigods, Cyclops, 
Chimeras, Furies, and such like: so as he goeth hand in hand with 
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nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely 
ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit. (MW 216) 
 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the most famous episode of Pamela’s literary 
afterlife is not Richardson’s novel but, rather, the scene that unfolded on the scaffold 
in front of Whitehall immediately before Charles I’s 1649 execution. According to a 
widely-circulated rumor Charles—immediately before his execution—recited 
Pamela’s prayer. John Milton famously picked up on this fact in his 1649 
Eikonoklastes, where he mocks the dead king's choice of a profane text for his final 
prayer. Though he praises Sidney’s Arcadia as being a book “among the best of its 
kind”—one that is “full of worth and witt”—it is, he claims, “among religious 
thoughts, and duties not worthy to be nam’d.”78   But while Milton chooses to 
interpret Charles’ unusual devotional choice in terms of his own impiety and 
religious hypocrisy, it is possible to see his pre-mortem identification with Pamela in 
another light. For Sidney’s figure models a powerful fantasy of heroism that emerges 
out of the same fundamental situation that claimed Charles’ life: a contradiction 
between a dying mode of kingly and aristocratic life and the inevitable imperatives 
of an emerging political modernity. 
                                                     
78








It would be hard to exaggerate the impact that Christopher Marlowe’s 
Tamburlaine made when it was first performed in 1587. Like most of English 
Renaissance literature, Tamburlaine was not “original” in the modern, post-romantic 
sense of the term. The play’s stunning spectacles of heroic violence self-consciously 
drew on a tradition of chivalric-heroic romances representing “actiue deeds … 
honour, laud and praise” 1  that had thronged London’s stages since the commercial 
theater was established, and it was additionally indebted to a long dramatic backlog 
of theatrical tyrants, from Seneca’s tragedies and the ranting Herods of the medieval 
cycle plays.2  But even if Marlowe’s play was not original, it was still remarkable.  
Tamburlaine set a new standard for theatrical audacity. Part of this had to do with the 
play’s ambitious and aggressive titular protagonist, who eschewed moral norms 
with a boldness that was strikingly unapologetic. But even more important was the 
                                                     
1





 See David Bevington, From ‘Mankind’ to Marlowe: Growth and Structure in the Popular Drama of 
Tudor England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962) for a classic account of Marlowe’s 
formal debts to his theatrical forebears. For an overview of Marlowe’s more thematic links to earlier 
dramatic texts in Tamburlaine see also Brian Gibbons, “Romance and the Heroic Play,” in Cambridge 
Companion to English Renaissance Drama, eds. Michael Hattaway and A.R. Braunmuller (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) pp. 197-227 and Ruth Linney’s recent Marlowe and the Popular 
Tradition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). G.K. Hunter’s “Seneca and the Elizabethans: 
A Case Study in ‘Influence,’” Shakespeare Survey 20 (1967) pp. 89-100 surveys Seneca’s influence on 
Marlowe and his theatrical milieu more broadly. 
109 
 
sheer firepower of Marlowe’s poetic language. No character on the English stage had 
ever sounded like Tamburlaine before. Take the titular lead character of Thomas 
Preston’s Cambyses (1570). At the height of his tyrannical grandeur and gravitas 
Cambyses can only manage the clunkily mannered menace of lines like: 
 
 The Egiptians against us repugne, as verlets slave and vile. 
Therefore I meane with Marsis hart, with warres them to frequent.3 
 
In Tamburlaine, by contrast, Marlowe dropped the thumping fourteeners and 
rhetorical filigree of this earlier poetic mode. He adopted a frenetically fast-paced 
blank verse characterized by simple syntax and vivid imagery. Ben Jonson would 
later call this Marlowe’s “mighty line,” and for good reason.4  It produced a forward-
moving sense of power, of self-actualization, of sheer conquest. Compared with 
Cambyses, Tamburlaine’s threats to his own set of recalcitrant Egyptians— 
 
   When holy Fates 
 Shall ‘stablish me in strong Egyptia, 
 We mean to travel to th’Antarctic Pole, 
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 Conquering the people underneath our feet, 
 And be renowned as never emperors were.5 
 
—must have seemed something like that post-tornadic moment in the Wizard of Oz 
when Dorothy walks out of her house and everything turns technicolor.6   
Marlowe took the basics of Tamburlaine’s story from the real life of Tīmūr-e-
Lang, a Mongol magnate and warlord who conquered a sizeable part of central and 
south Asia during the fourteenth century. Tīmūr was a well-known figure in the 
period, and his life had been chronicled by a number of Latin and vernacular 
writings. 7  In Marlowe’s hands, however, this complicated moral and political story 
these writings told is largely dropped: the life of Tīmūr is shorn of almost all its 
geopolitical complexity and transformed into a single-minded account of one man’s 
desire to dominate everything he encounters.8 Tamburlaine, as well as the play’s 
quickly-penned follow-up, which came out the following year, present complex 
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realities. They portray dozens of conquests stretching from Persia to Egypt and 
Africa. But the plays’ enormous mimetic scope, the sweeping global-geographical 
glitz of their imagery, and the abundant dramatis personae that swell their scenes are 
all almost totally subordinated to Tamburlaine and his libido dominandi.9  They are 
put into the service of a will to power that Marlowe gives an almost cosmic 
capaciousness: 
 
Nature that fram’d us of foure Elements, 
 Warring within our breasts for regiment, 
 Doth teach us to have aspyring minds: 
 Our soules, whose faculties can comprehend 
 The wondrous Architecture of the world: 
And measure every wandring planets course: 
Still climing after knowledge infinite, 
And always moving as the restles Spheares, 
Wils us to weare our selves and never rest 
Untill we reach the ripest fruit of all, 
That perfect blisse and sole felicitie, 
The sweet fruition of an earthly crowne. 
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This well-known passage captures a concern at the heart of Tamburlaine’s version of 
heroism—an experience of becoming, of over-reaching ambition trumping any moral 
norms or natural hierarchies; of the “fiery” pursuit of “sovereignty” overcoming any 
other force or factor (2.1.20). But these lines also capture another, and equally 
important, fact about Marlowe’s play. In Tamburlaine the experience of heroic 
experience is not exclusively a matter of action. It is also always a matter of language. 
It is a literary-critical commonplace that signifier and signified, form and content, are 
always inextricably tangled up in one another. But Tamburlaine takes this to the 
extreme. It is a text where “magniloquence”—as Harry Levin writes in his classic 
study of Marlowe—“does duty for magnificence.”  It is a play where language 
serves not simply as a “means of communication” but also as “a substitute for 
representation.”10  Tamburlaine’s spectacle of heroic becoming—in other words—is 
indissociable from an experience of poetic becoming. In Marlowe’s play heroism goes 
hand-in-hand with the “affluent spirit yielding inuention to praise or dispraise, or 
anie ways to discourse” that Renaissance writers referred to as wit.11   
The spectacularly heroic surface of the play’s poetic language has been the 
major focus of scholarly commentary on Tamburlaine—from Hazlitt to the New 
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Historicists.12  But this chapter takes a different tack on the play’s heroism. Behind its 
spectacular suture of heroic action and poetic projection, I argue, Tamburlaine is 
engaged with an experience of political impossibility. This experience of impossibility, 
however, is different from what we saw in the last chapter. There, I argued that 
Sidney’s New Arcadia grapples with the impossibility of an active heroism by 
embracing the exemplary ethical and aesthetic force of the heroism of passive-active 
power embodied by Pamela. But while Sidney’s work both encounters heroism’s 
political impossibility and dialectically subsumes this practical impossibility into the 
imaginative potentiality of poetic imagination, Marlowe is different.  His work is 
suspicious of heroism’s translation from action into imagination.  His work—I will 
argue—is haunted by a sense of heroism’s virtuality; by the unbridgeable chiasmus 
that separates heroism’s verbal subcomponents, the imaginative split separating the 
“hero” from the “ism.”   
Such a stance toward heroism is subtly evidenced in Tamburlaine’s 
presentation of its titular lead character. But it emerges even more fully in his later 
play Doctor Faustus (c. 1592).  Critics commonly read these plays as not only distinct 
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but diametrically opposed, the violent and aggressive military conquests of the one 
negatively mirrored by the intellectual aspiration of the other.13  But read together, 
Tamburlaine and Doctor Faustus show a common concern with the troubled dialectic 
relationship of linguistic wit and heroic sovereignty. But to understand this 
relationship, however, I first need to turn both to Marlowe’s own historical situation 
and to the key term through which this situation is experientially presented and 
grappled with in his two plays: wit. 
 
II 
The biographical baseline of Marlowe’s life is well- and widely-known.  He 
was born the son of a shoemaker in Canterbury in late February 1564; studied on 
scholarship at the local grammar school and later at Cambridge; had oblique 
connections to Francis Walsingham’s intelligence services; and, later on, in the midst 
of sudden and remarkable theatrical success, was mysteriously murdered in May of 
1593.14  But although Marlowe’s life was unique in many ways, this short summary 
highlights how much it was also deeply characteristic of a much broader social 
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formation in late sixteenth-century England.15  This social formation encompassed 
the young and “middle-class”16 men who came out of the Elizabethan education 
system.  This system, as historian M.H. Curtis writes, was “geared to the 
extraordinary demands for trained men which the Elizabethan Church and State 
made upon them.” But in trying to fill these needs, it also ended up producing 
“more educated talent than that society … could put to work”; preparing “too many 
men for too few places.”17   
Such a human surplus of overeducated and underemployed university 
graduates is a familiar phenomenon to students and scholars of the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries. But the objective and institutional account of their 
situation by historians like Curtis does not capture the experiential and subjective side 
of their situation. Reducing the latter to the former would be to fall into a historicist 
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version of what William James called the psychologist’s fallacy: the “confusion of his 
own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report.”18  
And to understand the “mental facts,” the political experience of Marlowe and other 
men in his social, economic, and political position—to understand difficulties not on 
not only an ontic but also an ontological level—requires that we understand 
something important about the Elizabethan educational system. 
Modern education is almost always presented through a rhetorical frame of 
universality.  It is seen as being committed to capacious and malleable ideas like 
excellence, self-exploration, and success. 19  But Elizabethan education was 
resoundingly particular and (especially after the Henrician Reformation) civic.  It was 
intended to train those strata of society who were, to quote Smith’s De Republica 
Anglorum, “participant of the common wealth” and who would “beare office.” 20  
Elizabethan education, in other words, was intended to school gentlemen.  But 
throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the Tudor-Stuart state 
apparatus grew and its need for literate low-level bureaucrats increased, educational 
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argument in his critique of the psychology of his day it fits nicely into my own critique of the erasure of 
experience in contemporary scholarship on Renaissance literature and culture. For a later, but equally 
germane, discussion of the unavoidable nature of the category of experience see William James, Essays in 
Radical Empiricism (New York, 1912). 
19
 See Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System:  How Testing and Choice 
are Undermining Education (New York: Basic Books, 2011).  In the 200+ pages of this compelling 
polemic Ravitch never once considers that education should train children for particular, pre-determined 
social slots. 
20
 Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Anglorum: A Discourse on the Commonwealth of England, ed. L. 
Alston (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1906) p. 32.  
117 
 
opportunity became more accessible to young men who were not born into the 
ruling elite but came, instead, from England’s mechanical and middling classes.21  
The aim behind educating such low-born subjects was not providing mobility or 
opportunity.  These concepts, in fact, were almost totally alien to Marlowe’s period.  
The aim, rather, was to provide personnel to fill humble offices in the church and the 
lower levels of the state bureaucracy.22  But scholarship boys like Marlowe were still 
schooled in a combination of rhetoric, poetics, and civic humanism that had 
originally been designed to educate England’s enfranchised elite. They were trained 
for a participation in public life.  And before long, the social incongruity of such 
schooling became hard to avoid—especially during the late sixteenth-century’s 
constriction of offices and political opportunities, which made the positions for 
which men like Marlowe thought themselves destined increasingly scarce.  
Curtis calls such young men the “alienated intellectuals” of late-Elizabethan 
and early-Stuart England. Modern scholars might dismiss this appellation—balking 
at its whiff of anachronism, its shades of Sartre’s Roquentin or Heidegger’s das Man, 
and preferring to analyze this segment of the population in more institutional or 
ideological terms. But I would argue that alienation is an apposite descriptor if we 
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take the term in a political-ontological (rather than an existential or an economic) 
sense; if we understand these “alienated intellectuals” as being caught in a 
contradiction between an assumption and an experience of political possibility and 
the increasing thwarting of this possibility in the period’s concrete historical-
material life. 23  But understanding this alienation also requires comprehending 
something specific about the experience of Marlowe and men like him. As David 
Riggs argues in his recent biography, the upward path toward political participation 
for poor scholarship boys like Marlowe would have involved an ideal not just of 
political action (as with the more aristocratic Sidney) but also rhetorical and poetic 
skill.24  Such skills formed the basis of the Tudor curriculum. From grammar schools 
all the way to the Oxbridge Colleges rhetoric, poetics, and politics would have 
merged into a common, broadly Ciceronian concept of vita activa, of a life lead 
appropriately “in actione.”25   They would have combined into an ideal experience of 
moving—as Gabriel Harvey put it—“a meditatione, ad praxim,” from meditation to 
practice, from contemplation to action. 26   Within the “monarchical republic” of 
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  Gabriel Harvey’s Marginalia, ed. G.C. Moore Smith (Stratford-upon-Avon: Shakespeare Head Press, 
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Elizabethan England, “acting and speaking” went hand-in-hand as the essential 
foundations of dynamic political experience.27  But as I have already shown, such an 
experience was becoming increasingly impossible in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries. Harvey, for instance, who shared Marlowe’s middling 
background, harps obsessively on action, on praxis.  Throughout his marginalia and 
commonplace books, he extolls the ideal of the “right pragmaticall” who “karrieth 
euermore liuely and quyck spirites, and takith continually the nymbliest and 
speediest way.”28  But he does so only out of a deep-seated and long-lasting political 
frustration that resulted from his repeated failure to actually attain the kind of 
political participation for which he had been trained. Nor was Harvey’s hard 
realization that “[c]ommon Learning and the name of a good scholar was never so 
much contemned and abjected of princes, pragmaticals, and common gallants as 
nowadays” unique.29  Indeed Marlowe himself—in an odd moment in Hero and 
Leander—sums it up precisely in the form of an etiological fable about the origins of 
the political marginalization of poets and scholars: 
 
… Midas brood shall sit in Honors chaire, 
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To which the Muses sonnes are only heire: 
And fruitfull wits that in aspiring are, 
Shall discontent, run into regions farre; 
And few great lords in vertuous deeds shall joy 
But be surpris’d with every garish toy. 
And still inrich the loftie servile clowne, 
Who with incroching guile, keeps learning down. 
(475-82)    
 
These lines limn the objective, material circumstances of men like Marlowe and 
Harvey. They show how “poverty” and political disenfranchisement have become 
“the Muses’ patrimony” (as Robert Burton would later call it in the Anatomy of 
Melancholy [1621], where he quotes from Marlowe’s poem during his famous 
digression on the “miseries of scholars”).30  But Marlowe’s fable also captures the 
subjective, experiential side of political alienation.  It captures the experience of 
exclusion from the active life of “Honors chaire” and “vertuous deeds.”  And, 
significantly, it identifies the young, learned men who have been the victims of this 
exclusion as wits. In the fable’s fictional temporality, these “fruitful wits” ostensibly 
precede their exclusion from “Honors chaire”: in Marlowe’s myth, that is, there was 
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presumably a time before “Midas broode” came to monopolize honor and political 
participation.  But within the poem itself, these men only emerge as a unit of 
aspiring but alienated “wits” insofar as they are excluded from the active life.  The 
experience of wit, in other words, is inseparable from the experience of exclusion. 
Actuality—to adapt Hegel’s formulation—precedes potentiality. The possible is 
parasitic on the actual, a retroactive reconstruction, from the perspective of a 
frustrated present.31    
Wit emerges, in these lines, as fundamentally ambivalent.  In psychoanalytic 
terms, a kind of objet petit a, simultaneously signifying the possibility but the always-
already lost nature of a primal, political-poetic jouissance.32   Such ambivalence will 
run throughout the relationship between heroism and its imaginative vehicles in 
Tamburlaine and Doctor Faustus. But to understand the significance of wit’s place in 
these plays, one first needs to get a sense of the term’s broader meanings in 
Marlowe’s period.  
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Wit has one of the more complicated philological pedigrees of any word in 
the English language. “What is I then, which like the Power divine / We only can by 
negatives define,” Abraham Cowley complains near the close of his own “Ode to 
Wit,” and such exasperation is understandable after even a quick glance at the 
diversity of definitions that wit has accrued over the centuries. 33   But in the 
Renaissance it generally signified the idea of imaginative and intellectual potential 
passing into actuality.34  Take, for instance, the use of wit in Philip Sidney’s Defense of 
Poesy (c. 1583).  Here Sidney famously argues that it is “only the poet” who, 
“disdaining to be tied to any such subjection” and “lifted up with the vigour of his 
own invention,” is capable of creating “another nature” over and above the fallen 
world.35 The poet’s use of language to transcend actuality, Sidney goes on to claim, 
puts him on the same plane as God.  It is also indicative of the divine element—the 
prelapsarian potentiality—that inheres in fallen human beings.  And Sidney 
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identifies this potentiality with what he calls “erected wit” that “maketh us know 
what perfection is,” however much “our infected will keepeth us from reaching unto 
it.36   Wit carries a similar sense in the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (1593), where 
Hooker repeatedly invokes the “naturall perfection of wit” as a way of marking the 
innate striving after the good inherent in human beings generally.37  In general, the 
idea of wit (both in its English avatar and its Latin doppelganger ingenium) was 
linked in the period to concepts of linguistic and imaginative capacity passing into 
actuality.  It was associated with poetic “production” in the etymological sense of 
pro-ducere:  a “leading out” of inner capacity, of in-genium, into the actuality of 
poiesis.38    
In the late sixteenth century, however, wit also came to signify the troubling 
status of imaginative and intellectual potential disjoined from any appropriate 
avenues of actualization. We see this sense of the term especially in the milieu of 
“alienated intellectuals” who, like Marlowe, lacked legitimate political office and 
were forced to ply their educations in the proto-public sphere of vernacular print, in 
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an emergent literary culture where (as George Chapman would write) wit became a 
“free trade for all sorts to liue by.”39  In this context, wit often evoked anxieties about 
poetry and learning’s relationship to political exclusion and alienation. Such anxiety, 
for instance, runs through the extensive literature of prodigality that was 
inaugurated by John Lyly’s bestselling Euphues (1578), which was significantly 
subtitled The Anatomy of Wit, and which chronicled the misadventures of its titular 
character, a “young gallant” 
 
of wit more than wealth, and yet of more wealth than wisdom, [who] 
seeing himself inferior to none in pleasant conceits thought himself 
superior to all in honest conditions, in so much that he thought 
himself so apt to all things that he gave himself almost to nothing but 
practicing those things commonly which are incident to these sharp 
wits: fine phrases, smooth quips, merry taunts, jesting without mean 
and abusing mirth without measure.40 
 
In his influential study Elizabethan Prodigals, the late Richard Helgerson argued that 
Lyly introduced a narrative pattern and paradigm into much vernacular literature 
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where the theme of wit squandered and lost was mapped and described with 
reference to the Biblical parable of the prodigal son (a story that reached its dramatic 
culmination in the repeated writings of the life of the period’s prodigal-in-chief, 
Robert Greene).41  But Marlowe decisively broke from this paradigm of prodigality, 
this understanding of wit as a distraction from the proper course of political life. For 
Marlowe wit is not—as Thomas Nashe wrote—a “worthless” distraction produced 
by “deceitful arts” from political existence.42  It is not 
 
but a phantasme and Idea, a quarreling shadowe, that will seldom 
dwell in the same roome with a full pursue, but commonly is the idle 
follower of a forlorne creature … a deuill that will neuer leaue a man 
till it hath brought him to beggerie, a malicious spirit that delightes in 
a close libel or an open Satyre … an vnfortunate thinge….43   
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Wit, rather, is the unactualized tropism of learning and linguistic and poetic ability 
toward action, a tendency thwarted in a social situation where, as Francis Bacon 
would later comment, “more are bred scholars, than preferments can take off.”44   
Probably the best gloss on this understanding of wit in the period is provided 
in Richard Mulcaster’s Positions (1581).  Here Mulcaster, probably the most 
perceptive educational commentator of the period, writes that “many very toward 
wittes, of reasonable good reading and of excellent good utterance” are led—on 
account of the extreme expectation and subsequent disappointment produced by 
their educations—to “overshoot themselves by overruling the circumstance and 
overstraining authority.”45  Elsewhere in the same text, he goes on to talk about: 
 
… wittes misplaced most vnquiet and seditious:  as any thinge else 
strayned against nature: light thinges prease vpward, and will ye force 
Fire downe? Heauie thinges beare downeward: and will ye haue 
Leade to leape vp? An imperiall witte for want of education and 
abilitie, being placed in a meane calling will trouble the whole 
companie, if he haue not his will, as winde in the stomacke: and if he 
haue his will, then shall ye see what his naturall did shoote at.46 
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For Mulcaster wit is a force of potentiality that strives and struggles for 
actualization.  But, when deprived of the opportunity, those who have wit 
reflexively recoil on its lost potential, becoming “unquiet,” “seditious,” a source of 
“trouble.”  In Tamburlaine and Doctor Faustus, Marlowe’s “wit” shows the same 
ambivalent oscillation between potentiality and loss, between learning and language 
and political alienation.  And this oscillation both structures and ultimately 
undercuts the heroic fantasy articulated in both plays.    
 
III 
Throughout Tamburlaine Marlowe foregrounds the relationship between wit 
and sovereignty. Take the play’s presentation of the very first character it introduces: 
Mycetes, the incompetent king of Persia. The topos of the maladroit monarch was 
common currency on the Renaissance stage: it was used to great dramatic effect in 
Shakespeare’s first tetralogy and by Marlowe himself in Edward II. But Marlowe 
presents kingly incompetence at the start of Tamburlaine with a particular twist. 
Mycetes is not just a bad king in general.  He is inept specifically on account of his 
resounding lack of imaginative and verbal capacity. He is a bad king, in other 
words, because he lacks wit. 
 
Brother Cosroe, I find my selfe agreev’d, 
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Yet insufficient to expresse the same: 
For it requires a great and thundering speech: 
Good brother tell the cause unto my Lords, 
I know you have a better wit than I.  
    (1.1.1-5; my emphasis) 
 
In reading this hap- and helpless dithering it is important to remember an important 
historical fact. Mycetes is the king of Persia, and for Elizabethan audiences—at least 
educated Elizabethan audiences—Persia would have had a specific set of 
associations. Such audiences would have associated Persia, in part, with threatening 
oriental otherness. But they would have also associated Persia with something more 
positive: with ideas of ideal kingship, the kind of kingship —combining “quickness 
of learning” with a “courageous doing of every thing,” combining sovereignty with 
wit—that was portrayed in the Athenian writer Xenophon’s fourth-century 
Cyropaideia.47  Although nowadays largely forgotten, the Cyropaideia was a major 
component of the classical curricula of the sixteenth century: Spenser was not going 
off the grid of mainstream opinion when he wrote, in the “Letter to Raleigh,” that it 
surpassed Plato’s Republic.48 But even for an uneducated auditor, the rift between wit 
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and sovereignty in Mycetes would have contrasted sharply with Tamburlaine’s 
prologue, spoken only a few moments earlier in the theater. Here Marlowe—with a 
formal aplomb that was unprecedented on the Elizabethan stage—dismisses the 
“jygging vaines of riming mother wits,” the demotic humor of stage clowns and 
other popular performers, and promises, instead, to show his audience a new 
combination of wit with sovereignty, of poetry with power; to “leade” the audience 
to Tamburlaine’s “stately tent of War,” where they 
 
shall heare the Scythian Tamburlaine, 
Threatning the world with high astounding tearms 
And scourging kingdoms with his conquering sword. 
     (Prol 4-6) 
 
One critic calls this mini-manifesto the “most forceful articulation of the early 
Elizabethan dramatist’s sense of his own authority and entitlement to transform the 
common stage to create a self-contained verbal picture of an imaginary world.” 49 
And indeed Tamburlaine’s prologue would have lingered over the play’s opening 
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scene like a burst of ozone. It would have made Mycetes’ failures to translate wit 
into kingship—which eventually leads to his brother Cosroe overthrowing him and 
taking the Persian crown from “his wearie witlesse head” (2.1.46; my emphasis)—
bend anticipatorily toward Tamburlaine’s apparition. Indeed, when he is 
introduced, Tamburlaine fully delivers on the prologue’s promise.  
We first encounter Tamburlaine in the play’s second scene as he is in the 
process of abducting a traveling Egyptian princess named Zenocrate. Zenocrate, 
taken aback by the boldness of a low-born shepherd, objects that she is traveling 
under her father’s orders to see the Chinese “Cham.”  Her attempt to pull rank, 
however, does not impress Tamburlaine, and he quickly asserts that her “letters and 
commands” have been 
 
 … countermanded by a greater man. 
 And through my provinces you must expect 
 Letters of conduct from my mightiness 
 If you intend to keep your treasure safe. 
    (1.2.21-24) 
 
Although Zenocrate is understandably nonplussed and puzzled by this obscure 
shepherd’s wild and whirling words, Tamburlaine resolutely asserts himself in a 
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single compact but significant sentence after she responds to his not so subtle 
question about her marital status: 
 
 Zenocrate.  I am (my Lord), for so you do import. 
 Tamburlaine. I am a Lord, for so my deeds shall prove. 
      (1.2.33-34) 
 
These ten words micrologically anticipate much of Marlowe’s play. The rider that 
Zenocrate adds to her answer in the first line suggests her skepticism about 
Tamburlaine and implies a split between the shepherd’s pretensions and the reality 
of his situation. But Tamburlaine wastes no time in trying to suture this split. In 
what almost seems like a linguistic-rhetorical analogue to the abduction he is 
attempting, Tamburlaine hijacks the syntax of Zenocrate’s skeptical response to his 
question—“I am (my Lord)”—and transforms it into a declarative statement—“I am 
a Lord”—whose strong and definitive copula almost has the ring of the 
proclamation of the Old Testament deity. This monotheistic rhetorical auctoritas 
carries over into the next clause as Tamburlaine translates the subjunctive skepticism 
of the Zenocrate’s “for so you do import” into the firm futurity of “for so my deeds 
shall prove.”  Shall is the key word here. Tamburlaine deliberately overlaps ontology 
and grammar. By the force of linguistic fiat, future potentiality subsumes the 
actualities of the present. This move is repeated as the scene goes on and 
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Tamburlaine dramatically doffs his pastoral outfit to reveal that underneath he is 
actually (and emblematically) clad in the full military regalia of a conqueror: 
 
This compleat armor, and this curtle-axe 
Are adjuncts more beseeming Tamburlaine. 
And Maddam, whatsoever you esteeme 
Of this successe, and losse unvalued, 
Both may invest you Empresse of the East. 
     (1.2.42-6) 
 
Seemingly-straightforward, these lines are actually crisscrossed by a number of 
oppositions: between  appearance and essence, being and seeming, “beseeming” and 
“esteeming.”  The result is phenomenological confusion as the reader or auditor is 
forced to flip back and forth between Tamburlaine and Zenocrate’s perspectives. But 
once again, Tamburlaine decisively and authoritatively resolves this confusion. And 
once again, he does so with reference to the future, particularly by positing a future 
image of Zenocrate as “Empresse of the East.”  Of course the local point of this 
gesture is to justify the sexual violation politely referred to in Tamburlaine’s mention 
of Zenocrate’s upcoming “losse unvalued” (that is, of her virginity).  But more is 
going on here than a simple rhetorical apologia for rape. In these lines (and the others 
I just discussed) Marlowe introduces a rhetorical strategy that will run throughout 
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both Tamburlaine plays, a rhetorical gesture in which the heroic sovereignty of the 
present is established vis-à-vis the future projections of imagination. He introduces a 
strategy in which sovereignty is established through the prolepsis of wit.  
The term prolepsis comes out of classical Greek rhetoric and filtered into the 
Renaissance as a grammatical term of art for the dramatic delay of details in a given 
sentence (something hard to pull off in English but which is quite easy in highly 
inflected languages like Latin and Greek). Marlovian prolepsis, however, is of a 
different sort. I apply the term to Tamburlaine to signify the core move on which its 
presentation of heroism is grounded: the dismissal of the actual in favor of a 
potentiality that is projected—by the sheer power of poetic language, by the sheer 
fiatic force of wit—into the future. Like some hyper-kinetic version of Heidegger’s 
Dasein, Tamburlaine’s being is always a Sich-vorweg-sein, a “being-ahead-of-itself,” a 
being constantly thrown into the future.50  But unlike the death-limned finitude of 
Heidegger’s archetypal protagonist, Marlowe’s proleptic hero knows no limits or 
negativities. No matter how much he conquers, the future is wide open.   Take, for 
instance, the following statement, spoken by Tamburlaine to his followers in the 
same scene: 
 
 These Lords (perhaps) do scorne our estimates, 
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And thinke we prattle with distempered spirits: 
But since they measure our deserts so meane, 
That in conceit bear Empires on our speares, 
Affecting thoughts coequall with the cloudes, 
They shall be kept our forced followers, 
Till with their eies they view us Emperours.  
     (1.2.52-58; my emphasis) 
 
Once again, these show wit’s proleptic push into the future. They demonstrate 
Tamburlaine’s use of images of future conquest and superabundance as a kind of 
solvent on the actual. But interestingly, this moment also shows an odd—and 
otherwise uncharacteristic—self-awareness and even defensiveness about such 
proleptic gesturing. This defensiveness is introduced with the parenthetical 
“perhaps” of the opening line, and runs through the passage—culminating in 
Tamburlaine’s sideways recognition that some might believe that he and his 
followers are little more than “distempered” dreamers who touch the “clouds” in 
their thoughts rather than their actions. What is being broached here is the 
possibility that Tamburlaine’s pending imperium is more a matter of conceit than 
coming actuality. But this possibility is quickly passed over, sidelined in the final 
proleptic image of these vaguely defined “lords” being one-day kept as the “forced 
followers” of Tamburlaine and his troops. Wit wins out, in other words, over the 
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stresses of things as they are. And futurity becomes the existential horizon of the rest 
of Marlowe’s play. As he says, later on, to his lieutenant Theridamas: 
 
 … Wil and Shall best fitteth Tamburlain, 
 Whose smiling stars gives him assured hope 
 Of martiall triumph, ere he meete his foes: 
 I that am tearm’d the Scourge and Wrath of God, 
 The onnely feare and terror of the world, 
 Wil first subdue the Turke, and then inlarge 
 Those Christian Captives, which you keep as slaves  
 Burdening their bodies with your heavie chaines, 
 And feeding them with thin and slender fare, 
 That naked rowe about the Terrene sea. 
    (3.3.41-50) 
 
As much as Tamburlaine’s prologue, this passage provides a kind of mini-manifesto 
for the imaginative method of both plays, reiterating not just the Antichrist-like 
terror their protagonist is meant to inspire but also the “high astounding terms” 
through which he inspires it. But they also show an odd and underappreciated 
feature of Tamburlaine’s proleptic sublation of wit into sovereignty. Grammar is 
foregrounded at the start of Tamburlaine’s declaration, with his claim that the future 
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mood best captures his heroic aspirations. But grammar also tells another story here. 
Although Tamburlaine himself is the grammatical subject of the ten-line sentence 
that constitutes this passage, he notably fades away by its conclusion. The sentence 
starts out with Tamburlaine, but in the rapid movement to subdued Turks and 
Christian captives and heavy chains and the Terrene Sea, Tamburlaine gets lost. He 
is subsumed into the images he proleptically posits. So while this passage is a perfect 
demonstration of the play’s proleptic sublation of wit into sovereignty by way of 
future, imaginative projection, it also shows how prolepsis goes hand-in-hand with 
aphanisis: with the disappearance and fading out of the subject under the strain of 
the signifier.51   
This odd coexistence of self-negation and self-assertion, of prolepsis and 
aphanisis, recurs throughout the rest of Tamburlaine’s first and second parts. It is, for 
instance, particularly apparent in what is probably Tamburlaine’s most famous scene, 
one evoked and parodied from Shakespeare’s Pistol to George Eliot’s Will Ladislaw: 
the “Jades of Asia” speech in the play’s second part. Here, Tamburlaine enters on a 
chariot pulled by the Asian kings he has conquered, proclaiming: 
  
… forward then ye Jades: 
Now crowch ye kings of greatest Asia, 
And tremble when ye heare this Scourge wil come, 
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That whips downe cities, and controweleth crownes, 
Adding their wealth and treasure to my store. 
The Euxine sea North to Natolia 
The Terrene west, the Caspian north north-east, 
And on the south to Senus Arabicus, 
Shal al be loaden with the martiall spoiles… 
 ……………………. 
Then in my coach like Saturnes royal son, 
 Mounted his shining chariot, gilt with fire, 
And drawen with princely Eagles through the path, 
Pav’d with bright Christall, and enchac’d with stares, 
When all the Gods stand gazing at his pomp: 
So will I ride through Samarcanda streets, 
Until my soule dissevered from the flesh, 
Shall mount the milk-white way and meet him there. 
To Babylon, my lords, to Babylon! 
     (4.3.97-105; 125-34) 
  
“No scene in all ten acts of this play,” Eugene Waith writes, “depicts more clearly 
Tamburlaine's lust for power,” his Herculean drive to dominate, conquer, and 
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actualize his heroic potentiality on an uncomprehending and inferior world.52   But 
as Tamburlaine proclaims his conquering, heroic becoming he also fades into the 
future conquests he summons to support this ambition and agenda.  The Euxine sea, 
Natolia, the Terrene Sea … all of them loom larger than Tamburlaine himself. And 
this subjective fade-out seems only further reinforced by his eventual fantasy of 
cosmic ascent, of his “shining chariot” moving toward heaven in a Herculean rise 
toward deification.   
Such aphanisis is the flipside of Tamburlaine’s proleptic version of heroism. It 
is the flipside of the play’s attempt to sublate wit into sovereignty. When Hegel, in 
the Shorter Logic, defines sublation (Aufheben in German) he makes note of its 
“double meaning”: sublation can mean both “to clear away, or annul” but also “to 
keep, preserve.” 53   Tamburlaine draws on both features. In Marlowe’s play the 
proleptic establishment of heroism goes hand-in-hand with the annulment of the 
hero.  Tamburlaine centers, to a remarkable degree, on Tamburlaine himself. But in 
the end, what Marlowe’s play provides is not so much a hero as a heroism. What it 
provides is not so much a singular figure of action as a fantasmatic structure in 
which action is infinitely imagined by being projected into the future. Tamburlaine, 
that is to say, provides its audience, with an experience of potentiality—of the 
potentiality, the imaginative power of language and of fantasy. This was, no doubt, 
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precisely the appeal of Tamburlaine, what made it so stunning and striking when it 
was first performed. But it was also what made Tamburlaine so easy to parody for 
writers like Shakespeare and Jonson, who in moments like Pistol’s  
 
  Shall packhorses 
 And hollow pampered jades of Asia, 
 Which cannot go but thirty mile a day, 
 Compare with Caesars, and with Cannibals, 
 And Trojan Greeks? 54 
 
pilloried precisely the unreality of its heroism, the gap between the heroic 
imagination of what Mulcaster called “imperial wits” and the humbleness of their 
actual circumstances.55   No hint of this gap appears in Marlowe’s actual play; its 
spectacular presentation of heroism refuses the very possibility of such a split in 
subsuming the hero so completely into his own language.  But when Marlowe 
moved on from Tamburlaine he was not through with the question of the relationship 
between alienation and heroism, the relationship between wit and sovereignty. A 
few years later he returned to the issue, from a wholly different point of view, in 
Doctor Faustus. 
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As with Tamburlaine, Marlowe built Doctor Faustus out of semi-real events—
specifically the life of John Faustus, a scholar supposedly-turned-sorcerer who lived 
in early sixteenth-century Germany and, by the end of that century, had become a 
legendary figure across Europe with a reputation that was reinforced by a 
vernacular pamphlet presenting an embellished version of his life that scholars have 
come to call the Faustbook and which was Marlowe’s main source in putting his play 
together.56  In the Faustbook, Doctor John is presented as a poor and malcontented 
academic who conjures and colludes with the devil to gain the powers necessary to 
fulfill his rather extensive and Epicurean lusts for money as well as to satisfy an 
ego—in the words of the prologue to Marlowe’s play—“swool’n with cunning of a 
self-conceit” (Prol 20). But while Marlowe’s prologue toes this particular narrative 
line, the play changes the figure of Faustus significantly. In Marlowe’s play, the 
Doctor’s motivations shift from greed and lust into an intense heroic aspiration. I 
have already mentioned that critics tend to read Faustus as a speculative and 
intellectual version of Tamburlaine’s more earthly aggression. But when the 
differences of the two figures’ circumstances are set aside it becomes quite clear that 
their fundamental motivations are almost identical. Both are driven by the desire for 
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“omnipotence,” the capacity to have “[a]ll things that move betweene the quiet 
poles” at his “command” are as characteristic of Doctor Faustus as they are of 
Marlowe’s earlier hero (1.54, 56-57).  
Doctor Faustus and Tamburlaine, in other words, both approach heroism in 
terms of its combination of wit and sovereignty. Indeed, like its predecessor Faustus 
foregrounds wit from early on. In the play’s famous opening scene, Faustus fixates 
on wit as he catalogues his disenchantment with the academic studies he has 
undertaken: 
 
Settle thy studies, Faustus, and beginne 
To sound the deapth of that thou wilt professe: 
Having commenced, be a Divine in shew, 
Yet level at the end of every Art, 
And live and die in Aristotles workes: 
Sweete Analutikes tis thou hast ravisht me, 
Bene disserere est finis logicis, 
Is, to dispute well, Logickes chiefest end 
Affoords this Art no greater miracle: 
Then reade no more, thou hast attaind that end: 
A greater subject fitteth Faustus wit… 




The gnarled enjambment of these lines is distinctly different from the flowing and 
forceful hypotaxis of Tamburlaine’s rhetoric. But both of Marlowe’s protagonists are 
propelled by the same drive to dominate. Both are driven toward the same 
experience of violent entelecheia, of potentiality bursting into actuality vis-à-vis 
conquest, domination, pure worldly power. But while Tamburlaine begins with—
and, as we just saw, never leaves behind—a fantasmatic experience of such 
entelecheia, its bombastic imagery acidizing the actual and compressing the future 
into an instant of pure possibility, Doctor Faustus begins with the failure of this 
gesture. It begins with an experience not of actualization but of wit’s vexing 
separation and exile from political action and actualization. It begins, in other words, 
with the problem of alienation that Marlowe sketched in Hero and Leander, where the 
learning and eloquence of wit are primally banished from the realm of rule and wit 
lingers as a lost reminder and remainder, an objet petit a alluding to the impossible 
plenitude of a pure political praxis.   
The anxieties and attention deficits that come from such alienation, from such 
a sense of primal loss, pulse through this scene and infuse the seemingly dry and 
desultory rhetoric of Faustus’s seriatim dissection of each of the things he has 
studied. Faustus combs through these past studies in detail but his focus is always 
on wit. He dismisses disciplines like “Law and Phyisicke” that seem to be 
appropriate only “for pettie wits” (1.107). He is—despite his best efforts—unable to 
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decide on a “subject” that fits his own “wit.”  What wit marks here is, of course, 
intellectual capacity. But it also indicates an ontologically thicker sense of 
potentiality, a potentiality whose final aim is not the pure knowledge of Platonic 
noiesis but rather very worldly rule: 
 
 O what a world of profit and delight, 
 Of power, of honor, of omnipotence 
 Is promised to the studious Artizan? 
 All things that move betweene the quiet poles 
 Shalbe at my command, Emperours and Kings, 
 Are but obeyd in their severall provinces: 
 Nor can they raise the winde, or rend the cloudes: 
 But his dominion that exceeds in this, 
 Stretcheth as farre as doth the minde of man. 
 A sound Magician is a mighty god: 
 Heere Faustus trie thy braines to gaine a deitie. 
     (1.53-63) 
 
In Tamburlaine’s already-quoted apologia for the “aspiring” mind’s pursuit of worldly 
power we saw Marlowe materialistically subvert the well-known Neo-Platonic trope 
of intellectual aspiration, transforming a transcendent quest for the absolute into an 
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immanent grab for power. Marlowe repeats such conceptual catachresis here as he 
has Faustus invoke, but simultaneously subvert, the old hendiadys of dulce et utile—
Horace’s formula for the ideal agenda of poetry.  From this point of view, learning 
and poetry foster conventional moral norms. But Faustus’s viewpoint could not be 
further from this conventional commonplace. For him, wit marks a potentiality that 
can only be actualized when he has secured worldly power and transformed 
himself, as he says a little later, into being the “great Emprour of the world” (3.104). 
As this scene goes on, with the encouragement of his two fellow scholars Cornelius 
and Valdes, Marlowe’s Doctor finally decides that the only way to accomplish this 
goal is through the black arts. As his friend Valdes says, it is only by putting 
Faustus’s “wit” toward magic that they “Shall make all nations to canonize us, / As 
Indian Moores obey their Spanish Lords” (1.119-21); that they will be presented with 
“huge Argoces” from Venice and take from “America the golden fleece, / That 
yearely stuffes olde Philips treasury” (1.29-31).  
In such early moments of aspiration, Doctor Faustus almost seems as though it 
will follow the path of Tamburlaine, sharing in the earlier play’s use of global 
imagining as a mode of proleptic conquest.57  Things do not fall out this way in 
Doctor Faustus, however. In the play, Marlowe swaps the centrifugal open-
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endedness of the romance genre he adapted in Tamburlaine for the closed 
eschatological economy of a morality play. Whatever Faustus gains through his deal 
with Mephistopheles and his master, his powers have an expiration date.  But 
Marlowe also, and more interestingly, portrays Faustus as somebody who seems 
again and again incapable of using the powers he acquires through his deal with the 
devil to follow through on what motivated him in the first place.  He portrays 
Faustus, in other words, as somebody who starts off wanting Tamburlaine-level 
worldly dominance but ends up mired in a miasma of mimesis and representation. 
Consider the following lines, spoken as Faustus’s final hour draws near: 
 
 Have not I made blinde Homer sing to me, 
 Of Alexanders love, and Enons death, 
 And hath not he that built the walles of Thebes, 
 With ravishing sound of his melodious harp 
 Made musicke with my Mephastophilis, 
 Why should I dye then, or basely dispaire? 
      (6.208-213) 
 
We just saw that Faustus starts off wanting to sublate wit into sovereignty, to change 
the scholar’s gown for the imperial regalia of a monarch like Philip.  But by midway 
through the play all he has done with the almost-infinite power he has obtained is to 
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stay within the realm of representation, imagination, fantasy—within the realm of wit. 
Turning, in the passage just quoted, to canvass what wonderful things he has 
accomplished with his powers, Faustus can think only of making Homer sing to him, 
of seeing classical scenes unfold before him. Completely missing are any of the 
worldly, material, and imperial feats he initially imagined. Even Amphion—
legendary founder of Thebes who used music to “move” stones (and in Sidney’s 
Defense is exemplary of the capacity of poets to civilize and form polities)—appears 
only as Mephastophilis’s partner in some sort of serio-ludically hellish hoedown. 
Faustus starts off wanting the omnipotent power that Tamburlaine projects. 
But he ends up not with “power in general” but—as Peter Womack writes—“the 
power to create illusions.”58   Faustus’ framework of Christian morality, in which the 
overreaching ambition of “toward wits” is punished with damnation, seems to 
enforce a lesson that is less religious than metaliterary. 59  The play emerges, in the 
words of one recent critic, as a “didactic work teaching that to place one’s trust in the 
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performative sign is to subjugate oneself to Satan.”60 The attempt to convert wit into 
sovereignty leads only to entrapment and a situation in which wit’s fantasmatic 
prism becomes a mental prison and locus of alienation. As in Mulcaster’s account of 
the contradictions of Tudor education, Faustus’ own “Imperiall Wit” marks both a 
positive desire to become and a negative symptom of social exclusion. It marks a desire 
to control and to conquer that is itself a compensatory attempt to overcome an 
absence, a lack, that is inscribed in this desire’s very origins.  
This realization hangs over the long dénouement of Marlowe’s play, but its 
most poignant articulation comes in the late scene where Faustus is summoned 
before the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V. Charles, we learn, has heard reports of 
the Doctor’s deep “knowledge in the black Arte” (9.2). He thinks this will help him 
banish the malaise that he has been suffering from: 
 
As I was sometime solitary set, within my Closet sundry thoughts 
arose, about the honour of mine auncestors, howe they had wonne by 
prowess such exploits, gote such riches, subdued so many kingdoms, 
as we that do suceede, or they that shal hereafter possesse our throne, 
shal (I feare me) never attaine to that degree of high renowne and 
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great authoritie, amongst which kings is Alexander the great, chiefe 
spectacle of the worlds preheminence. (9.18-25)    
 
The Emperor hopes Faustus can cure his ill temper by bringing back to life the 
exemplary figure of Alexander the Great. But all he is capable of providing is pure 
(and professed) illusion: demons and minions of Mephastophilis dressed in the 
borrowed robes of heroic greatness, but which both he and the Emperor desperately 
want to accept as postmortem embodiments of heroic action, an experience of 
political meaning and plenitude that is, in reality, irrevocably lost.  In this scene, 
Marlowe presents a summation of Doctor Faustus’s interrogation of the relationship 
between wit and sovereignty, between heroism and its own basis in fantasy. Wit is 
no longer a free-floating potentiality that needs to be actualized by way of a passage 
into heroic praxis.  Doctor Faustus stages the realization that all of heroism’s “art and 
power” are—in the words of a knight at Charles’ court who refuses to take Faustus’ 
conjuring seriously—“just nothing at all” (9.40-1). 
 
V 
Nothing at all. These three words capture the final position of Marlowe’s 
interrogation of the wit. While Tamburlaine is a fantasy organized and oriented 
around an experience of political entelecheia vis-à-vis the linguistic praxis to which it 
was linked for Marlowe, the play’s very success brushed up against the negativity 
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signaled in the fading out of the hero under the pressure of linguistic power itself. 
But in Doctor Faustus the relationship between sovereignty and wit is presented in an 
even bleaker light. The play suggests that wit is not an imaginative potential that is 
unbreakably tied to political life but—rather—a capacity for unreality tied to nothing, 
validated by nothing, adrift in a politically disenchanted world. This experience of 
wit is, in the final analysis, what Marlowe’s engagement with heroism reveals. 
Marlowe’s two heroes are remainders and reminders of a primal split between the 
potentiality of language and the potentiality to participate in the political world—a 
split from which heroism emerges, but which it is also constitutively unable to 
mend.  
In subsequent centuries, wit would find a new place on the shifting maps of 
English and European culture. It would come to signal the free-floating imaginative 
and creative potentiality whose valorization was central in the rising discourses of 
neo-classical criticism and aesthetic ideology. In these, wit would signify the 
combinatory capacities of the human mind harnessed by the creative writer capable 
of “‘discordia concors’; a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult 
resemblances in things apparently unlike.”61  Wit’s migration into this new cultural 
and textual territory, however, was itself part of the process of political 
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transformation, of political alienation, that Marlowe’s texts witness. The emergence of 
“the political as abstract” and “universal”—as Christopher Pye recently writes—
went hand-in-hand with the emergence of the literary and the aesthetic as formally 
autonomous categories.62  But while Marlowe’s work struggles with the challenges 
of this political change, his work looks backward rather than forward; it understands 
wit not as the origin of an independent or autonomous form of literary practice but 
rather as a marker of a lost plenitude of politico-poetic unity.  
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So far, I have argued that in the plays, prose, and poems of Philip Sidney and 
Christopher Marlowe heroism functions as a powerful mode of political-poetic 
fantasy, one that mediates a major shift in elite political culture that was ongoing in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This shift involved the collision 
between a traditional English political paradigm—one that combined monarchy 
with local autonomy, office-holding, and a republican ethos that understood politics 
in terms of dynamic individual action and potentiality—and an inchoate and 
fundamentally alienated form of political life, one that centered on the consolidated 
political power of the state. Historians have charted this shift variously. But as I 
noted earlier, they have tended to see the story of state-formation as a series of 
objective processes and institutional changes. Like any historical process, however, 
the emergence of the early modern English state was just as much subjective as it was 
objective. It occurred not only within the ontic sphere of material and institutional 
history, but also within the ontological sphere of political experience.  
Both Sidney and Marlowe, as we have seen, use heroism as a way of 
imaginatively coming to grips with the increasing impossibility of a dynamic ideal 
of political action. In each writer’s work, this heroic ideal exits the realm of practical 
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possibility and becomes, instead, a marker of poetic creativity’s separation from 
actuality. But while Marlowe and Sidney’s works only gradually reconcile themselves 
to a newly alienated political reality, this chapter turns to a writer for whom the 
fundamental disenchantment, the fundamental alienation, of political life is not a 
hard realization but a basic point of departure: George Chapman (c. 1559-1634). 
Though little read today, Chapman was a remarkable writer. His immense body of 
work runs the gamut from arcane philosophical coterie poetry to deluxe translations 
of classical authors, from demotic humoral comedy to some of the most highly-
wrought tragedies that ever graced the Renaissance stage. And he has a strong claim 
to being one of the most powerful, intensive, and extensive engagements with 
heroism that early modern England produced.1      
Heroism is at the center of the two literary projects that dominated 
Chapman’s career. The first of these projects was the Homer translation for which 
Chapman (largely due to Keats’ famous sonnet) is best known today. Chapman first 
hit on the idea of Englishing Homer in the mid-1590s and announced it with Achilles 
Shield (1598), a pamphletic teaser that provided a bit of the initial translation and 
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advertised the further work to come.2   This was followed up, in the same year, by 
the more substantial Seven Books of the Iliads of Homer, and the project continued in a 
number of subsequent editions that came out well into the first two decades of the 
seventeenth century and culminated with The Whole Works of Homer (1616). 3   
Chapman’s Homer translation is a high-water mark for the prestige and centrality of 
heroism to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English culture. Throughout the 
extensive notes, prefaces, and other paratextual materials he appended to its various 
editions and redactions, Chapman emerges as a powerful and eloquent apologist for 
heroism as a paradigmatic model of human excellence and potential. Homer’s 
heroes, he writes, are models of “unmatched virtues” and “dignities” of the soul.4  
They signal the greatness of which human beings are intrinsically capable.  
This strong ethical and political investment in heroism is also at the center of 
Chapman’s other major project and his most lasting accomplishment as a 
playwright: the series of tragedies he composed in the early years of the seventeenth 
century and which include Bussy D’Ambois (1603), the Conspiracy and Tragedy of 
Charles, Duke of Byron (1608), the follow-up to the first Revenge of Bussy D’Ambois 
(first published in 1603), and the harder to date Tragedy of Chabot, Admiral of France 
(c. 1611-22). These plays—which modern critics call the “French Tragedies,” since 
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 See George Chapman, Achilles Shield (London, 1598). 
3
 See George Chapman, Seauen Bookes of the Iliades of Homere (London, 1598); George Chapman, The 
Whole Works of Homer (London, 1616). 
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they focus on the French court—present heroism as an ethical and political 
exemplum of human potentiality. In them, such potential can take various forms. It 
can, for instance, appear in the near-Herculean magnanimity of a figure like Charles, 
Duke of Byron, who proclaims that it is “[i]mmortallitie to die aspiring” and that   
 
 No true power doth admit privation 
 Adverse to him, or suffers any fellow 
 Joined in his subject; you superiors, 
 It is the nature of things absolute 
 One to destroy another… 5 
 
as well as in the heroized stoic apatheia of a “Senecal man” like Claremont D’Ambois: 
 
In his most gentle and unwearied mind 
Rightly to virtue framed; in very nature; 
In his most firm inexorable spirit 
To be removed from anything he chooseth 
For worthiness, or bear the least persuasion 
To what is base, or fitteth not his object.6 
                                                     
5
 George Chapman, The Conspiracy of Charles, Duke of Byron, in The Conspiracy and Tragedy of Charles, 
Duke of Byron, ed. John Margeson (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1988) 1.2.99-103. 
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But whether engaging heroism in terms of the “[b]odies … outward Fortitude” or 
the mind’s “inward, constant, and vnconquerd Empire,” Chapman’s French 
tragedies present heroism as an avatar of the “excellence of royal humanity.”7    
It is thus not surprising that scholars have seen Chapman as uniquely 
invested in the heroic. No “dramatist of the period before 1642,” as Eugene Waith 
writes, “was more explicitly concerned with the heroic tradition than George 
Chapman.”8  In what follows, however, I want to argue that Chapman was also 
deeply ambivalent about heroism.9 For Chapman, heroism was an ethical, a political, 
and an intellectual ideal. In the French Tragedies, however, he is concerned equally 
with how heroism’s ideality collides with contemporary political conditions that are 
inimical to it. In Chapman’s drama, heroism emerges not as a singular ethical or 
political absolute. It functions as a flexible but powerful political fantasy, one 
capable of encompassing a broad range of political experiences, but which exists in a 
state of tension with political reality. This political tension, rather than negating 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
 George Chapman, The Revenge of Bussy D’Ambois, in Four Revenge Tragedies, ed. Katherine Eisaman 
Maus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 4.4.14-19. 
7
 Chapman, Whole Works, A4
r




 Eugene Waith, Ideas of Greatness (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971) p. 124. 
9
 The scholarly debate about Chapman’s attitude toward the heroic tends to occur alongside another debate, 
concerning whether Chapman’s writing articulates a coherent set of philosophical positions or whether it is 
a more unstable mixture of different—and often contradictory—philosophical, ethical, and political 
positions. For a persuasive argument that Chapman’s work, and his presentation of his heroes in the French 
tragedies, does not adhere to a single, standard doctrinal line see Maclure, George Chapman. For a less 
persuasive argument that Chapman is actually a relatively doctrinaire proponent of a Christian humanist 
philosophy see Rees, Tragedies, and Roy W. Battenhouse, “Chapman and the Nature of Man,” ELH 12, no. 
2 (1945) pp. 87-107.  
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heroism, provides the fundamental source of its political appeal—a paradox that is 
worked through most intensively and most extensively in what critics generally 
agree is the greatest of the French plays: Bussy D’Ambois.  
Bussy D’Ambois is based on the real life of Louis de Clermont, seigneur de 
Bussy d’Ambois (1549-1579), a courtier and scion of a wealthy and influential family 
who was known as a particularly prickly and trouble-prone young man in Henry 
III’s already trouble-prone court. In 1574 Bussy, previously loyal to Henry, 
transferred his allegiance to his (Henry’s) brother the Duc d’Alençon (Chapman 
refers to him as “Monsieur,” the standard moniker for the heir apparent). In a series 
of twists and turns largely ignored in Chapman’s play, he was eventually 
assassinated in a factional conflict between the King and the Duke. Bussy was 
somewhat well-known in his own day, and he seems to have had a significant 
reputation “for personal courage, violent temper, sexual intrigue and dueling”; but 
no commentator on contemporary French affairs—as one of the play’s modern 
editors writes—seems to have ever considered giving him “heroic status.” 10  
Chapman, however, transforms Bussy almost completely. Rather than a privileged 
courtier, he makes Bussy “poor,” the bastard son of a cardinal and disaffected 
soldier and a scholar who—as the play opens—has retreated from the active life into 
stoic apatheia but is subsequently lured by Monsieur to serve as one of his hangers-
                                                     
10
 I draw here on Nicholas Brooke’s introduction to this edition of Bussy D’Ambois (London: Methuen, 
1964). All subsequent citations to Bussy refer to this edition by act, scene, and line number.  
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on. Once Bussy arrives at court, in Chapman’s version, he develops a “great” spirit 
that “will not down” in the face of any of the prerogatives of privilege or position. 
He defies his superiors, takes up with Tamyra, the wife of a high-ranking nobleman, 
and establishes himself as a vocal malcontent who, with the protection of the king, 
carries himself as an embodiment of natural nobility and the prelapsarian virtus of a 
lost heroic age.  
This eventually (and predictably) leads to Bussy’s downfall when he is 
gunned down by the henchmen of his spurned patron and the jealous husband of 
his mistress. But the most gripping and dramatic dynamic of Chapman’s play is not 
the predictably fatal twist of its tragic plot. It is, rather, the central characterological 
ambiguity of Bussy himself, the way in which he becomes the focal point for a 
widely divergent set of political perspectives and experiences.  In his presentation of 
Bussy’s meteoric ascent and descent in the French curia, Chapman constantly calls 
attention to the triangular tension between how Bussy sees himself, how others see 
him, and the bare facts of what he does.  The most striking of these three dramatic 
levels is the third, for what Bussy actually does is precisely nothing. We see no great 
feats of heroism from Bussy. His heroism rather emerges in Chapman’s play as 
largely virtual, existing in the articulated experience and perception of the characters 
that surround him. For Tamyra, for the King, and for Bussy himself, Bussy is an 
instance of a kind of primal, almost prelapsarian “naturalness.”  In one scene, for 




Sin is a coward Madam, and insults 
But on our weakness, in his truest valour: 
And so our ignorance tames us, that we let 
His shadows fright us: and like empty clouds 
In which our faulty apprehensions forge 
The forms of dragons, lions, elephants 
When they hold no proportion, the sly charms 
Of the witch Policy make him like a monster 
Kept only to shew men for Goddess Money. 
     (3.1.18-26) 
 
This passage combines two well-known classical notions. First, Bussy invokes the 
common classical concept of the “natural man.” 11   He sets himself up as a 
paradigmatic instance of a prelapsarian purity that is opposed to the ideological 
forces of “sin” and “ignorance”—concepts, he claims, that function to “tame” 
individuals. This initial self-presentation, however, develops into another position 
and another unique riff on classical precedent. Bussy identifies the force behind such 
                                                     
11
 On Chapman’s use of this concept and its Senecan background, see Richard S. Ide, Possessed with 
Greatness: The Heroic Tragedies of Shakespeare and Chapman (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1980) p. 84.  
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attempted “taming” as the “witch Policy.”12 Hovering in the background of this 
identification is the classical concept of Fortuna as a femininely-personified allegory 
of the worldly contingency that individual virtus has to strive and struggle to 
overcome.13  In replacing fortune with policy, however, Bussy opposes himself not 
only to the mutability of the sublunary world. He opposes himself to something 
more specific:  the social and a political totality that is opposed to heroic identity and 
integrity. That totality, which the French court represents, is marked off by and 
identified with the term policy. 
This chapter reads Bussy’s complex and multiple portrayal of its 
protagonist—from his own viewpoint, and in the viewpoints of those around him—
through the lens of the idea of policy. For Chapman, I will argue, this term marks an 
experience of the political as fundamentally alienated. It captures a vision of the 
political world as a space of impossibility, suffused by the forces of corrupt 
constituted power. But while in his more strictly philosophical poetic writing 
Chapman willingly dismisses policy as intrinsically corrupt, a more complex 
position emerges in Bussy D’Ambois. In Bussy we see both a profound skepticism 
about the active life as well as a demonstration of its unavoidable appeal. Bussy’s 
                                                     
12
 For an analysis of Chapman’s play—and Jacobean drama more generally—as practicing a kind of 
inchoate form of ideology critique see Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology, and 
Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries, 3rd ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2004) pp. 182-
88. 
13
 On the classical concept of fortune, see J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) and 
Hanna Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccòlo Machiavelli (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999).  
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species of heroism is—for Chapman—impossible within the political realities he 
inhabits. But this impossibility is also the source of Bussy’s power and appeal as a 
poetic and philosophical ideal. 14  
In what follows, I suggest that by tracing the term policy through Chapman’s 
play we can see Bussy D’Ambois articulating a complex dialectic of poetic-political 
(im)possibility. But before turning to Chapman’s play, I want to first canvass his 
career more broadly and talk more generally about his presentation of the concept of 
policy. For throughout Chapman’s writing this term marks a profoundly alienated 
experience of the political—one to which Chapman’s literary work is a particular, 
powerful, and complex response.  
 
II 
George Chapman lived and worked in a milieu that should be familiar from 
the last chapter’s discussion of Marlowe’s life and historical moment. Much like 
                                                     
14
 Critics have gone back and forth about the perspectival multiplicity of how Chapman presents Bussy. 
Rees, Tragedies, argues that Bussy is a kind of ironic variation on the concept of the Marlowe-style 
superman, and many others have argued that Chapman’s presentation of his protagonist is—in one way or 
another—ironic (see, e.g., Peter Ure, “Chapman’s Tragedies,” in Jacobean Theater [London: Edward 
Arnold, 1960] p. 236). Probably the best account of the presentational multiplicity of Chapman’s play is A. 
R. Braunmuller’s subtle and supple account of Chapman’s major tragedies in his study Natural Fictions: 
George Chapman’s Major Tragedies (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1983). “The play’s courtly 
speakers,” Braunmuller writes, “lack a language to describe Bussy, or at least to describe one aspect of the 
hero. They struggle to find terms—demon or prelapsarian man or blustering bully—for what they have 
never experienced. This difficulty extends to Bussy himself. He, too, flounders when he tries to define 
himself as the outsider he feels he is. Linguistic difficulties echo the social and psychological ones. If 
definition could be found, Bussy could be ‘placed’ in the court world, and, of course, the politicians could 
then control and manipulate him as they control and manipulate more orthodox individuals” (p. 40). My 
own reading departs from these earlier readings, however, insofar as I claim that Chapman is not only 
aware of this ambiguity, but that it is itself a statement—an implicit statement, but a statement 
nonetheless—about the contradictions of the period’s political experience.  
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Marlowe, Chapman was one of the over-educated but under-employed lumpenliterati 
who provided plays for the popular stage as well as a wide variety of other texts for 
the vernacular print culture that was booming in late sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth-century London.15  And like Marlowe (and Greene, and Nashe, and 
many other young writers) Chapman’s career was a long and uneven attempt to 
carve out an authorial position in this new social situation—a situation where 
poetry’s longtime link to networks of patronage was waning; where (as Chapman 
wrote) the “sonnes of the Muses” no longer had the “priuiledge to liue onlie by their 
wits” but, instead, had to find their way in the “free trade” of the literary 
marketplace.16   
Historians and critics have failed to unearth much information about 
Chapman’s early life. He was apparently born into a middling family at sometime 
around 1560 and spent some of his early years serving as a foot soldier during the ill-
fated Netherlands expedition in which Sidney was killed (a grunt’s-eye experience 
of combat that perhaps accounts for some of the skepticism toward glorified military 
violence that we see in his work). Where Chapman acquired his extensive learning is 
a mystery. An extensive Oxbridge education is unlikely, so he seems to have been a 
                                                     
15
 See the general discussion in the last chapter as well as M.H. Curtis, “The Alienated Intellectuals of 
Early Stuart England,” Past and Present 32 (1962) pp. 27-28 and G.K. Hunter, John Lyly: The Humanist as 
Courtier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). 
16
 Chapman, Monsieur D’Olive (London, 1606) B2r.  
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Jonson-style autodidact.17  By the early 1590s, in any case, Chapman was in London, 
trying to start a writing career. He cut his theatrical teeth writing for the popular 
theater—first for Henslowe’s Admiral’s Men (who produced his first play The Blind 
Beggar of Alexandria in 1596) and later for the Children of the Chapel (who performed 
the French Tragedies). At the same time, however, Chapman also started moving in 
a different and more unusual literary direction. In the mid-90s, he began publishing 
a series of long, learned, and seriously arcane philosophical poems. The first was the 
Shadow of Night (1594), a pair of hyper-learned hymns to Night and the classical 
goddess Cynthia that try to develop a style of poetry that eschews the “monstrous 
affections” of sensuality and amorousness for a more “beautifull” intellectual 
“iudgement.” 18   The second was Ovid’s Banquet of Sense, which came out the 
following year and which tries to pull off what Adorno and Benjamin might have 
called an “immanent critique” of the erotic epyllia popular in the 1590s.19 (Around 
the same time, Chapman also provided a continuation of Marlowe’s fragmentary 
contribution to this genre, Hero and Leander—a continuation that carried on in 
                                                     
17
 See Burnett, “George Chapman.”  
18
 George Chapman, The Shadow of Night, in The Poems of George Chapman, ed. Phyllis Brooks Bartlett 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1941) p. 19. All subsequent citations to Chapman’s poetry will be to 
this addition, hereafter abbreviated as Poems.  The philosophical confidence and intensity of this particular 
poem led an earlier generation of critics to speculate that Chapman belonged to some sort of secret cabal of 
magicians, scholars, and poets called the “School of Night.” See M.C. Bradbrook, The School of Night 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936). The idea of this school—also thought to have involved 
Marlowe, Raleigh, and Thomas Harriot—has since fallen out of fashion. 
19
 George Chapman, Ovid’s Banquet of Sense, in Poems. On the epyllion and its popularity in this period 
see Elizabeth Story Donno, “The Epyllion,” in English Poetry and Prose, 1540-1674, ed. Christopher Ricks 
(London: Sphere, 1986) pp. 82-100. For more on the poem’s negotiation of its situation and its traditions 
see Frank Kermode, “The Banquet of Sense,” in Shakespeare, Spenser, Donne: Renaissance Essays 
(London: Routledge, 1971) pp. 84-115.  
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Marlowe’s spirit but also downplayed the erotic sensuousness of the original 
fragment).20   
Chapman’s early poems are unique—even by the standards of the innovative 
literary culture of the English 1590s. They show an unparalleled level of 
metaphysical intensity and a tendency toward syntactic and imagistic torsion that is 
both impressive and irritating.  To take but one of thousands of possible examples, 
consider the following stanza from Ovid’s Banquet of Sense:  
 
Here Ovid sold his freedom for a looke, 
And with that looke was ten tymes more enthralled, 
He blusht, lookt pale, and like a fervor shooke, 
And as a burning vapor being exhaled 
  Promist by Phoebus eye to be a star 
Heavens walles denying to be further scalde 
  The force dissolves that drewe it up so far: 
And then it lightens against his death and fals 
So Ovid’s powre, this powerful sight appals.21 
 
                                                     
20
 See Hero and Leander, in Poems. On Marlowe’s poem and Chapman’s continuation see C.S. Lewis, 
“Hero and Leander,” in Selected Literary Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) pp. 58-
73.  
21
 George Chapman, Ovid’s Banquet of Sense, in Poems, p. 65.  
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Commentators on Chapman’s poetic style have often tried to account for its 
difficulty by emphasizing the complexities of Chapman’s imagery. Rosemond Tuve 
is typical here in describing Chapman’s fondness for “introducing an unexpected 
logical complication into an image.”22  We see this quality in the stanza just quoted, 
particularly in the confusing image of vapor that Chapman puts forward in its later 
lines. But the difficulty and peculiarity of Chapman’s poetic writing go way beyond 
its opaque images. Chapman’s poetic obscurity is part of an overall poetic and 
rhetorical strategy, one characterized linguistically by a tendency toward 
asyndeton—toward what George Puttenham calls a “Loose Language” which 
“wants good band or coupling.”23  Trying to account for Chapman’s peculiarity T.S. 
Eliot argued in the early twentieth century that Chapman stood alongside Donne, 
both exemplifying a metaphysical merger of meaning and sense that was possible in 
poetry before the later seventeenth-century “dissociation of sensibility.”24  But with 
all due respect to Eliot, the Donne/Chapman analogy is misleading. True, both poets 
share a tendency toward imagistic abstraction and syntactic contortion.  But the 
rococo virtuosity of Donne’s lyric is integrally linked to its limited intended 
audiences, coteries au courant in the same arcane learning that Donne himself was 
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 Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963) 
p. 267.  
23
 George Puttenham, The Arte of English Poesy, ed. Frank Whigham and Wayne A. Rebhorn (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2007) p. 259.  
24
 See Eliot’s famous essay/introduction “The Metaphysical Poets,” in Selected Essays (New York: 
Harcourt, 1961) p. 296, where he crisply claims that in “Chapman especially there is a direct sensuous 
apprehension of thought, or a recreation of thought into feeling, which is exactly what we find in Donne.” 
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and who could thus be counted on to appreciate the ways in which he parlayed this 
learning into complex feats of poetic brilliance.25  But Chapman is different. His 
poetry is written with a much different conception of authorship and audience in 
mind. Raymond Waddington (drawing on the work of Michael Murrin) calls this 
conception “allegorical”: a model of authorship where the poet eschews the 
rhetorical back-and-forth of audience assumption and authorial articulation and 
instead “begins with an absolute truth, which creates a presentational dilemma; 
while he must protect his truth from the unworthy multitude by concealing it, he 
must conceal it in such a way as to reveal it to the few prepared to understand and 
accept.”26  And indeed Chapman’s poetry, which hinges on a model of learning 
defined as 
  
…skill to throwe  
 Reignes on your bodies powers, that nothing knowe; 
 And fill the soules powers, so with act, and art, 
That she can curbe the bodies angrie part; 
All perturbations; all affects that stray 
                                                     
25
 See Arthur Marotti, John Donne, Coterie Poet (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986). 
26
 The critic is Raymond B. Waddington, and much of the above draws on his helpful account of 
Chapman’s nachleben in the first chapter of his The Mind’s Empire: Myth and Form in Chapman’s 
Narrative Poetry (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). Waddington bases his distinction 
between allegorical and oratorical poetry on Michael Murrin’s The Veil of Allegory: Some Notes Toward a 
Theory of Allegorical Rhetoric in the English Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).  
166 
 
From their one obiect; which is to obay 
Her Soueraigne Empire… 27 
 
—a skill, he claims, that can be channeled by a “diuine discipline of Poesie” capable 
of providing to a select few  the “exceeding rapture of delight in the deepe search of 
knowledge”—repeatedly demonstrates this understanding of authorship.28 Anybody 
familiar with Chapman’s body of work—a body of work dotted with declarations 
like 
 
Away, vngodly Vulgars, far away 




The Prophane multitude I hate, & onelie consecrate my strange Poems 
to these searching spirits, whom learning hath made noble…30 
 
                                                     
27
 Chapman, Euthymiae Raptus, or The Teares of Peace, in Poems, p. 184. 
28
 I am quoting here from the prefatory epistle to Matthew Royden, attached to Chapman’s first volume of 
published poetry, The Shadow of Night (1594), printed in Poems, p. 19.  
29
 George Chapman, Andromeda Liberata, in Poems, p. 305.  
30
 George Chapman, Preface, Ovid’s Banquet of Sense, in Poems, p. 49. 
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and whose individual texts are often are stuffed with a superabundance of scholarly 
self-assertion that makes Ben Jonson look like a paragon of lightly-worn learning—
will have no trouble recognizing this allegorical idea of authorship at play 
throughout, from his early arcane poetry of the late 1590s all the way down through 
the mature poetry, translations, and tragedies. 
 Chapman’s unique vision of poetic authorship, however, did not emerge in 
an historical vacuum. The relative decline of critical interest in Chapman’s work 
over the last few decades is indicative of the fact that critics reading literature in 
terms of its social and political complexity find it difficult to historicize a writer 
whose work is obsessed with transcendent truths and whose writing almost always 
leads back to the same strikingly syncretic but ultimately unoriginal mélange of 
Platonism, Stoicism, and the other bits of hermetic lore popular among the educated 
classes of Renaissance Europe. But  Chapman’s attempts to fashion himself as a kind 
of oracular poet/sage are no less historically and socially situated than those of the 
period’s other and more-examined “self-crowned laureates” (Spenser’s Virgilian 
rota, Jonson’s attempts to revive Horatian ethical perspective and sociability…).31 
Particularly, I would argue that Chapman’s oracular poetic self-conception speaks to 
the specific political position he occupied and from which he wrote. It was a 
response to the social, economic, and political alienation that—like Marlowe and 
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 See Richard Helgerson, Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton and the Literary System 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); Patrick Cheney, Spenser’s Famous 
Flight: A Renaissance Idea of a Literary Career (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983). 
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other writers in similar social positions—Chapman’s career embodied. For Marlowe 
poetry’s opposition to the political realm is fundamentally unjust.  It is—to quote 
these helpful lines again—the result of a primal disenfranchisement he imagined in 
Hero and Leander’s description of how 
 
… Midas brood shall sit in Honors chaire, 
To which the Muses sonnes are only heire: 
And fruitfull wits that in aspiring are, 
Shall discontent, run into regions farre; 
And few great lords in vertuous deeds shall joy 
But be surpris’d with every garish toy. 
And still inrich the loftie servile clowne, 
Who with incroching guile, keeps learning down. 
(475-82) 
 
Chapman, by contrast, not only accepts the split between poetry and philosophy and 
politics but uses it as a way of positing the superiority of poetry and learning to the 
politically active world. For Chapman, poetry and learning are fundamentally 
opposed to the world of policy. Take, for instance, these lines from an early stanza in 




‘Tis for mere looke-like Ladies, and for men 
To boast of birth that still be children, 
Running to Father straight to helpe theyr needs; 
True dignities and rites of reuerence, 
Are sowne in minds and reapt in liuely deedes, 
And onely pollicie makes difference 
Twixt States, since virtue wants due intemperance…32 
 
This skepticism toward the active life—an active life characterized, here, by 
unnatural division and the repression of virtue—continues and increases in intensity 
as Chapman’s career goes on. Repeatedly in his later poetry Chapman uses policy to 
mark an experience of political alienation: a sense that no good can come of 
participation in collective life; that it is a degraded and inherently corrupt space 
where, as he writes in The Tears of Peace (1609), 
 
… Actiue men, consume their whole lifes fire,  
In thirst of State-height, higher still and higher,  
(Like seeled Pigeons) mounting, to make sport,  
To lower lookers on; in seeing how short  
They come of that they seeke, and with what trouble;  
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 Chapman, Ovid’s Banquet, in Poems, pp. 75-76. 
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Lamely, and farre from Nature, they redouble  
Their paines in flying, more then humbler witts,  
To reach death, more direct. 33 
 
For Chapman, policy serves not just as a marker of political corruption. As 
these lines suggest, the term also functions as a kind of symbolic condensation of the 
political alienation and ressentiment that affected the entire social stratum he 
inhabited. Here, policy comes to mark a fundamentally negative political experience: 
a view of the collective realm as alienated, distant, a degraded sphere from which 
any value—poetic or philosophical—must be rigorously separated.  But to 
understand the significance of this vision of politics and policy for Chapman’s 
work—and, ultimately, to understand the uniqueness of how he treats the term in 
Bussy D’Ambois—we first need to establish what the term meant in the context in 
which Chapman wrote.   
Contemporary senses of the term policy—“a definite course or method of 
action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide 
and determine present and future decisions … a high-level overall plan embracing 
the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body,” 
according to a recent redaction of Webster’s—provide an almost perfect summary of 
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 Chapman, Tears of Peace, in Poems, p. 182. Indeed, in a later patronage letter, when Chapman is forced 
by the rhetorical occasion to speak of a “true policy” that can make “men great and good” he still speaks of 
policy in the rather ambivalent image of a “serpent” who “windes” through “all Empery” (Andromeda 
Liberata, in Poems, p. 311).  
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a modern experience and understanding of the political. They point to the way in 
which modern political life is mediated by either representation or the institutional 
totality of the state, whose “formally unified” bureaucratic “guidance” (to quote 
Max Weber) the contemporary term policy marks. 34   However, from its initial 
appearance in English during the fourteenth century, policy marked a very different 
understanding and experience of the political: one that was profoundly personalized 
and lacking the mundane metaphysics of market, state, and representation that 
mediate and alienate modern political life.  Policy was the art of governance.  It was 
the area of human endeavor where members of the enfranchised elite—whether the 
monarch and the ruling aristocracy or the educated proto-middle class who advised 
and educated them—could realize “the potentialities of his inborn nature” by taking 
on the “responsibility appropriate to his status in the life of his community or 
country.”35  This positive sense of policy runs through much later-medieval and 
early-Tudor writing, from John Gower’s Confessio Amantis to Thomas Starkey’s 
Dialogue between Pole and Lupset (to cite just a few examples).36  And it continued into 
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the later sixteenth century, where policy was still seen as the proper pursuit of an 
active life and defined as “the regiment of a cittie, or Common-wealth; and that 
which the Grecians call politicall gouernment.”37   
But in the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, policy’s significance 
also began to shift. Specifically, it started to signify the increasing sense of separation 
between a republican ethos of public participation and the constituted power of the 
state. The last two chapters have described this shift from the perspective of both 
Sidney’s aristocratic milieu and Marlowe’s world of “alienated intellectuals.”  What I 
want to emphasize here, however, is that policy came to mark a political vision—a 
political fantasy—that both these perspectives shared: an emergent experience and 
understanding of politics in terms of political ideologies of arcana imperii and raison 
d’état and their ethical emphases on constancy, prudence, and a politically charged 
inwardness of “reserving into a man’s self a fair retreat” captured so memorably in 
Bacon’s Essays.38  This alienated view of the political often attached itself to the semi-
fictional version of Machiavelli that circulated in the popular imaginary. Modern 
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scholars have decisively dispelled this understanding of Machiavelli, and 
demonstrated how his bracing realpolitikal analyses were in fact made as part of an 
attempt to preserve this republican order. 39   But nevertheless the “distortions” 
Machiavelli’s thought “was subjected to after his death” were part and parcel of the 
negative connotations the term “‘policy’ and its derivatives acquired in the course of 
the sixteenth century.”40  This negative version of policy had a long life. In the late 
seventeenth century, Philip Sidney’s great nephew Algernon Sidney would 
complain that “not any word [is] more abused than that of policy”—abuse, he 
claims, that is grounded in the forgetting of the etymological fact that the polis from 
which it derives, in the Aristotelian formation, should be organized around the 
pursuit of a “happy human life” that follows from virtue; but the term also came to 
indicate political practice unmoored from any ethical norms. 41  And this 
fundamentally negative view of policy would be even more powerful during 
Chapman’s historical moment, a moment where “‘policy’ and ‘politic’ came to be 
generally used as denoting cunning, and altogether amoral conduct based on 
expediency, deceitfulness,”42  and where policy was often seen as being coequal with 
                                                     
39
 See, e.g., Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, and Maurizio Viroli, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford University 
press, 1998). 
40
 See Nicolai Rubinstein, “The History of the Word ‘Politicus’ in Early-Modern Europe,” in The 
Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, ed. Anthony Pagden (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) p. 53. 
41
 Algernon Sidney, Court Maxims, ed. H.W. Blom et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
p. 24.  
42
 Rubinstein, ibid., pp. 53-54.  
174 
 
what  Greenes Groatsworth of Wit (1592) described as a “pestilent Machiuilian 
policy.”43   
Such negative visions of policy, however, assume that the political amorality 
and alienation that it signifies are aberrations from the norms of civic virtue and a 
stable monarchical-republican political community. For Chapman, on the other 
hand, policy’s state of exception becomes the norm. The term marks no longer the 
breakdown of proper political life but its dark, degraded essence. Chapman’s 
espousal of this viewpoint is in a sense not surprising, given the moment when he 
began his literary career. Sidney and Marlowe began (and, in Sidney’s case, ended) 
their literary careers in the 1570s and 80s, when the sense of political alienation and 
disenfranchisement we have already discussed was only starting to surface. But 
Chapman started off in the midst of the 1590s, a period when the increasing penury 
of the Elizabethan state and the authoritarianism of the crown and the Cecil faction 
as well as an increasing sense of social disequilibrium generated a profound and 
ubiquitous sense of pessimism.44  The most notable symptom of such tensions was 
the Essex Revolt of 1601, which brought together a coalition of alienated aristocrats 
and alienated intellectuals.45  But the very fact that Essex and his followers chose to 
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revolt in the first place is indicative of their continuing faith in the power of political 
action. Chapman, on the other hand, had a much darker vision of politics. Indeed, 
the singularity of this vision comes through in his own attempt to court Essex’s 
patronage in the dedicatory epistle to the 1598 Seauen bookes of the Iliades of Homere. In 
this letter, Chapman starts off by predictably associating Essex with Homer’s 
paradigmatic hero, Achilles. His way of making this comparison, however, is 
peculiar.  
 
Most true Achilles (whom by sacred prophecie Homere did but 
prefigure in his admirable object) and in whole unmatched vertues 
shyne the dignities of the soule, and the whole excellence of royall 
humanitie. Let not the Peasant-common polities of the world, that 
count all things servile and simple: that pamper not their own private 
sensualities, buying quick in their filthy sepulchers of earth, the whole 
bodies and soules of honor, virtue, and pietie: stirre your diuine 
temper from perseuerance in godlike pursute of Eternitie.46 
 
The gap between the viewpoints of Essex and Chapman is revealing. Although 
Essex himself viewed politics from the perspective of the same activity-emphasizing 
honor culture we saw in Sidney’s work, Chapman—even as he seeks the Earl’s 
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patronage—cannot help revealing his own, fundamentally opposite belief in the 
fundamental futility of any and all attempts at immanently devoting oneself to the 
“peasant common” politics of the vita activa. Some of Chapman’s critics have 
claimed that the political pessimism evident in his writing—particularly in the 
French tragedies—was an oblique response to the fall of Essex. 47  But here we see it 
even before this fall occurred.  Even in the late 1590s, Chapman was already 
profoundly skeptical of any concrete, active politics.  The ideal of heroism that 
Chapman tries to sell to Essex, here, looks less like the immanent “well-doing” we 
see in Sidney and more like the transcendent model of intellectual heroism evident 
in the work of Ficino, Pico, Bruno, and other Platonists and mystics.48  
This passage also demonstrates a more complex relationship between 
immanent and transcendent models of the heroic than the Neo-Platonist thinkers put 
forward. For Chapman, transcendent heroism does not occur in isolation: its 
aesthetic power and intellectual ideality emerge only as part of a dialectical negation 
of the political world. Chapman’s transcendent heroism, in other words, can only 
exist on the negated ruins of the immanent and degraded world of policy that he 
rejects. The passage just quoted stages this complicated relationship between 
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immanence and transcendence, between policy and heroism, in miniature. In Bussy 
D’Ambois, however, Chapman elaborates it extensively and in dramatic form.  
 
III 
We can start our path toward Bussy by considering its setting.  Bussy 
D’Ambois is set at the French court, and this fact is extremely significant for the 
play’s perspective on heroism. As we saw a moment ago, when policy started to 
develop a sense of the corrupt practices of the political world it was often associated 
with Italy. Roger Ascham’s Schoolmaster (1570), for instance, cautions against the 
young “liuing and traueling in Italie” because they might “bringeth home into 
England out of Italie, the Religion, the learning” and the “policie.”49  But by the end 
of the sixteenth century, and especially in the wake of the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
Massacre, France started to absorb many of Italy’s negative associations.  It was 
increasingly French rather than Italian settings that provided the fantasmatic screen 
on which English writers projected their bleak visions of political alienation. 50 
Marlowe’s Massacre at Paris (c. 1593) is exemplary here.  In the play, France provides 
a state of exception par excellence:  it models the suspension of the traditional norms 
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of political virtue.51  And a similar attitude toward France and the French court 
hovers over Bussy’s first scene. 
In our first encounter with Bussy Chapman very quickly associates him with 
an experience of political alienation. But Chapman’s presentation of this experience 
is complex, contradictory, and mingles disaffection and ressentiment with a growing 
heroic impulse. This scene starts off the flat-out rejection of political life we have 
seen elsewhere in Chapman’s work. Bussy’s initial statements could come straight 
out of Chapman’s anti-worldly poetry.  But our first encounter with Bussy also 
reveals that the renunciation that Chapman stages in his poetry is, in practice, part 
and parcel of a more complex political experience—one caught between alienation 
and the impulse to act and participate in political life. Bussy’s first scene does not 
actually contain the word “policy,” but it is nevertheless suffused by what the 
political ambivalences the term will, in the rest of the play, come to signify.  As the 
first scene begins Bussy enters “poor.” And indeed poverty and privation—in both 
political and economic senses—are the central leitmotifs of his first lines:  
 
Fortune, not Reason, rules the state of things, 
Reward goes backward, Honour on his head; 
Who is not poor, is monstrous; only Need 
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Gives form and worth to every human seed. 
     (1.1.1-4) 
 
Chapman begins with a striking combination of the conventional and the 
subversive. His opening line parrots a classical commonplace—vitam regit fortuna, 
non sapientia—that can be traced back to Cicero and Plutarch and other ancient 
writers.52   But this cliché is quickly coupled with another, edgier argument. The 
contingency of the cosmos means anyone who manages to come out on top—anyone 
who is “not poor”—is a priori “monstrous.”  In a world ruled by fortune, success is 
not just random; it implies corruption.  And this quick metaphysical conclusion 
leads Bussy to a startling political argument.  “Honour,” he claims is “on his head.”    
This line deserves some consideration. In the personalized political culture of 
the Renaissance honor was an immensely important concept. But its precise 
structure and significance in the period are also difficult to grasp from the vantage 
point of the contemporary west.53  Thomas Hobbes provides some assistance here.  
In his Elements of Law (1640) Hobbes defines honor as a key symbolic place-holder 
within inter-subjective economies of respect and social cohesion.  To “honour a man 
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(inwardly in the mind)” he writes, “is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man 
hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth 
himself.”54  In Bussy’s speech, however, honor is defined as being impossible in a 
contemporary political environment of axiological inversion. Anything good, Bussy 
claims, can only be good insofar as it is thwarted; only insofar as it exists in 
opposition to the realm of the realm of the actual or—as Chapman calls it in a 
significant synecdoche—“reward.” 
Chapman’s play, then, starts off with a statement of profound political 
alienation. But as Bussy’s opening monologue goes on, the articulation of this 
alienation moves from the jumpy plain-style juxtaposition of sententiae to a more 
epic timbre and tone:    
 
As cedars beaten with incessant storms, 
So great men flourish; and do imitate 
Unskillful statuaries, who suppose 
(In forging a Colossus) if they make him 
Straddle enough, strut, and look big, and gape, 
Their work is goodly: so our tympanous statists 
(In their affected gravity of voice, 
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Sourness of countenance, manners’ cruelty, 
Authority, wealth, and all the spawn of Fortune) 
Think they bear all the kingdom’s worth before them; 
Yet differ not from those colossic statues, 
Which with heroic forms without o’erspread, 
Within are ought but mortar, flint and lead. 
   (1.1.5-17) 
 
Those who profit—those who are not poor, who reap the benefits of contingency—
are inclined to forget the contingency of their own situations. In this way, they are 
like colossi of antiquity: their outward forms are “heroic,” but such sparkling 
surfaces conceal a metaphysical insolvency. This insolvency is sharply suggested by 
Chapman’s addition in Bussy’s second edition of the term “tympanous statists,” an 
adjectival riff on the term tympany, which marked a swelling on the body, often as a 
result of pregnancy.55 While monumentality is clearly the major metaphoric register 
in which this passage unfolds, this turn of phrase introduces another element: one of 
a clearly distasteful feminine fecundity that chimes with the long and already-noted 
mythographic tradition of associating fortune’s contingency with feminine 
fickleness.56 Here, however, the political coordinates of this association are quite 
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specific. Fortune’s tympany is tied to the state insofar as it is attributed to those 
(“statists”) who rise through manipulating it, to those who dwell in the political 
realm and profit from policy.57    
Bussy strongly opposes himself to such people in his subsequent claim that 
 
… when we wander furthest through the waves 
Of glassy Glory and the gulfs of State, 
Topp’d with all titles, spreading all our reaches, 
As if each private arm would sphere the world; 
We must to Virtue for her guide resort, 
Or we shall shipwrack in our safest Port. 
    (1.1.28-33)  
 
In our earlier discussion of Sidney we saw in his writing an aristocratic honor 
culture where virtue marked not only moral good behavior but “the possession of 
divinely endowed gifts and powers,” “properties” that, “if cultivated by education” 
could “carry the authority of example and … change the world.”58  Here, however, 
virtue marks a renunciation of a dynamic link between individual human capacity 
and the surrounding world: a stoic withdrawal into apatheia and self-governance. It 
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is the interiority necessary to navigate the alienated “gulfs of state” Bussy invokes. 
Oceanic imagery (which recurs with surprising frequency in Chapman’s play, and to 
which I will return below) is associated with the implied femininity of the political 
realm, the mutability of policy; with a vision of collective life as the zone of an 
almost Boethian fortuna. The solution, however, is not to tame it. It is to withdraw. 
At the start of Chapman’s play, then, Bussy positions himself in a direct, 
alienated opposition to the political realm. Much like Chapman’s philosophical 
poetry, Bussy expresses the kind of absolute political alienation that Hegel, in the 
Phenomenology of Mind, called “unhappy consciousness” (unglückliche Bewusstsein). 
This stage of experience (Erfahrung) encompasses the bondage of individuals to 
collective forces beyond them and produces a flight into the “pure universality of 
thought.”59  For Hegel, such a withdrawal from the world, such an alienation is 
evidenced in the various schools of ethical and metaphysical thinking that 
dominated later antiquity: cynicism, skepticism, and, above all, the stoicism that 
Bussy implicitly invokes in these lines. In Chapman, however, we see not only this 
particular state of alienated political experience in terms of abstract ethical doctrine. 
We also see its link to centralized and alienated state-form insofar as Bussy opposes 
himself to “statists.”   
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But as Hegel realized, political experience is never stable: it is always riddled 
with complexities and contradictions that push it dialectically forward into new 
forms.60  Chapman’s play proves this true. As the first scene continues, Bussy moves 
from a political experience of absolute alienation into an increasingly active 
orientation toward collective life. This starts when we meet Monsieur, the King’s 
malcontented brother who has sought out Bussy and wants to recruit him into his 
retinue at court. Monsieur wants to set himself up to take the throne when the time 
comes. As a result, wants “resolved spirits” to be in his service (1.1.44). Thus he has  
 
... follow’d D’Ambois to this green retreat; 
A man of spirit beyond the reach of fear, 
Who (discontent with his neglected worth) 
Neglects the light, and loves obscure abodes; 
But he is young and haughty, apt to take 
Fire at advancement, to bear state and flourish… 
   (1.1.45-50) 
 
Monsieur’s quick take on Bussy’s character acknowledges the alienation we have 
earlier seen him exhibit earlier. But it also puts this alienation in a different—and 
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more contradictory—light. According to Monsieur, Bussy’s disaffection is a result of 
his experience of a split between his own sense of inner potentiality, of inner 
“worth,” and how it has been outwardly recognized. Bussy seems like he is giving 
up any notion of worldly worth in his opening lines: though a “man of spirit” he 
“neglects the light and loves obscure abodes.”  “But,” Monsieur says, some part of 
Bussy is still compelled to an active life of “virtuous deeds, by which we live” 
(1.1.81). The adversative (“but”) is important here: it points to something that is not 
yet put forward in Bussy’s initial speech—a contradictory element of his political 
experience of alienation.  
Monsieur subtly shifts the meaning of virtue, and this subtle shift in the sense 
of the term “virtue” predicts the way in which he will turn out to be right about 
Bussy.  Bussy, at first, justifies his decision to enter into Monsieur’s service and go to 
court in terms of reform. He wants to “bring up a new fashion / And rise in Court 
with virtue” (1.1.125-6). He is, he also claims, “for honest actions, not for great” 
(1.1.124), a “smooth plain ground” that will “never nourish any politic seed” 
(1.1.123). But this sense of alienated virtue is quickly replaced by an attraction to the 
“light” of active life, which, as Monsieur puts it, 
 
 Not only serves to shew, but render us 
 Mutually profitable: so our lives 
 In acts exemplary not only win 
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 Ourselves good Names, but doth to others give 
 Matter for virtuous Deeds, by which we live. 
    (1.1.77-82)  
 
Monsieur’s statement here is a fairly standard assertion of the priority of the life of 
action to the life of contemplation, the vita activa to the vita contemplativa. 61 
Considered in the broader context of Chapman’s writing, however, his use of the 
imagery of light makes these lines a highly ambiguous and ambivalent moment. 
Chapman’s first published poem—the “Hymnus in Noctem” included in the 1594 
Shadow of Night volume—hinges on the idea that night is metaphysically superior to 
the day. Daytime’s “whoredome of … painted light,” Chapman argues, signals the 
false worldly enmeshment of sensuality and political participation. Night, on the 
other hand, is a “tender fortresse of our woes”—it is coequal with a contemplative, 
speculative retreat from the contingencies and inequities of the material world.62  
The passage into light is not into illumination. Rather, it entails taking on the 
contradictions, distortions, and perversions of the material world. 
Such an attitude toward the active life is foregrounded at the tail end of 
Bussy’s first scene. After Bussy agrees to serve Monsieur and is promised money for 
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his service, we encounter an initial outburst of aggressive dyspepsia when he attacks 
Maffé, the servant Monsieur sends to deliver the payment. Maffé is, understandably, 
skeptical of his master’s elevation of this seemingly marginal figure to a prominent 
place in his service, opining about the fickle “Humour of Princes” (1.1.140). But 
when he expresses the slightest hint of skepticism and sarcasm in his dialogue with 
Bussy, Bussy immediately takes an almost Achillean offense, proclaiming himself to 
be a “scholar” and a “soldier” (1.1.182).  In this initial scene—in other words—a rift 
starts to surface between a vision of Bussy in terms of political ideals of action and 
reform and his actual behavior. And this gap between Bussy’s self-perceptions (and 
the perceptions of others) and his petty and violent behavior becomes only more 
striking in the subsequent scene, when Bussy arrives at court with his new master. 
Initially, Bussy is presented to King Henry as a “Gentleman t’attend you” (1.2.57). 
Their first exchange, however, is significant: 
 
Henry.  I have expected th’offer of your service; 
For we (in fear to make mild Virtue proud) 
Use not to seek her out in any man. 
 
 Buss.  Nor doth she use to seek out any man: 
   He that will win, must woo her; she’s not shameless. 




Here Bussy moves from a passive to an active model of virtue. He earlier adhered to 
a passive, stoic model of virtue to navigate the “Gulfs of State.” But now, face to face 
with the monarch himself, he drops this model of virtue, embracing, instead, a more 




 In the early scenes of Bussy D’Ambois, then, we see two threads that will 
become increasingly prominent as the play goes on. On the one hand, Chapman 
reiterates the anti-worldly, anti-political, and profoundly alienated perspective of his 
poetry, introducing a strain of political skepticism that will persist in the play’s 
background noise and eventually return in full force at its conclusion. But on the 
other hand he also presents heroism as existing in a relationship to political life that 
is far more complex than simple renunciation. Heroism is a fantasy of political 
selfhood and political being opposing itself to the political vita activa: we see this in 
the heroism of stoic apatheia that Bussy espouses in the play’s very first lines. 
Heroism, however, is also drawn irresistibly to political activity and enmeshment—
toward what we have been referring to as a dynamic ideal of political experience, in 
which collective life is a venue for individual virtue and becoming.  
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Heroism’s ambiguous capacity to capture both alienation and the desire to 
overcome it runs through the rest of Bussy D’Ambois, as the play moves beyond 
Bussy himself to catalogue the multiple perspectives various court figures take on 
him, to catalogue the various fantasies and scattered sorts of political experience 
whose screen he becomes. This is evident, for instance, in the subsequent action of 
the second scene. Here, after Bussy’s dialogue with the king (and some rather 
aggressive flirtation with the wife of the the Guise) one of the courtiers on stage 
notes sarcastically: “Here’s a sudden transmigration with D’Ambois, out of the 
Knights’ ward, into the Duchess’ bed” (1.2.116). Knights’ wards were parts of 
contemporary prisons where higher-ranking inmates received preferred treatment 
while being held (often for private debts), and this imputation of poverty is made 
even sharper by the fact that it comes from a low-level courtier who (unlike the 
royals with whom he has just parlayed) is Bussy’s equal. “See what a 
metamorphosis a brave suit can work” another comments (1.1.117). For his social 
equals, then, from their perspective, Bussy is little more than an upstart. In their 
view of the events they have just seen—his presentation to the king, the patronage 
he has received from a high-ranking nobleman—he falls into that class of aspiring 
courtiers Chapman had helped to parody in Eastward, Ho! (1605).63   
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Chapman, however, is less concerned in this scene with undercutting Bussy’s 
own view of himself than with staging the sheer multiplicity of possible perspectives 
on the protagonist. And such multiplicity is once again made clear by way of 
violence as Bussy realizes he is being mocked by his fellow courtiers and 
subsequently slays several of them in a brawl. Chapman presents this conflict in 1.2., 
as a petty fight between the hired hangers-on and thugs of the French court’s 
aristocratic grandees. But it appears in a different—a much different—light at the 
start of the second act when a character identified only as a “nuncius”  comes to 
King Henry and informs him of the brawl that has just occurred. The use of the term 
“nuncius” to designate this particular figure is significant: it plunges a reader of the 
playtext into the dramatic realm of Senecan closet tragedy. And a sense of both 
linguistic grandeur and Seneca’s own herculean model of heroism is everywhere in 
the nuncius’ subsequent description of the fight that has just occurred. Consider the 
following examples: 
 
What Atlas, or Olympus lifts his head 
So far past covert, that with air enough 
My words may be inform’d? And from his height 
I may be seen, and heard through all the world? 
A tale so worthy, and so fraught with wonder, 
Sticks in my jaws, and labors with event. 
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    (2.1.25-30) 
 
When face to face the three defendants met them, 
Alike prepar’d, and resolute alike, 
Like bonfires of contributory wood… 
    (42-44) 
 
But D’Ambois’ sword (that light’ned as it flew) 
Shot like a pointed Comet at the face 
Of manly Barrisor; and there it stuck: 
Thrice pluck’d he at it, and thrice drew on thrusts … 
    (81-4) 
 
This speech is one of the odder moments in Chapman’s play: it is 
uncharacteristically ornate, and goes on for nearly a hundred lines. But the overall 
effect is clear enough: the messenger’s description is deliberately dissonant and 
seems designed to remind the reader/auditor that the play is presenting two distinct 
perspectives on Bussy, two distinct fictional and dramatic domains. It is an 
impressive rhetorical accomplishment. But anyone who has just seen the back-and-
forth between Bussy and the other courtiers cannot help remain aware of the gap 
between heroic vehicle and humble tenor.  
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 Chapman’s striking dramatic double-take on Bussy’s brawl with his fellow 
courtiers thus expands upon an emphasis introduced in the play’s first act. It 
reiterates the way that, for Bussy, heroism models and captures a political 
experience caught ambivalently between stoic withdrawal and an active, almost 
Herculean engagement in worldly action. But it also introduces another key concern 
throughout the rest of the play: the way in which Bussy himself becomes a figurant 
for various sorts of political experience and indeed political desire on the part of 
various other characters in Chapman’s play. Bussy D’Ambois presents heroism as a 
multiplicity of experiences, a multiple fantasmatic structure that can accommodate a 
whole range of political positions within the corrupted and bleak world of the 
French court.   
This attitude toward heroism becomes even clearer in the subsequent scene 
where Bussy has to own up to the murders he has committed in his brawl with his 
fellow courtiers. These murders are, of course, illegal. But as his patron the Monsieur 
intercedes with the King and manages to secure a pardon. This pardon, presented as 
a voluntary royal beneficence, is, however, not good enough for Bussy. He manages 
to convince the King that his own heroic valor positions himself fundamentally 
outside the law; that Henry should not just pardon him, but 
 
Let me be King myself (as man was made) 
And do justice that exceeds the law: 
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If my wrong pass the power of single valour 
To right and expiate; then be you my King, 
And do a Right, exceeding Law and Nature: 
Who to himself is law, no law doth need, 
Offends no King, and is a King indeed. 
    (2.1.198-204) 
 
It would be possible to read Bussy’s declaration of his own heroic autarky as simple 
hyperbolic flourish. What is being evoked here, however, is a more significant set of 
political and ethical and heroic ideas that will haunt Chapman’s play. The notion 
that monarchy emerged, historically, out of the surrender of some sort of primal 
sovereignty is often associated with the bleak and brutal fantasy of Hobbes’ bellum 
omnium contra omnes.64 But although it became famous through Hobbes’ elaboration, 
it was a notion of very long standing, reflected in the work of various earlier writers. 
Fulke Greville, for instance, wrote in his Inquisition upon Fame and Honour about how 
“[f]rom which Cras’d womb of frailty was brought forth, / A Giant Creature in 
excess of Might, / To work in all with every pow'r but worth.”65  However, while 
Greville’s notorious pessimism anticipates Hobbes, this notion of primal, pre- or 
extra-governmental autarky was often spun in more positive terms. It is often 
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associated with the idea of a natural, prelapsarian purity that connected easily with 
the classical concept of the “heroic age.”  In the introduction, we saw this sense of 
heroism running through Aristotle’s treatment of both Hector’s “heroic virtue” and 
the troubling figure of the “great-souled man” whose greatness excludes him from 
the life of the polis. For Aristotle, both these instances are politically threatening—but 
they are also aesthetically, poetically, and imaginatively appealing.66  For Aristotle, 
in other words, a primal heroic virtue is poetically powerful precisely because it is 
politically impossible: it is a fantasy whose appeal derives precisely from its 
opposition to the drabber and more institutional norms of political life. And, mutatis 
mutandis, a similar attitude is attributed by Chapman to the French King. He grants 
Bussy his request, and later defends Bussy to the Guise, in the following terms: 
 
  … I wonder 
 Your equal disposition brooks so ill 
A man so good, that only would uphold 
Man in his native noblesse, from whose fall 
All our dissensions rise; that in himself 
(Without the outward patches of our frailty, 
Riches and honour) knows he comprehends 
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Worth with the greatest: Kings had never borne 
Such boundless eminence over other men, 
Had all maintain’d the spirit and state of D’Ambois… 
     (3.2.88-97) 
 
The key term here is “worth.”  For the King, Bussy presents a fantasmatic vision of 
value, of greatness. The passage begins by situating such worth on an outward, 
sensorily-available level: the King wonders why the Guise does not admire a “man 
so good.”  Worth, however, quickly moves inward: according to the King, Bussy’s 
greatness is based not just on his appearance to others; it is based on his own ability 
to recognize, reflexively, worth “in himself.” It is this (inner) sense of dynamic 
potentiality that grounds his heroism, that makes Bussy superior to the King and 
Guise and the other members of the aristocracy. Their honors and positions are 
actually “outward patches of our frailty,” a frailty based precisely on their 
outwardness. Bussy, by contrast, by looking inward, and recognizing his own 
dynamic potentiality, “comprehends / Worth with the greatest.”   
 
V 
In the opening acts of Chapman’s play, then, Bussy moves from embodying a 
heroism of stoic withdrawal to embodying a heroism of dynamic worldly 
participation, valor, and value. But while his is the dominant attitude toward 
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heroism and its attendant political experience for both Bussy and King Henry early 
in the play, Chapman subsequently goes on to profoundly problematize this heroic 
vision. In the later acts, Bussy’s own actions, attitude, and expressed political 
experience, become more and more contradictory and ambiguous. As we have 
already seen, Bussy starts off wanting to enforce virtue. When the Monsieur first 
makes his offer in the play’s first scene, Bussy describes himself as: 
 
  … a smooth plain ground 
Will never nourish any politic seed; 
I am for honest actions, not for great: 
If I may bring up a new fashion, 
And rise in Court with virtue, speed his plough… 
     (1.1.122-26) 
 
But by the start of the play’s third act this adherence to virtue has significantly 
shifted. Bussy initially extols this active model of virtue by way of the metaphorical, 
Machiavellian conquest of fortune by virtue. However, he subsequently transforms 
and literalizes this dynamic drive this into the active pursuit of inappropriate sexual 
behavior toward Guise’s wife. He goes further as the play continues, beginning an 
affair with Tamyra, the wife of a prominent aristocrat named Montsurry. When 
Tamyra expresses some guilt over her infidelity, he dismisses such concerns in terms 
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that suggest a significant alteration in the consequences of Bussy’s own dynamic 
sense of his own “worth.”  We have already quoted this dismissal, but it is worth 
examining again: 
    
Sin is a coward Madam, and insults 
But on our weakness, in his truest valour: 
And so our ignorance tames us, that we let 
His shadows fright us: and like empty clouds 
In which our faulty apprehensions forge 
The forms of dragons, lions, elephants 
When they hold no proportion, the sly charms 
Of the witch Policy make him like a monster 
Kept only to shew men for Goddess Money. 
    (3.1.18-26) 
 
This statement suggests not just a departure from Bussy’s ostensible heroic moral 
purity at the start of the play. It also represents an important rupture with an earlier 
element of Chapman’s presentation of his protagonist: Bussy’s firm critical sense of 
the inequities and inequalities of French society, and his various critiques of how 
“great men” use their “greatness” to “bombast[…]” their “private roofs, with public 
riches” (3.2.27). In his moments of social critique, Bussy is particularly focused on 
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excoriating the “Protean law” that can be manipulated by “great men” who, along 
with their lawyers, turn “sacred Law / … Into a Harpy, that eats all but ‘s own” 
(3.2.49-54). In making such statements, Bussy decisively positions himself in 
opposition to policy, juxtaposing his own sense of valor, honor, and heroic worth 
with the degradations of actual political life. For Chapman, as one critic writes, 
policy marks the “the triumph of lawless appetite over traditional norms of social 
and ethical behavior.”67  But while Bussy’s own experience of his valor, potentiality 
and worth is opposed to such a version of policy, his increasing fall into an amoral 
dismissal of any constraint on his desires shows that he himself is sliding into 
policy’s purview. 
This is not lost on the play’s other characters. Although the King himself is 
blind—wanting to make Bussy something like the specter of Alexander the Great 
that Faustus summons up for the Holy Roman Emperor in Marlowe’s play—
Monsieur sees through Bussy’s front. In a key moment, he verbally attacks Bussy, 
sarcastically undercutting Bussy’s pretensions of heroic autarky and casting him as a 
brutal animal who is both beneath human norms but also inextricably bound up 
with the policy that he outwardly excoriates:  
 
   I think thee then a man 
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That dares as much as a wild horse or tiger; 
As headstrong and as bloody; and to feed 
The ravenous wolf of thy most Cannibal valour 
(Rather than not employ it), thou would’st turn 
Hackster to any whore, slave to a Jew 
Or English usurer, to force possessions 
(And cut men’s throats) of mortgaged estates; 
Or thou wouldst tire thee like a tinker’s wife 
And murder market folks; quarrel with sheep, 
And run as mad as Ajax… 
     (3.2.336-46) 
 
Bussy’s supposed heroic virtue is reduced here to an almost bestial “daring.” His 
supposedly sacred heroic valor and virtue—which, earlier, he implicitly opposes to 
the rapacity of noblemen and lawyers who would eat all but their “own” (3.2.54)—is 
revealed as its own form of cannibalism, equally enmeshed with the compromised 
corruptions of self-interested political existence. Monsieur’s final reference to Ajax, 
here, is also significant. For Ajax, of course, is the major classical exemplar of heroic 
valor become animal savagery. Monsieur, however, in these lines, is not just 
criticizing Bussy’s animal attitude toward his fellow men, however. He is also 
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suggesting that Bussy’s whole experience of his own heroic singularity is 
contradictory:  
 
 … in thy valour th’ art like other naturals, 
That have strange gifts in nature, but no soul 
Diffus’d quite through to make them of a piece, 
But stop at humours that are more absurd, 
Childish and villainous than a huckster, whore,  
Slave, cut’throat, tinker’s bitch, compar’d before. 
     (3.2.347-53) 
 
As the awkward internal reference in this passage’s last line suggests, Monsieur 
comes back around to his initial point, and drives home the claim that Bussy is 
utterly lacking in the (dynamic) autarky he pretends to possess. Bussy, Monsieur 
emphasizes, is hardly an embodiment of autarkous heroic virtue: protected by the 
king as his favorite, he is no more elevated than any of the other “mountebanks” and 
“painted bawd[s]” that populate the French court (3.2.361).   
Chapman’s play, then, manages to maintain two perspectives on Bussy. For 
Bussy himself, and for others (the King, Tamyra) he is the apogee of a heroic fantasy 
hinging on a dynamic mode of political experience. However, what the play seems to 
promise at its outset, a “moral theater of disguise and discovery” in which “Bussy 
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will play the role of the courtier in order to search out vice and, by purging it, to 
reform the enchanted glass of the court,” conspicuously fails to materialize: as 
Robert Ornstein writes, “[h]aving made the initial compromise to enter the fallen 
world, Bussy has not only been entangled by it but increasingly has become a 
representative citizen of it. He has been corrupted by society, but the defective 
nature of his heroic spirit, inspiring a blind heroic idealism, has itself been an 
accomplice in that corruption.”68   
The rest of Chapman’s play demonstrates this. Bussy’s affair with 
Montsurry’s wife is discovered, and Tamyra is (brutally) tortured until she sets up 
Bussy for assassination by the newly-minted alliance of her husband, Guise, and 
Monsieur. Meanwhile, Bussy—as he discovers, and prepares to confront this plot—
becomes more and more explicit about his acceptance of the policy he had initially 
scorned and still seems to hold himself above: 
 
 I’ll soothe his plots: and strew my hate with smiles 
 Till all at once the close mines of my heart 
 Rise at full date, and rush into his blood: 
 I’ll bind his arm in silk, and rub his flesh 
 To make the vein swell, that his soul may gush 
 Into some kennel, where it longs to lie, 
                                                     
68
 Ide, Ideas of Greatness, p. 89.  
202 
 
 And policy shall be flank’d with policy. 
    (4.2.155-61; my emphasis) 
 
In what reads like a brutal version of anti-court satire so frequent in the early 
seventeenth century, Bussy claims he will “sooth” (i.e. flatter, go along with) the 
Monsieur’s plots, hiding his hate under “smiles.”  He then moves into a military 
metaphor, of the mines that sappers dig under a wall, during a siege, which will 
eventually explode, that is, “rise at full date.” The scene of projected torture that 
follows is a sharp contrast with his earlier condemnation of great men. He is, now, 
fully enmeshed in policy. 
 
VI 
Chapman’s play presents us with an experience of the heroic that is multiple, 
based in both Bussy’s fantasies about himself and the fantasies that other characters 
project onto him. In doing this, Bussy D’Ambois suggests that heroism is both 
contradictory as a direct mode of experience and self-conceptualization and is 
deeply problematic in a contemporary world. Heroism—as a way of understanding 
oneself and a way of seeing the world—fails throughout the play to work. Bussy can 
declaim his separation from policy but, ultimately, he cannot escape it. From the 
moment he passes out of the play’s preliminary darkness into the unflattering light 
of the vita activa, the impossibility of Bussy’s heroic aspirations is again and again 
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made clear. Throughout the play, we see a growing gap between how Bussy sees the 
events unfolding around him and how they actually (“objectively”) appear within 
the play. The final scene provides a kind of culminating elaboration of this growing 
gap and of its bleak implications for the virtuality and impossibility of heroism.  
This scene falls into two parts. In the first, Monsieur and Guise pause to 
consider Bussy’s character, shortly before their assassination of him is set to be 
carried out. Earlier, we saw Monsieur taking a rather hard line on Bussy—dressing-
down his “cannibal valour.”  But now his attitude is markedly different:  
 
 Now shall we see, that Nature hath no end 
 In her great works, responsive to their worths, 
 That she who makes so many eyes, and souls, 
To see and foresee, is stark blind herself: 
And as illiterate men say Latin prayers 
By rote of heart, and daily iteration; 
In whose hot zeal, a man would think they knew 
What they ran so away with, and were sure 
To have rewards proportion’d to their labours; 
Yet may implore their own confusions 
For anything they know, which oftentimes 
It falls out they incur: so Nature lays 
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A mass of stuff together, and by use, 
Or by the mere necessity of matter, 
Ends such a work, fills it, or leaves it empty 
Of strength, or virtue, error or clean truth; 
Not knowing what she does;  
    (5.3.1-17) 
 
Monsieur’s initial reflections frame Nature as a site of contingency. It lacks an 
“end”—an organic organization in which the inner potentialities of things 
progressively and rationally unfold into the realm of the actual. Instead, Nature is 
aleatory and encompasses a profound disjuncture between essential virtue and 
entelecheia. The very philosophical—largely Aristotelian—metaphysical bases of a 
dynamic model of political experience are being demolished in this passage. The 
spirit of Montaigne (with his dismissal of an enchanted, ordered nature, and of the 
essential unfolding of human virtue) seems to hover over Monsieur’s words as he 
elaborates both a general, alternate metaphysic and moves in to focus more 
specifically on how this is relevant to Bussy. Nature, he goes on to claim, 
 
… usually 
Gives that which we call merit to a man 
(And believe should arrive him on huge riches, 
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Honour and happiness), that effects his ruin; 
Right as in ships of war, whole lasts of powder 
Are laid (men think) to make them last, and guard them: 
When a disorder’d spark that powder taking, 
Blows up with sudden violence and horror 
Ships that kept empty, had sail’d long with terror.  
   (5.3.18-25) 
 
The idea that merit, worth, virtue, potentiality must and will be actualized is once 
again rejected here. Indeed, when read in the broader context of Chapman’s play, 
these lines see Monsieur coming implicitly back to the initial, alienated political 
perspective articulated by Bussy in the first scene. In this early scene Monsieur 
reflected that 
 
There is no second place in numerous State 
That holds more than a cipher: in a King 
All places are contain’d. His words and looks 
Are like the flashes and the bolts of Jove, 
His deeds inimitable, like the sea 
That shuts still as it opes, and leaves no tracts, 
Nor prints of precedent for poor men’s facts. 
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    (1.1.34-41) 
 
But now, as the play nears its end, he comes back to this perspective and sees in 
Bussy’s fate evidence of the lack of purposiveness of nature. Monsieur clearly 
admires Bussy as a fantasmatic object. But he also sees that the flipside of the fantasy 
of heroism he embodies (for himself and others) is impossibility: 
 
 Young, learned, valiant, virtuous, and full mann’d; 
 One on whom Nature spent so rich a hand, 
 That, with an ominous eye, she wept to see 
So much consum’d her virtuous treasury; 
Yet, as the winds sing through a hollow tree, 
And (since it lets them pass through) let it stand; 
But a tree solid, since it gives no way 
To their wild rages, they rend up by th’root:  
So this full creature now shall reel and fall, 
Before the frantic puffs of purblind Chance. 




The puffing of chance, he says, “pipes through empty men, and makes them dance” 
(5.3.48). But now Bussy has become “full” in this very sense. He has come to be one 
of the colossi he earlier critiqued, one of those men who 
 
… differ not from those colossic statues, 
Which with heroic forms without o’erspread 
Within are bought but mortar, flint, and lead. 
  
Monsieur’s realizations and philosophical statements in the first part of the 
final scene of Bussy D’Ambois set up an important dramaturgical move that 
Chapman makes in the scene’s second segment, where we see Bussy’s death and 
final words. Here Chapman provides a culminating vision of the heroic as 
simultaneously a poetically powerful fantasy—an ideal embodiment of human 
capacity—and a profoundly problematic concept vis-à-vis the harsh realities of 
political existence. He does this by creating another parallelism between the play’s 
first and last scenes—this one not only thematic but dramaturgical. 
Many scholars have noted that early modern drama was not only narrative 
but also “spatial and emblematic” in method. 69   Such an emblematic mode of 
theatrical practice is evident at the start of Chapman’s play, in his implicit reference 
to the long tradition, emblematic and textual, of Herculean heroism. The opening 
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scene—with Bussy oscillating between darkness and light, between contemplative 
and active—invokes the famous emblematic scene of the “choice of Hercules” where 
Hercules, in a verdant retreat like the one that Bussy inhabits, is portrayed as 
choosing between the active, contemplative, and sensual lives—represented, 
respectively, by light and dark.70   Hercules, of course, decides to move into the light 
of activity—as does Bussy. But while Hercules’ own decision leads to his 
foundational heroic labors, Bussy’s turns out to lead him not into the glorious 
luminosity of the heroic vita activa but rather into the darkness and degradation that 
Chapman, throughout his poetry, saw as typical of engaged political existence. As 
he says, realizing this, soon after he is shot by Monsieur’s assassins: 
 
  … is my body then 
 But penetrable flesh? And must my mind 
 Follow my blood?  Can my divine part add 
No aid to th’ earthly in extremity? 
Then these divines are but for form, not fact: 
Man is of two sweet courtly friends compact; 
A mistress and a servant: let my death 
Define life nothing but a Courtier’s breath. 
Nothing is made of nought, of all things made; 
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Their abstract being a dream but of a shade. 
I’ll not complain to earth yet, but to heaven, 
And (like a man) look upwards even in death. 
    (5.3.125-36) 
 
Bussy decisively returns to his bleak, semi-stoic withdrawal from the world; to his 
initial acknowledgment of the vacuity of worldly existence. But while earlier this 
had led to been embodied by the stage direction of laying down (“he lies down”), 
here Bussy insists on standing, citing the classical precedent of Emperor Vespasian. 
 
 And if Vespasian thought in majesty 
 An Emperor might die standing, why not I? 
     She offers to help him  
 Nay without help, in which I will exceed him; 
 For he died splinted with his chamber grooms. 
 Prop me, true sword, as thou hast ever done: 
 The equal thought I bear of life and death, 
 Shall make me faint on no side; I am up 
 Here like a Roman statue; I will stand 
 Till death hath made me marble: O my fame 
 Live in despite of murder: take thy wings 
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 And haste thee where the gray-ey’d Morn perfines 
 Her rosy chariot with Sabaean spices; 
     (137-48) 
 
As in the first scene, Bussy calls here on a stoic ethos, describing himself as being 
“equal thought … of life and death.”  But he significantly differs from his initial 
presentation insofar as he embraces his status as a powerful but ultimately empty 
heroic colossus, a “heroic figure,” while at the same time acknowledging the human 
weakness and frailty that undercuts the heroic ideal. 
 
O frail condition of strength, valour, virtue, 
In me like warning fire upon the top 
Of some steep beacon, on a steeper hill; 
Made to express it like a falling star 
Silently glanc’d—that like a thunderbolt 
Look’d to have stuck, and shook the firmament. 
    (188-93) 
 
Bussy has become (and recognizes himself to have become) an exemplum of a 
heroism that is no longer possible, a bleak anagnorisis that is further reiterated in the 
concluding choral remark provided by the ghost of the Friar who earlier provided a 
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go-between for Bussy and his mistress Tamyra but here serves a kind of choral 
function: 
 
Farewell brave relicts of a complete man: 
 Look up and see thy spirit made a star, 
 Join flames with Hercules: and when thou set’st 
Thy radiant forehead in the firmament, 
Make the vast continent, crak’d with thy receipt  
Spread to a world of fire: and th’ aged sky, 
Cheer with new sparks of old humanity. 
    (5.3.268-74) 
 
The friar’s final description of Bussy provides a kind of parting précis of the 
whole play. Bussy, he claims, is an embodiment of human possibility and perfection. 
A “complete man,” he warrants comparison to the classical super-antecedent of 
Hercules. But Bussy’s Herculean impressiveness—his “join”-ing together with 
Hercules—occurs only in his post-death elevation into a constellation. Post-mortem 
monumentality, in other words, is indissociable from Bussy’s elevation into being a 
heroic ideal, from his embodiment of what is best about “old humanity.” Chapman’s 
choice of language here is significant. Throughout his plays and poems Chapman 
uses the notion of an “old humanity” to signify the primeval, prelapsarian purity 
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that human beings innately possess, before they are compromised and corrupted by 
the soiled policy of the current world.71 In an early sonnet printed along with Ovid’s 
Banquet, for example, he writes of a kind of a pure philosophical love that can teach 
“by passion” 
 
 … what perfection is, 
In whose fixt beauties shine the sacred scroules 
And long-lost records of your humane blisse72   
 
In the much-later The Tears of Peace (1609) the allegorical personification of Peace 
evokes this ideal again, rhetorically asking 
 
  … who is it can denie, 
 That the rich crowne of ould Humanitie, 
 Is still your birth-right?73 
    
In both these examples, and in countless others, Chapman uses the notion of 
humanity to signify the deepest potentialities of human being. But in the real world 
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that the plays (rather than the poems) represent, a world crisscrossed by corruption 
and policy, this humanity can only exist as an extra-worldly ideal. The play begins 
with Bussy striking a Herculean posture of withdrawal from the active life. It ends 
with the transposition of the active heroic ideal into a paradoxical place where it is 
both aesthetically exemplary and practically impossible. 
Chapman, in short, ends his play by hinting at the poetico-political 
(im)possibility of heroism. He concludes by gesturing at heroism’s simultaneous 
status as an aesthetic ideal and an impossible political task. But while Chapman 
would continue to grapple with the complexities of this impossible heroism in his 
subsequent plays and poems and translations I want, in the final chapter of this 
dissertation, to turn elsewhere. I want to turn, instead, to another writer—a writer 
for whom the simultaneous appeal and impossibility of heroism is not a paradox but 








 Reading Macbeth as a heroic play might seem, at first glance, like an odd 
critical gesture. When one thinks of Shakespeare and heroism the Scottish play does 
not usually spring to mind—and with good reason. Macbeth lacks overt heroic 
themes and posturing, an absence that stands in sharp contrast to most of the other 
tragic plays Shakespeare penned around the same time. Hamlet, for instance, is 
haunted by heroism: the prince negatively compares both himself and his uncle to 
Herculean strength and decisiveness.1  Othello is quite explicitly set up as a heroic 
figure who woos his future bride Desdemona with stories of “battles, sieges, 
fortunes / That I have passed.”2  And Antony and Coriolanus, of course, both exhibit 
heroic energies and ambitions—even if they ultimately lapse into moral decrepitude 
and violent psychosis.3 But such heroic ideas and ideals are lacking in Macbeth. 
Classical heroism seems weirdly absent from the play’s imaginary. 
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 Macbeth’s relationship to the heroic, however, is not as simple as this 
summary might suggest. True, the play lacks explicitly heroic themes. But a lack of 
self-conscious heroic thematization does not necessarily mean a lack of heroism. All 
the other Shakespeare plays just listed gesture at heroism, explicitly and 
deliberately. 4  But all of them also dwell in dramatic worlds where heroism is 
circumstantially impossible; where heroic ideals are deeply mismatched with social 
and political and cultural realities. The grim surveillance-state of Hamlet’s Elsinore, 
the decadence and corruption of Othello’s Venice, the late-Republican entropy of 
Antony and Cleopatra—all these are out of sync with the protagonists’ heroic 
greatness.5  Each play’s surface-level obsession with heroism seems almost like a 
symptom of the circumstantial impossibility of heroic behavior.  
 Macbeth, however, is different. Macbeth may not thematize heroism, but the 
play’s titular protagonist embodies heroism—and he does so more fully and 
thoroughly than almost any of Shakespeare’s other tragic leads. Macbeth, as Mary 
Beth Rose perceptively writes, “is set apart from other Shakespearean warriors of 
noble stature by the way in which his heroic idealism grows almost to perfection, 
increasing in severity and intensity throughout the play.” He “illuminates with 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
4
 See Brower, Hero and Saint, for careful accounts of each of their debts to the Greco-Roman heroic 
tradition. For a more specific study of Herculean heroism in Shakespeare see Eugene Waith, The Herculean 
Hero in Marlowe, Chapman, Shakespeare, and Dryden (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). For 
more on Shakespeare and heroism see also the introduction.  
 
5
 See, for example, Cleopatra’s ironic description of Antony as a “Herculean Roman” in William 
Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra, ed. John Wilders (London: Thomson, 1995) 1.3.85.  
216 
 
perfect and rigorous clarity the shared values and beliefs that the culture uses to 
construct heroism.”6   
 But while Macbeth embodies heroic action more fully and thoroughly than 
Shakespeare’s other tragedies the play also submits it to a searing skepticism 
unequaled almost anywhere else in the Shakespearean canon. 7  Macbeth is 
preoccupied with what we have called a dynamic ideal of action: it fixates time and 
again on the ability of “deeds” to “trammel” up their own consequences; of praxis to 
exist as its own plenitudinous “be-all” and “end-all.”8  But Macbeth’s dramatic arch 
hinges on this ideal’s failure. In chronicling the darkly ironic consequences of 
Macbeth’s murder of Duncan and usurpation of the Scottish throne, Shakespeare’s 
play ultimately presents a portrait of action as partial, problematic, and subject to 
unfathomable and inscrutable forces beyond any individual agent’s ken or control. 
Macbeth ultimately presents individual praxis as deeply and essentially (rather than 
circumstantially) inadequate.  
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 The clearest statement of this attitude comes in Macbeth’s famous “sound and 
fury” soliloquy. Spoken shortly before his downfall, Macbeth’s eleventh-hour 
anagnorisis casts a backward look at his bold and bloody faith in the power of 
human deeds and the deep disillusion it has caused: 
 
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
To the last syllable of recorded time, 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out brief candle. 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing.  
(5.5.17-26) 
In these lines, we see what might be called a traversal of heroic action.  In Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, “traversal” is the subject’s passage through the fantasmatic 
structures of her own subjectivity and the resulting “acceptance of the fact that there 
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is no secret treasure in me, that the support of me (the subject) is purely phantasmic.”9  
Shakespeare’s lines stage a similar event.  They show a traversal of heroic action.  
They reveal that the ideal of masculine-military praxis is little more than fantasmatic 
“sound and fury,” covering up the fundamental fact that human action and human 
life are always displaced from the present; that human beings live always beyond 
themselves, in a constant disruptive anticipation that amounts to little more than 
quotidian creeping toward the telos of “dusty death.” 
In the rest of this chapter I want to explore the thought these lines stage. I 
want to read Macbeth as grappling with the relationship of an ideal of heroic action 
and the self-displacement that this passage portrays—a self-displacement that the 
play repeatedly refers to as ecstasy. Ecstasy, of course, is a complex idea, with long 
historical links to medicine, philosophy, as well as a whole slew of Jewish, Platonic, 
Christian, and New Age mysticisms.10 In Macbeth, however, the term has a narrow 
(though intense) meaning. In Shakespeare’s play, ecstasy signals the movement from 
presence to absence, the passage from immersion in the world at hand to 
displacement from it.11 In Macbeth, ecstasy comes to mark the jarring leap from the 
                                                     
9
 Slavoj Zizek, The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso, 1997) pp. 9-10.  
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 On the history of ecstasy see Margharita Laski, Ecstasy: A Study of Some Secular and Religious 
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immanence of the heroic vita activa to the ultimate realization that human deeds are 
subject to transcendent forces beyond anyone’s control.  
By reading Macbeth in this way, I want to chart a new methodological 
approach to the play. Particularly, I want to suggest the value of paying attention to 
the play’s philosophical and speculative commitments. In the last few decades, these 
commitments have been downplayed in Macbeth scholarship. Suspicious of lapsing 
into A. C. Bradley-style modes of ahistorical metaphysical analysis, historicist critics 
have tended to ignore Macbeth’s philosophical concerns to focus, instead, on its 
more marginal historical intrications (the culture of witchcraft in the Renaissance, 
the recent Jacobean accession, related issues of Anglo-Scottish unity and archipelagic 
identity and so forth).12 But while interesting work has resulted from this turn, I 
would argue that Macbeth’s political and historical content cannot be separated from 
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its metaphysical concerns.13 The play’s obsessive wrangling with the problems of 
action and fate cuts to the core of the major shift in political organization, culture, 
and experience that the previous chapters have traced. Macbeth’s concern with 
action, I will claim, is a direct (if complex) response to the alienation of political 
experience that went hand-in-hand with the early stirrings of the modern state.  
In dealing with these concerns, Macbeth is not alone among Shakespeare’s 
works. In fact, the play is the culmination of a series of Shakespearean tragedies that 
are centrally concerned with the problem of action and its relationship to political 
totality; which witness a “declining belief in the correlation between individual 
action and the larger movements of social and political transformation.” 14 A 
thorough consideration of the politics of Shakespearean tragedy is, of course, far 
beyond the scope of this chapter. But to frame Macbeth in a broader Shakespearean 
context I would like to focus selectively on two other tragic texts. One of them is 
obvious and it is Hamlet—a play also concerned with heroic action and with its 
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 The Tragedy of Julius Caesar (c. 1599) is a play of considerable political 
sophistication and formal beauty, but it has often stood on the sidelines of 
Shakespeare scholarship, attracting far less commentary than a number of arguably 
lesser works. This is, in part, a result of the play’s generic indeterminacy: it hovers 
ambiguously between the history plays of the 1590s and the mature tragedies of the 
first decade of the seventeenth century, fully inhabiting neither generic niche. It also 
might have something to do with Caesar’s central place in the curricula of American 
high schools, where it is the first experience many students have with Shakespeare.15  
But whatever the reason, the play has been underserved by its critics. This has 
started to change recently: with a surge of interest in Renaissance republicanism, 
today’s critics are slowly turning back to Caesar and the ways in which it both 
reflects and refracts the republican political cultures of the late sixteenth century.16  
But while such attention is salutary, its republican emphasis threatens to occlude the 
fact that Caesar is a play whose political agenda goes beyond the representation of 
late republican/early imperial Rome. It is a play that cuts to the core of a broader 
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crisis of action in the later English Renaissance and begins Shakespeare’s 
preoccupation with a politics of failed heroic action—a politics whose culminating 
moment is Macbeth.17   
We can get a sense of Caesar’s political preoccupations by turning to the 
play’s second scene. Here the audience is first introduced to the main protagonists: 
Brutus and Cassius. Both are deeply troubled by Caesar’s pending elevation to 
permanent dictatorship. Both worry for Rome, as well as their own honor as 
members of the republic’s patrician aristocracy. Cassius, however, is especially 
agitated. “I was born as free as Caesar, so were you,” he complains to Brutus. “We 
both have fed as well, and we can both / Endure the winter’s cold as well as he” 
(1.2.99-101). He then drives the point home with a story: 
 
… once upon a raw and gusty day, 
The troubled Tiber chafing with her shores, 
Said Caesar to me ‘Dar’st thou, Cassius, now 
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Leap in with me into this angry flood, 
And swim to yonder point?’18   
 
They do so. But Caesar falters, calling 
 
  ‘Help me, Cassius, or I sink!’ 
 Ay, as Aeneas our great ancestor 
 Did from the flames of Troy upon his shoulder 
 The old Anchises bear, so from the waves of Tiber 
 Did I the tired Caesar. And this man 
 Is now become a god, and Cassius is 
 A wretched creature, and must bend his body 
 If Caesar carelessly but nod on him. 
     (1.2.113-20) 
 
This passage percolates with a sense of frustration and thwarted honor. Cassius’s 
resentment is so strong that it poisons one of the exemplary moments from Rome’s 
history: Aeneas carrying his elderly father Anchises from the flames of Troy. This 
story was canonized in Virgil’s Aeneid and made a substantial impact on centuries of 
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 All further references to Julius Caesar refer to Julius Caesar, ed. Arthur Humphreys (New York: 
Oxford, 2008) by act, scene, and line number.  
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educated readers: in the Defense of Poesy, for instance, Sidney cites the Virgilian 
image of “Aeneas carrying old Anchises on his back” as irrefutable proof of poesy’s 
ability to inculcate moral virtue.19 For Cassius, however, this heroic tableau becomes 
little more than food for the green-eyed monster—a source of bafflement that 
somehow this very mortal man is now “become a God” and reduced his former 
peers to pitiful “creatures.” Cassius’ word choice here is significant. In a remarkable 
reading of The Tempest, Julia Reinhard Lupton argues the term “creature” had a 
different and more complex meaning in Shakespeare’s time than it does today. 
Creaturality, she claims, drawing on patristic and other sources, marked the 
suspension of life between divine creation and worldly fragility. It carried a sense 
similar to Giorgio Agamben’s notion of “bare life”: like the homo sacer and 
Musselman, the creature embodied a “pure vitality denuded of its symbolic 
significance and political capacity and then sequestered within the domain of 
civilization as its disavowed core.”20  And while Lupton develops this argument 
while reading Caliban from The Tempest, I would argue that a similar sense of the 
term is mobilized at this moment in Julius Caesar. For what Cassius imagines, here, is 
a total subjection to power. It is a simultaneous alienation of the patricians from 
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power, and inscription of them under the absolute sway of Caesar’s budding 
auctoritas.   
Cassius, in short, confronts political alienation that we have been tracing 
throughout the previous chapters. It is hardly surprising, then, that the febrile, 
feckless stoicism he exhibits is voiced with an almost Marlovian end-stopped 
grandiosity (combined with some of Bussy’s stoic hauteur): 
 
 Cassius from bondage will deliver Cassius. 
 Therein, ye gods, you make the weak most strong. 
 Therein, ye gods, you tyrants do defeat. 
 Nor stony tower, nor walls of beaten brass, 
 Nor airless dungeoun, nor strong links of iron, 
 Can be retentive to the strength of spirit; 
 But life, being weary of these worldly bars, 
 Never lacks a power to dismiss itself. 
    (1.3.89-96) 
 
For Shakespeare, however, the key response to Caesar’s rise to power is not Cassius.  
It is Brutus. And Brutus puts forward a different response to Caesar’s assent, one 
that looks forward to Macbeth and starts toward a new view of heroic agency, one 
that moves beyond military action and stoicism into a more complex and ambivalent 
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sense of the ultimate inadequacy of action in the face of complex and recalcitrant 
political reality. 
This attitude does not emerge in isolation. Shakespeare portrays Brutus’s 
response to Caesar’s rise as being mixed and mingled with a range of other emotions 
and thoughts on Brutus’ part. At moments early on in Julius Caesar Brutus seems to 
flirt with Cassius’s angry drive toward responsive action. He is also very much 
aware of the anti-tyrannical precedent set by his ancestor Junius Brutus, who was 
instrumental in overthrowing Rome’s Tarquin kings (an event Shakespeare 
portrayed in his earlier long poem The Rape of Lucrece [1594]). Take, for instance, the 
following declaration: 
 
 Brutus had rather be a villager 
 Than to repute himself a son of Rome 
 Under these hard conditions as this time 
 Is like to lay upon us.  
     (1.2.173-6) 
 
Brutus also gestures toward a sense of stoic constancy early in the play. Part of this 
constancy is linked to stoic notions of self-sufficient philosophical honor. Brutus 
demands, for instance, that the conspirators demonstrate “untired spirits and formal 
constancy” (2.1.227) after they have assassinated Caesar.  
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But at the core of Shakespeare’s portrayal of Brutus is something else: a sense 
of the essential alienation, the essential inefficacy, of individual action. Brutus is 
haunted from the play’s first scenes by a growing of the deep, essential, ontological 
inadequacy of the deeds he is about to undertake. While he is firm in his faith that 
Caesar’s death is necessary “for the general” good, even if he personally has no 
“cause to spurn at him” (2.1.10-13), he also shows a deeper malaise about the very 
possibility that striking Caesar will remedy the situation. This emerges less in 
conscious reflection and more in a sense of stallage and inner disarray. Take his 
solitary reflections from the start of Act 2, one of the play’s most poignant moments: 
 
 Since Cassius first did whet me against Caesar 
 I have not slept. 
 Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
 And the first motion, all the interim is 
 Like a phantasma or a hideous dream. 
 The genius and the mortal instruments 
 Are then in counsel, and the state of man 
 Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
 The nature of an insurrection. 




In an essay on the history of the idea of freedom in western politics, Hannah Arendt 
cites this moment of Shakespeare’s play as exemplifying the classical conception of 
politics. This conception, for Arendt, is oriented around action: it is dynamic in the 
sense I have been using the term previously—focused on the passage of the potential 
into the actual, hinged on the ability to by acting “call something into being which 
did not exist before, which was not given.”21  But, with all due respect to Arendt, this 
is a misreading. What we are actually seeing here is not a manifestation of a pure 
theory of action. What we see is the beginning of its breakdown. What we see in 
Julius Caesar—and indeed in Shakespeare’s work in general—is the power of action 
being swallowed up in the gap between intention and impact, between 
consciousness and its transmission into praxis. For Brutus earlier on, for Cassius, 
and for the conspirators subsequently, a decisive action can restore the political 
world for freedom, virtue, and republican values. But for Brutus, here, it is lost in a 
“phantasma,” an ecstatic displacement of the self’s relationship to reality.  
With Brutus’s brief meditation, then, we see the first hints in Shakespeare’s 
work of interaction between action and ecstasy. The inadequacy of action is first 
suggested—not directly, but through a kind of penumbral sense of insufficiency, 
stallage, and anxiety. Both here and throughout Julius Caesar the limit of action is 
marked off by Caesar himself. Critics have often puzzled over the title of 
                                                     
21
 Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom,” in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(New York: Viking, 1961) p. 151.  
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Shakespeare’s play: Caesar is only briefly a major part of the play, which seems to be 
more appropriately the tragedy of Brutus and Cassius. But in the play Caesar comes 
to mark the senescence of what Brutus is a latter day embodiment of: a classical, 
action-oriented, and dynamic model of the political. Caesar comes to mark the 
political alienation with which the play is centrally concerned. As Brutus comments 
at one point, toward the play’s conclusion: 
 
O Julius Caesar, thou art mighty yet. 
Thy spirit walks abroad, and turns out swords 
 In our own proper entrails. 
     (5.3.93-5) 
 
By the time he speaks these lines, Brutus’s initial sense of the futility—of the self-
displacement—of political action has come to fruition. Rather than restoring a plural 
patrician order, Caesar’s assassination has by the end of the play unleashed a civil 
war that consumes the conspirators. But while Shakespeare’s play seems to gesture 
toward a sense of action’s inadequacy as being behind this political breakdown early 
in Julius Caesar, it is left for another play from around the same period to more fully 
think through the ontological inadequacy of action in the political realm. This play, 
of course, is Hamlet.  
230 
 
We do not know precisely when Hamlet was written and performed: the 
play’s composition, production, and publication are notoriously uncertain and 
controversial. But whatever the exact specifics there is little doubt that Hamlet comes 
out of roughly the same moment as Julius Caesar, and that it combines the earlier 
play’s skepticism toward political action with a more protracted and more self-
conscious treatment of heroism. Heroism is not absent from Caesar, but it is also 
never explicitly evoked, and seems almost eclipsed by the play’s portrayal of Roman 
virtus.22 In Hamlet, by contrast, heroic tropes and types are front-and-center from the 
first scene onward. The heroism Hamlet presents, however, is also complex, anxious, 
and ambivalent. Heroic themes run through the play, but the ideal around which 
they orbit is awkwardly out of place in the fictional Denmark that both Hamlet and 
Hamlet inhabit.23 This Denmark is a place of uncertainty and duality. In its cold 
climate the drive to decisive heroic action leads only to an experience of self-
displacement, to an experience of ecstasy.  
Consider Hamlet’s opening scene. Here, the ghost of Hamlet’s father appears 
to Horatio and a number of other guards on the ramparts of Elsinore. Horatio’s 
description quickly makes it clear that the ghost appears in the full military regalia 
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of the earlier king: Horatio notes the ghost’s “warlike form” and his “majesty” 
(1.1.46-7). The ghost, in other words, is heroic; and indeed throughout the play 
there’s an emphasis on the heroic accomplishment of Hamlet’s dead father. We are 
told about his forays against the Poles and the Norwegians, as well as their 
consequences, which are driven home by the Fortinbras subplot. Indeed, it is in 
Fortinbras that we have an odd echo of Hamlet Senior. But until the end of the play, 
this heroic avatar remains distant. The Denmark in the play is a resolutely post-
heroic polity. Hamlet Senior may have been a heroic king, but the same cannot be 
said of his successor, who is like the epitome of a post-heroic king, presiding over a 
degraded Renaissance court and skilled in the arts of managing surveillance and 
intrigue rather than in masculine-military action. 
The result is a portrait of the Danish court as being something like the corrupt 
French curia familiar from Chapman’s tragedies. But while Bussy D’Ambois’ 
response to his degraded surroundings was an intense resiliency and hauteur, in 
Hamlet we see something different. We see a kind of self-lacerating, self-
undercutting inwardness. Generation of scholars have puzzled over Hamlet’s famed 
“subjectivity effects,” its ability to somehow appear timelessly modern and 
individualistic. 24  I would suggest, though, that perhaps Hamlet’s apparently 
proleptic interiority is really a function of the failure of traditional ethical 
distinctions—the traditional normative orientation of the aristocratic political leader 
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toward heroic action. This failure haunts the play, abetting Hamlet’s repeated 
failures to act and his sense of alienation from his surroundings and from the 
traditional office he feels he ought to occupy. We see this in his negative comparison 
of himself to Hercules quoted above. And we see it, more subtly, throughout his 
extended bouts of self-reflection, in which the immediate imperative to undertake 
revenge for his father’s death is again and again thwarted by a sense of the ecstatic 
nature of human being and the inadequacy of heroic action. Indeed, the theme of 
ecstasy runs throughout Hamlet. Horatio initially thinks that the guards have seen 
the ghost as a result of their own mental defect, their own ecstatic detachment from 
reality. It is, he claims, but their “fantasy” (1.1.23). But when he is himself confronted 
with the ghost he realizes it is not just the individual self-displacement of some 
misguided mind. The ghost “bodes some strange eruption to our state” (1.1.68), a 
strange self-displacement that the play will later confirm. Brutus already spoke to 
the disarray of an individual mind being linked to the disarray of the state, and we 
see something similar here. And the theme continues as the play goes on. Hamlet’s 
ambiguous madness—possibly a guise, possibly real—is characterized, repeatedly, 
as a mode of ecstasy. The category is evoked by Gertrude during the closet scene, 
where she says when Hamlet sees his father’s specter that this “bodiless creation” is 
a result of “ecstasy” (3.4.136). Ophelia is even more explicit:   
 
 O, what a noble mind is here o’erthrown! 
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 The courtier’s, soldier’s, scholar’s eye, tongue, sword, 
 Th’expectation and rose of the fair state, 
 The glass of fashion and the mould of form, 
 Th’observed of all observers, quite, quite down. 
 And I, of ladies most deject and wretched, 
 That sucked the honey of his musicked vows, 
 Now see what noble and most sovereign reason 
 Like sweet bells jangled out of time and harsh— 
 That unmatched stature and form of blown youth 
 Blasted with ecstasy. 
      (3.1.149-59) 
 
The ideal that Ophelia charts here is not just something Hamlet fails to live 
up to. It is impossible in the political world he inhabits, a world in which the ethical 
nexus of perfect aristocratic identity has run up against an inexorable political sense 
of alienation. Heroism continues to haunt the play, all the way up to Fortinbras’ final 
instructions about the care of Hamlet’s fallen body: 
 
    Let four captains 
 Bear Hamlet like a soldier to the stage, 
 For he was likely, had he been put on, 
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 To have prov’d most royal… 
(5.2.400-403) 
  
But Fortinbras’ comments are, of course, conditional and conjectural and point to a 
military-monarchical ideal that only he himself seems capable of embodying in 
Hamlet’s dramatic world. When we turn to Macbeth, however, this monarchical-
military ideal of heroic action moves out of the margins and into the center of 
Shakespeare’s tragedy. Its full force and power, however, also sow the seeds of 




Heroism’s powerful, if somewhat occluded, place in Macbeth can be first 
approached by turning to the play’s initial section. At the outset of Macbeth we are 
thrown into the midst of a battle between an army loyal to the sitting Scottish 
sovereign, Duncan, and a rebelling aristocrat named Macdonwald. Near the 
battlefield, Duncan and his entourage encounter a “bleeding Captain” who tells the 
king how his most formidable warrior-nobleman, Macbeth, has just performed in the 
fight against the rebel.  
   
The merciless Macdonwald 
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 (Worthy to be a rebel, for to that 
 The multiplying villainies of nature 
 Do warm upon him) from the western isles 
 Of Kernes and Gallowglasses is supplied; 
 And Fortune, on his damned quarrel smiling, 
 Show’d like a rebel’s whore: but all’s too weak 
 For brave Macbeth (well he deserves that name), 
 Disdaining Fortune, with his brandish’d steel, 
 Which smok’d with bloody execution, 
 Like Valour’s minion, carv’d out his passage, 
 Till he fac’d the slave; 
 Which ne’er shook hands, nor bade farewell to him, 
 Till he unseam’d him from the nave to th’ chops, 
 And fix’d his head upon our battlements. 
     (1.2.9-23) 
 
The dramatic point of this passage is, of course, to introduce Macbeth for the first 
time—specifically by way of a comparison with his enemy and opposite 
Macdonwald. But in introducing these two characters, Shakespeare also sketches the 
two, opposite models of political experience that will run through the rest of the 
play. One of them based in action, a heroic action of the sort we have already seen. 
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The other based in the individual agent’s alienation from both the efficacy of deeds 
and the totalities that encompass and negate them.  
An ideal of heroic action is hardwired into the imagistic and poetic circuitry 
of the Captain’s description. Shakespeare structures this account around the 
common classical concept of Fortuna, an allegorical figure ubiquitous across the 
mythological consciousness of classical, medieval, and early modern European 
culture, and which was often opposed to the virtus and fortitude of heroic political 
action. Fortune embodied non-autonomy, the fragility and possible failure of action, 
a passivity at odds with ingrained cultural norms of male political activity. 25  And 
throughout the Captain’s initial description, Macdonwald’s fundamental feature is 
precisely this variety of feminized heteronomy. He embodies a lack of the 
autonomous self-reliance that should properly characterize aristocratic virtus. 
Shakespeare emphasizes this in the initial description of Macdonwald as being 
swarmed with the “multiplying villainies of nature.”  This semi-surreal image could 
mean two possible things. It might suggest either some sort of abstract, allegorical 
envelopment by personified bad deeds. Or it might suggest more concrete mode of 
assistance (the Third and Forth Folios read “villaines” rather than “villainies,” 
suggesting the latter).26  But, in either case, the overall impression remains the same. 
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 See Hanna Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo Machiavelli 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).  
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 I owe this point to Harry Berger’s discussion of the passage in “The Early Scenes of Macbeth: Preface to 
a New Interpretation,” ELH 47, no. 1 (1980) p. 7. 
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This impression is of a feminized lack of autonomy and autarky, a failure of 
individual action. The passage emphasizes that the action Macdonwald engages is 
fundamentally, ontologically, not his own. It is anti-heroic; at odds with traditional, 
dynamic heroism’s emphasis on individual singularity and the “luster” of 
“conspicuous power” that is what allows individuals to stand apart from and 
influence and awe other men, as Thomas Hobbes would later write.27    
This contrasts with Macbeth. Shakespeare’s Captain turns to Macbeth after 
leaving Fortuna fawning over Macdonwald like a “rebel’s whore.”  This segue is 
abrupt: the Captain proclaims “But all’s too weak” with a jarring caesural shifting of 
gears, transforming Macdonwald’s multivalent villainy into the homogenous 
antecedent of one, crisp substantivized adjective (“all”), and immediately describing 
it as paling in comparison to Macbeth’s military strength. Against the literal and 
figurative multiplicity Macdonwald figures stands “brave” Macbeth, an 
embodiment of a unified, integrated model of heroic political action. Macdonwald 
acts with an effeminate faith in Fortune’s favor, but Macbeth disdains her. 
Macdonwald fights with kerns and gallowglasses by his side, while Macbeth’s sole 
support is his “brandish’d Steel” which smokes “with bloody execution.”28  At this 
point in the passage, we should note, a number of critics have argued that 
                                                     
27
 Thomas Hobbes, “Answer to Davenant’s ‘Preface to Gondibert,” in Elizabethan Critical Essays, ed. Joel 
Spingarn (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1904) v. 2, p. 55.  
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 “[K]erns and gallowglasses” are foreign mercenaries—a minor detail both drives home the rebelling 
thane’s lack of aristocratic self-reliance and subtly associates this lack of personal integrity with an 
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238 
 
Shakespeare subtly undermines Macbeth’s initial presentation as a masculine 
aristocratic warrior par excellence by describing him as “Valor’s minion.”  Indeed, at 
first glance, this description does seem effeminizing: in the Renaissance the term 
“minion” ranged in its meanings from hanger-on to sexual subordinate in its 
meanings. 29   But I would argue that the antecedent of the simile “like Valor’s 
minion” is not Macbeth himself but rather his “Brandish’d steel.”  Macbeth’s sword, 
in other words, is a “minion” of his own “valor”—a simile made especially apt by 
the fact that a secondary and less-common meaning of “minion” in the period was 
“small cannon.”30    
This reading gains plausibility in light of a later moment in the same scene 
when another Scottish nobleman, the Thane of Ross, arrives and describes to Duncan 
and his entourage another engagement in the same battle—this one between 
Macbeth and the Macdonwald’s foreign ally, the King of Norway:  
 
… that Bellona’s bridegroom, lapp’d in proof, 
Confronted him with self-comparisons, 
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 See OED, s.v. “minion,” passim. On the understanding of valor at play in this early description and 
throughout Macbeth see Eugene Waith’s “Manhood and Valor in Two Shakespearean Tragedies,” ELH 17, 
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Point against point, rebellious arm ‘gainst arm, 
Curbing his lavish spirit…. 
   (1.2.55-58) 
 
In the description of his duel with Macdonwald, Macbeth metaphorically minionizes 
his sword in an act of implicit sexual subordination. Here, he is presented in terms of 
another sexual-symbolic conquest: the domination of Bellona, goddess of war. The 
“bloody proof” that “laps” Macbeth here seems to subtly suggest not just the gore in 
which he is splattered from his battlefield exploits but also the hymeneal blood that 
results from this other sort of sexual conquest. And this particular moment—like the 
initial comparison with Macdonwald—enforces a broader political-ontological point 
that Shakespeare drives home throughout his opening presentation of Macbeth, a 
point that is, in a sense, summed up in one word from this passage: “lavish.”  
Derived from the Old French term for downpour, lavish metaphorically migrated in 
early modern English to mark a sense of abundance, wealth, and political power 
associated with aristocratic largesse and magnanimity.31  In this passage, the term is 
initially applied to the Norwegian king’s princely greatness. But lavishness seems to 
migrate to Macbeth himself as he matches the foreign ruler with “self-comparisons” 
and eventually “curbs” his monarchical magnanimity. Macbeth, then, becomes an 
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 See OED, s.v. “lavish.”  For more on magnanimity and heroism see the discussion of Aristotelian 
heroism in the introduction below. 
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embodiment of individual becoming vis-à-vis dynamic action. He models a 
paradigm of political experience organized and oriented around the becoming of 
personal potentiality in a collective life defined by action and heroic virtus.  
The Captain’s initial introduction of Macbeth—with its themes of militarism, 
masculinity, and feudal loyalty—is a familiar and oft-glossed passage. But I have 
lingered over it for so long for a particular and important reason. In the imagistic 
and linguistic density of the Captain’s description of Macbeth, Shakespeare provides 
a compact conspectus of a dynamic model of heroic political experience. This goes 
beyond a simple representation and thematization of the heroic. This is not to say that 
the play’s initial presentation of Macbeth is unrelated to the elite aristocratic culture 
of Shakespeare’s day. As many historians have noted, the political culture of the 
Elizabethan and Jacobean aristocracy was both pluralistic (having “little room” for 
concepts of sovereignty-qua-absolute obedience) and personal (organized around the 
ideal of individual activity as constituting and sustained community of honor 
binding together sovereign and noble subject)—ideas that show through clearly in 
the Captain’s battlefield account.32 But Shakespeare presents this aristocratic cultural 
paradigm not as a normative political framework. Instead, he presents a political-
ontological ideal—one that is illuminated, I would suggest, by looking beyond 
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 Mervyn James, “English Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485-1642,” in Politics, Society and 
Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp. 308-415.  
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Macbeth’s immediate historical surround and to Hegel’s discussion, in the Aesthetics 
lectures, of what he calls the Heroenzustande, the “Heroic Age.”    
For Hegel, the “heroic age” is not a particular historical moment. It is, rather, 
a particular ideal representational determination of political life—one where the 
subject (das Subjekt) exists in the unmediated context (im unmittelbaren 
Zusammenhange) of “his entire willing, acting, and achieving, [and] so he also takes 
undivided responsibility for whatever consequences arise from his actions.”33  Hegel 
developed this formulation primarily in reference to Greek epic and tragedy. But the 
concept nonetheless cuts to the core of Shakespeare’s initial introduction of 
Macbeth—both in his combat with Macdonwald and in the subsequent post-battle 
scene where Macbeth meets back up with Duncan and his entourage. Here, the King 
fulsomely praises Macbeth, claiming that his “due” is far more than “all can pay” 
(1.4.21). And while Macbeth’s response is, at first glance, a simple self-deflating 
declaration of humbleness, beneath its banal surface-structure it provides a compact 
précis of another key facet of the “heroic” model of political experience. “The service 
and the loyalty I owe,” says Macbeth, 
 
In doing it, pays itself. Your highness' part 
Is to receive our duties; and our duties 
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 Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art, trans. T.M. Knox, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1975) p. 187. The German text is quoted from Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, in Werke, v. 13 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970) p. 246. 
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Are to your throne and state children and servants, 
Which do but what they should, by doing every thing 
Safe toward your love and honour. 
     (1.4.22-27) 
 
In these lines, rhetorical form and political-ontological content are woven together to 
the point of inseparability. The rhetorical form in question here is chiasmus: a 
stylized structural reversal that we can see structuring Macbeth’s assertion of the 
fundamentally reciprocal organization of the feudal-aristocratic polity to which both 
he and Duncan belong. On the one hand, Macbeth acknowledges the importance of 
aristocratic “doing,” of the action he has just distinguished himself by undertaking. 
But on the other, he also claims that such action is inseparable from the imperatives 
of loyalty to his feudal suzerain.34     
 
IV 
 Macbeth opens, then, with a particular version and vision of political life. It 
opens with a particular model of heroic political experience that is personalized and 
dynamic, and embedded in feudal norms of reciprocal rule. At the same time, 
however, Shakespeare’s play subtly but significantly presents this political model as 
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 On neo-feudalism in the political culture of early modern England—and, more particularly, an account of 
the way in which feudal concepts and tropes helped to reconcile the increasing marginalization of the 
English aristocracy—see Richard McCoy, The Rites of Knighthood: The Literature and Politics of 
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an exclusively aesthetic ideal. It is one fundamentally at odds with the political reality 
the play will actually go on to stage. For between the third-person account of 
Macbeth’s military exploits (1.2) and his profession of loyalty to Duncan (1.4) 
Shakespeare inserts the key scene where Macbeth encounters Weird Sisters and their 
decisive declaration of his pending accession to the Scottish throne.   
It is a critical commonplace that this scene is linguistically thematically 
suffused with duality—from their own riddling speech to Macbeth’s description of 
the day they meet as both “foul and fair” (1.3.38). This obvious emphasis on the dual 
and the double, however, takes on a new and profoundly political significance when 
we read it against the themes of unity, immanence, and heroic-autarkic singularity 
that are emphasized in the Captain’s account of Macbeth’s battlefield exploits. In this 
description, Macbeth is a figure of heroic singularity and unity. But after he hears 
the Sisters’ prophecy, the duality they represent rapidly starts to infuse and inflect 
his own consciousness—a consciousness increasingly caught up in the agential 
paradoxes that their prophecy poses.  
 
   [ Aside ] Two truths are told, 
 As happy prologues to the swelling act 
 Of the imperial theme. – I thank you, gentlemen. – 
 [Aside.] This supernatural soliciting 
 Cannot be ill; cannot be good: -  
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 If ill, why hath it given me earnest of success, 
 Commencing in a truth?  I am Thane of Cawdor: 
 If good, why do I yield to that suggestion 
 Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair, 
And make my seated heart knock at my ribs 
 Against the use of nature?  Present fears 
 Are less than horrible imaginings. 
 My thought, whose murther yet is but fantastical, 
 Shakes so my single state of man, 
 That function is smother’d in surmise, 
 And nothing is, but what is not. 
    (1.3.127-42) 
 
Macbeth’s monologue begins by reiterating the idea of magnanimous becoming that 
is at the core of the Captain’s description. Macbeth morphs the prophecies he has 
just heard into the “swelling act / Of the imperial theme” (a subtle but distinct echo 
the “lavishness” we saw in the previous scene). But the immanent ideal of action at 
the heart of this earlier, third-person description—the Captain’s Hegelian suture of 
the heroic subject with the “unmediated context of his “willing, acting, and 
achieving”—is, subsequently, scrambled. This happens in Macbeth’s soliloquy by 
way of the transcendent paradoxes that the Sisters’ “supernatural soliciting” seems 
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to press upon him. Action, here, is no longer a point of unity of becoming. It is 
dispersed into a projected futurity—into a “fantastical” prolepsis that makes 
Macbeth’s “single state of man” shake.  
Indeed, this particular line—“[s]o shakes my single state of man”—is highly 
significant. Its sibilant sounds, and its subtle emphasis on the “stat” phoneme, point 
to a key term that will, throughout much of the rest of Shakespeare’s play, signal 
precisely the experiences of displacement, of doubleness, and agential confusion that 
characterize Macbeth. This term is ecstasy. Macbeth first shows a concern with 
ecstasy in this scene—both in Macbeth’s actual monologue, and in the response of 
his companion Banquo to it: “Look how our partner’s rapt” (1.3.143)—and this 
preoccupation will run through the rest of the play. 35 Throughout Macbeth, ecstasy—
both as a surface-level signifier and a more complex political-experiential 
structure—repeatedly marks the failure of the initial ideal of action that the Captain’s 
speech so precisely and poetically sums up. In his analysis of the “heroic age,” Hegel 
writes that such a political-aesthetic configuration ends when the “individual is … 
no longer the vehicle and the sole actualization of [his] powers.”36  And it is such a 
breakdown of the relationship between agency and ability, of individual and 
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 For a characteristically sharp analysis of the theme of rapture in Shakespeare’s play—although one much 
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power.37  As in the earlier plays, though, Shakespeare gives it a unique and uniquely 
political inflection. He makes it mark an experience of political alienation, of the 
failure of political action that—as we will see—is at the fissile core of Macbeth’s 
tragic dynamic.  
But if we want to understand Shakespeare’s unique political-experiential 
inflection of ecstasy we first have to work our way through another—and less 
overtly interesting—thread in Macbeth’s weft: ambition.  
As far back as Greek tragedies and the concept of hubris, ambition has been 
linked to heroism. And if Macbeth starts off by associating its titular protagonist with 
the social and political immanence and unity of a “heroic” model of action, the 
play’s real momentum derives from working through another tendril of the classical 
conception of heroism—the “ambition” which, as Thomas Hobbes suggested, is a 
fault but also an often unavoidable ancillary of the “Heroick.”38  Ambition has its 
own long and complex history, from Greek concepts of hubris through widespread 
Elizabethan vilifications of the tendency.39  But Shakespeare’s presentation of it in 
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Macbeth gives the old concept a new twist. Macbeth’s treatment doesn’t just repeat 
the period’s boilerplate ethical injunctions. It uses ambition to think through the 
experience of political action was being profoundly disjoined from ethico-politcal 
norms.   
Here we can begin with the early scene in the play, where Lady Macbeth 
analyzes her husband’s character (1.5). At this point, Macbeth has already received 
the Weird Sisters’ startling prophecy and conveyed their message to his wife by 
letter. In the same missive, he has informed her that Duncan, grateful for his 
battlefield service, will soon visit their estate—information that leads Lady Macbeth 
to the conclusion that killing Duncan will speed along Macbeth’s pending royal 
ascent. With this scheme already at full boil, Lady Macbeth pauses to ponder the 
prospects of her husband actually being able to do the necessary deed: 
 
Glamis thou art, and Cawdor, and shalt be 
What thou art promised. Yet do I fear thy nature. 
It is too full o’th’ milk of human kindness 
To catch the nearest way. Thou wouldst be great, 
Art not without ambition, but without 
The illness should attend it. What thou wouldst highly, 
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That wouldst thou holily; wouldst not play false, 
And yet wouldst wrongly win. 
      (1.5.13-20) 
 
Like Macbeth’s chiastic retort to Duncan, these lines demonstrate the degree to 
which Macbeth constantly interweaves rhetoric and ontology—the ways in which its 
poetic patterns and conceptual dynamics form a complex filigree. But while 
Macbeth’s earlier riposte to Duncan hinged on the rhetorical trope of chiasmus, here 
we see a decisive shift away from chiasmus to contradiction: from the plenitude of 
political order to the paradoxes that will prove this order’s undoing.  
Throughout her speech, Lady Macbeth violently probes for paradoxes and 
inconsistencies in her husband’s character. She begins by portraying his personality 
as a kind of concordia discors of apparently opposed desires—to be high and holy, to 
be great and ambitious, but also lacking in illness or moral compromise—all of 
which exist in a fragile chiastic balance. But it quickly becomes clear that her goal is a 
full-on assault on this balance—a balance she disdainfully describes in terms of 
“kindness.”  According to the Lady, Macbeth’s “nature” is “overly full” with such 
kindness—a mammary metaphor whose low-level assonance (in the long vowels in 
“full” and “milk”) suggests both sonically and semantically that Macbeth is 
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complacent to an almost maternal power.40  What earlier passed as fealty has now 
become a bovinity—a bovinity that is made to seem viscerally disgusting.41  In this 
passage, we can see Lady Macbeth both mapping and planning to poke holes in this 
consistency and complacency. She is at pains to establish how she can make sure 
that Macbeth’s “ambition” must, in the end, paradoxically clash with his loyalty and 
obedience.  
It is significant that illness becomes the metaphorical marker, here, for what 
Lady Macbeth sees as necessary to break the boundaries of her husband’s 
complacency—to get him to seize the opportunity the Sisters have presented. 
Ambition and illness go hand-in hand; and to gauge the significance of what the 
Lady does here with ambition it is worth turning, for a moment, to the beginning of 
Francis Bacon’s roughly-contemporary consideration of the topic, the 1612 essay 
“On Ambition”:  
 
Ambition is like choler; which is an humor that maketh men active, 
earnest, full of alacrity, and stirring, if it be not stopped. But if it be 
stopped, and cannot have his way, it becometh adust, and thereby 
malign and venomous. So ambitious men, if they find the way open 
for their rising, and still get forward, they are rather busy than 
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 See her later request to be “unsex[ed]” (1.5.43).  
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dangerous; but if they be checked in their desires, they become 
secretly discontent, and look upon men and matters with an evil eye, 
and are best pleased, when things go backward; which is the worst 
property in a servant of a prince, or state.42   
 
Bacon begins by associating ambition with choler, the Galenic humor traditionally 
tied to anger and other sorts of violent perturbation. This is, in itself hardly startling: 
the early seventeenth century was an era in which the metaphorics of the humors 
could be stretched far enough to provide all-encompassing explanations of literally 
everything in the universe.43 But there is more going on, here, than a simple humoral 
comparison. For Bacon, ambition is not just a character flaw or ethical deviation. It is 
a breakdown of the homoeostatic order of the body politic; a breakdown of a 
particular model of what the political means and how it should work. For Bacon 
ambition is an autarkic force of becoming: a power unmoored from the organic 
political reciprocities that should contain it. While ambition, Bacon admits, is often a 
boon for the state, it is also a kind of free radical that constantly threatens its 
integrity.  
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This idea emerges, in similar terms, in Lady Macbeth’s analysis of her 
husband. The Lady’s rhetorical goal in the lines just quoted, however, is to render 
this destabilizing function in positive terms: she wants to yoke it to the very “heroic” 
model of the political that it threatens to subvert by casting ambition as a variety of 
self-actualization; a way in which (as she says to Macbeth later on) one “be the same 
in thine own act and valour / As thou art in desire” (1.7.40-1). But still, for Lady 
Macbeth as much as Bacon, ambition is a principle of absolute autarkic self-
actualization. It is the heroic ideal spiraling off into moral anarchy, a kind of 
misplaced ideal of immanence along solipsistic and anti-communal lines. But while 
Macbeth’s ambition appears this way from the outside—and we should remember 
that like the Captain’s, the Lady’s speech is external to Macbeth’s own perspective, 
presenting a third rather than a first person viewpoint—ambition’s relationship to 
action is considerably more complex from the “inside.”  Ambition, that is to say, is 
considerably more complex as a mode of first-person political experience.44 
Macbeth registers this complexity throughout the play: from his initial 
encounter with the Weird Sisters he sees the threatening and problematic 
possibilities of ambition’s particular model of action. Take the following lines, which 
Macbeth delivers shortly before killing Duncan. Again, this is a long and familiar 
speech. But it takes on a new and unfamiliar sense if we view it not as an expression 
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of proleptic subjectivity effects, or a rhetorical exercise, but as a profoundly political 
meditation—one that came out of a culture in which politics and individual action 
were indissociable:  
 
If it were done when 'tis done, then 'twere well 
It were done quickly: if the assassination 
Could trammel up the consequence, and catch 
With his surcease success; that but this blow 
Might be the be-all and the end-all here, 
But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, 
We'd jump the life to come. But in these cases 
We still have judgment here; that we but teach 
Bloody instructions, which, being taught, return 
To plague the inventor: this even-handed justice 
Commends the ingredients of our poison'd chalice 
To our own lips. He's here in double trust; 
First, as I am his kinsman and his subject, 
Strong both against the deed; then, as his host, 
Who should against his murderer shut the door, 
Not bear the knife myself. Besides, this Duncan 
Hath borne his faculties so meek, hath been 
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So clear in his great office, that his virtues 
Will plead like angels, trumpet-tongued, against 
The deep damnation of his taking-off; 
And pity, like a naked new-born babe, 
Striding the blast, or heaven's cherubim, horsed 
Upon the sightless couriers of the air, 
Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye, 
That tears shall drown the wind. I have no spur 
To prick the sides of my intent, but only 
Vaulting ambition, which o'erleaps itself 
And falls on the other. 
    (1.7.1-28) 
 
At the start of this speech we are confronted, again, with the ideal of action that 
Macbeth stages in its early scenes. It is presented here in Macbeth’s deployment of 
the rhetorical figure the Greeks called polyptoton and Puttenham dubbed the 
“tranlacer”: “when ye turne and tranlace a word into many sundry shapes as the 
Tailor doth his garment.”45  And in Macbeth’s speech we see a three-time tranlacing 
of “done,” a rhetorical move that—coupled with the opening sentence’s subtle but 
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perceptible patterning of “d” and “w” sounds—produces a sense, both sonic and 
syntactic, of a strong but deferred desire for closure, for a strong and decisive doing 
that could, as Macbeth puts it in the next line, “trammel up the consequences” (the 
verb literally means to bind up or to ensnare in a net).46 The striking scholastic 
swerve of the phrase “be-all and the end-all” draws out what is at stake here, the 
ideal of a perfectly unified action and self-consistency.  
But while Macbeth’s monologue begins with the action-oriented model of the 
political that echoes the opening of the play, the rest of this speech stages this 
notion’s radical undermining. The agents of this undercutting are, at first glance, 
externalized forms of ethical normativity: a pagan/Christian hybrid of the “life to 
come” and the “even-handed justice” (1.7.10) that threatens retribution for what 
Macbeth is about to do. But by the end of the speech these initially-external forces 
are internalized, migrating from outward justice and eschatology to a kind of 
psychomachia internal to Macbeth himself and which is increasingly dominated by 
the arguments of ambition, a force that is strikingly materialized in the speech’s 
closing lines as a spur to Macbeth’s action that also threatens to unhorse him in his 
upward ascent to greatness. Indeed, the chaos implicit in this odd, jarring metaphor 
predicts the ultimate consequences of Macbeth’s ambition—consequences that are 
manifested, in the play, on two levels. The first level is that of the Scottish polity as a 
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whole, and the ultimate impact of Macbeth’s ambition and usurpation on Scotland is 
summed up well by the Thane of Ross in the play’s fourth act: 
 
Alas, poor country! 
Almost afraid to know itself. It cannot 
Be call'd our mother, but our grave; where nothing, 
But who knows nothing, is once seen to smile; 
Where sighs and groans and shrieks that rend the air 
Are made, not mark'd; where violent sorrow seems 
A modern ecstasy …  
   (4.3.164-70) 
 
Macbeth’s ambition, this description suggests, leads to a form of collective “modern 
ecstasy.” But this striking phrase speaks to the outward effect of Macbeth’s 
usurpation and subsequent reign on Scotland as a whole—the “sighs and groans and 
shrieks” that go hand-in-hand with his reduction of the Scottish nobility to homines 
sacri quaking in front of Macbeth’s sovereign decisions—it also sums up the play’s 
primary focus: which is the effect of the murder of Duncan on Macbeth himself.47  As 
numerous critics have noted, Macbeth is a tragedy of tyranny, based on Macbeth’s 
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increasingly brutal actions on Scotland in terms of the enacting of one long “state of 
exception,” a sovereign emergency in which the laws of god and man are suspended 
while Macbeth seeks obsessively after the “safety” that the second half of the Sisters 
prophecy (that Banquo’s heirs will ascend in Macbeth’s wake) denies him.48 But pace 
Carl Schmitt’s influential description of the sovereign decision as a positive and 
productive institution of a juridical-political order, Macbeth’s bloody sovereign 
actions decisions precisely fail to attain positivity. 49  For they are, ultimately, 
motivated by an experience of radical inadequacy, of a radical lack at the core of 
Macbeth’s attempts at action—attempts that try to make his “deeds” into a “be-all” 
and an “end-all” but which are constantly shadowed by the ambiguity of the Weird 
Sisters’ vision of the future. When, earlier in the play, Lady Macbeth first hears this 
prophecy she posits a positive form of political ecstasy: 
 
Thy letters have transported me beyond 
This ignorant present, and I feel now 
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The future in the instant. 
   (1.5.54-5) 
 
But for Macbeth himself ecstasy comes to mark a darker self-displacement, a darker 
and more problematic alienation from action. In the play’s own peculiarly subjective 
version of tragic irony, this self-actualization is negated by the self-displacement 
from which it originally sprung, both in Macbeth’s own anxious cogitations and in 
his monarchical behavior, his willingness to let  
 
… the frame of things disjoint, both the worlds suffer, 
Ere we will eat our meal in fear, and sleep 
In the affliction of these terrible dreams, 
That shake us nightly. Better be with the dead, 
Whom we, to gain our peace, have sent to peace, 
Than on the torture of the mind to lie 
In restless ecstasy. 
    (3.2.15-22; my emphasis) 
 
Ecstasy emerges, here, in opposition to the themes of eating and sleeping—what G. 
Wilson Knight famously called the play’s “life themes”—which appear repeatedly at 
the margins of Shakespeare’s play as hints of a world beyond the bleak reality of 
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Macbeth’s own existence.50  Indeed, Macbeth speaks these lines shortly before he 
orders the assassination of Banquo, a move that he makes in order to close off the 
possibility of the self-displacement that haunts him in these lines. But while his 
assassins succeed in dispatching Banquo, his son and heir Fleance escapes, and this 
causes Macbeth, when he hears the news, to return once again to his ecstatic idée 
fixe—this time appears in the form of a “fit” that contrasts with the material solidity 
and airy freedom for which he increasingly pines: 
 
Then comes my fit again: I had else been perfect, 
Whole as the marble, founded as the rock, 
As broad and general as the casing air: 
But now I am cabin'd, cribb'd, confined, bound in 
To saucy doubts and fears. But Banquo's safe? 
    (3.4.21-5) 
 
These lines are spoken near the start of the Macbeth’s famous banquet scene, 
where Banquo’s recently-minted ghost haunts Macbeth as he attempts to conduct a 
court dinner. Critics have long focused on this scene, seeing it as a kind of set-piece 
moment where the disarray Macbeth is bringing to Scotland in his attempts to shore 
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 See G. Wilson Knights, The Wheel of Fire (London: Routledge, 2001) pp. 160-80. See also his The 
Imperial Theme (London: Methuen, 1968) pp. 125-53.  
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up his own kingship is made brutally clear.51  But the scene’s emphasis on the split 
between Macbeth’s perceptions and those of his guests also foregrounds the degree 
to which the play, as it proceeds, puts more and more emphasis on the subjective 
space of Macbeth’s own experience. This experience hinges on Macbeth’s increasing 
realization that the moral perfidy he has committed in the pursuit of his own 
ambition has left him ontologically displaced from both the social life of the Scottish 
aristocracy and from his own sense of stability, groundedness and (most decisively) 
his ability to act. We see this clearly in a monologue Macbeth speaks slightly earlier 
in the play, shortly before he has Banquo killed: 
 
To be thus is nothing; 
But to be safely thus. – Our fears in Banquo 
Stick deep; and in his royalty of nature 
Reigns that which would be fear'd: 'tis much he dares; 
And, to that dauntless temper of his mind, 
He hath a wisdom that doth guide his valour 
To act in safety. There is none but he 
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Whose being I do fear:  
   (3.1.47-53) 
 
These lines capture the ecstasy that Macbeth undergoes throughout the play’s long 
dénouement, and which will become so theatrically apparent after the attack on 
Banquo and his son fails. The disorienting deixis of the first two lines quickly cuts to 
a forceful thesis about the political being of the sovereign: that monarchical being is 
tantamount to non-being unless it is safe being. But significantly, this focus on 
sovereign safety quickly fades. Macbeth’s attention lingers only briefly on issues of 
sovereignty and rule, but he expends minimal space on Banquo’s apparent “royalty 
of nature.” Instead, his attention seems irresistibly drawn from the ideal of rule and 
toward the ideal of action—the very ideal, of course, that he himself embodied at the 
play’s opening. The first of these lines limn Banquo as an exemplary embodiment of 
a long-standing classical ideal of heroism— that is, the perfect conjunction of virtue 
and wisdom, virtus and sapientia, in which “virtue” leads to an action “governed 
with the scepter of knowledge,” as Sidney writes in the New Arcadia.52  And it is 
precisely this ethical and political state to from which Macbeth, by this point in the 
play, is alienated. 
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Macbeth’s condition after Duncan is dispatched, then, is characterized by a 
permanent experience of political ecstasy—a permanent ontological disorientation 
and displacement from both social belonging as well as the decisive “heroic” action 
under whose aegis he leaves that belonging. In Shakespeare’s portrayal of Macbeth, 
we see a state of exception where—rather than shoring up sovereign power—
Macbeth is forced to confront, in striving for sovereignty, the fragility, the weakness, 
the lack that is, he ultimately concludes, part of any and all human action.  
In a remarkable reading of Macbeth—one of the few recent accounts that 
operates outside the historicist mainstream of commentary on Shakespeare’s play—
Ewan Fernie argues that Macbeth is a play haunted by what Lacan called “the Real”: 
the negativity that persists in every action, every attempt to assign cut and dry 
meanings and cohesion to human existence. “It’s as if,” Fernie writes, “by means of 
Duncan's death Macbeth has scratched away the flimsy surface of the world to 
reveal the Lacanian void raging beneath.”53 But while Fernie uses Macbeth to develop 
a theory of tragedy’s confrontation with this negativity in trans-historical terms, I 
would argue that we might also read this dynamic in Macbeth as a product of 
something more specific. Here it is helpful to put Macbeth alongside not Lacan but 
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rather the work of perhaps the greatest thinker of ecstasy in the Renaissance: Michel 
de Montaigne.  
Montaigne’s Essays dwell repeatedly on ecstasy and ecstatic experiences in 
their repeated exploration of the inescapable internalized alienation of human 
beings, of the ways in which “[w]e are never ‘at home’: we are always outside 
ourselves. Fear, desire, hope, impel us toward the future; they rob us of feelings and 
concern for what now is, in order to spend time over what will be —even when we 
ourselves shall be no more.”54  This preoccupation runs throughout Montaigne’s 
writing, from early considerations of topics like sadness and intoxication all the way 
to the final pages of the last of the essays, “Of Experience.” 55  Montaigne’s 
preoccupation with ecstatic experiences has often been read in terms of his revival of 
classical stoic and skeptical thinkers and or his putative discovery of a kind of a kind 
of proto-Cartesian modernity. But it is worth emphasizing, here, that Montaigne’s 
entire project—and the sense of self-displacement that is at the heart of his 
development of the essay form—has its origins in particular political trauma, 
specifically in the trauma of the French Wars of Religion. Montaigne’s sense of 
human fragility, in other words, is the flipside of the political chaos he experienced 
in his own life—a chaos he reacted to by retreating into the aristocratic otium the 
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Essays stage but which, for other thinkers like Jean Bodin, provided legitimacy for a 
centralized and consolidated sovereign state power.56  This trauma appears only 
obliquely in the essays, but it is everywhere beneath the pessimism, the skepticism, 
the sense of human fragility that is their greatest feature and fixation: 
 
Man is the most slighted and frail of all creatures and, moreover, the 
most given to pride. This creature knows and sees that he is lodged 
down here, among the mire and shit of the world, bound and nailed to 
the deadest, most stagnant part of the universe, in the lowest storey of 
the building, and the farthest from the vault of heaven; his 
characteristics place him in the third and lowest category of animate 
creatures, yet, in thought, he sets himself above the circle of the moon, 
bringing the very heavens under his feet. 57  
 
Macbeth parallels Montaigne’s writing insofar as it stages such a politically-derived 
experience of human impotence, of the failure of action as a totalizing political 
practice. But while Montaigne retreats into the conciliatory literary praxis of his 
Essays, Macbeth derives a different conclusion from the late-Renaissance political 
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pessimism that Macbeth and the Essays share.58  And this conclusion is articulated in 
what is, without a doubt, Macbeth’s most famous speech:   
 
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow 
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day 
To the last syllable of recorded time, 
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out brief candle. 
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
Signifying nothing.  
   (5.5.17-27) 
 
These lines and their dramatic situation are both familiar. Following the sudden 
death of his wife, and with the violent and chaotic consequences of his usurpation of 
the Scottish crown barreling toward him, Macbeth steps back and considers the 
meaning of human existence. It is, he avers, not a site of plenitude or wholeness but 
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rather of lack; human existence is actually an ex-istence—a being always already 
outside itself. Such deep ontological displacement is, Macbeth goes on to claim, 
always caught up in time. Human life is always displaced from its present; we live 
in constant anticipation of a fragmented futurity. Hence the passage’s famous 
theatrical turn as Shakespeare summons up the ancient and ubiquitous image of the 
theatrum mundi, of the “world as stage,” but gives it a striking anti-theatrical twist, 
denuding this global theatricality of any positive content and making the “poor 
player” a figure for the emphemerality and emptiness of a human finitude as such.59    
It would be easy to read this in simply existential terms, or as a standard 
statement of Renaissance contemptus mundi.60  But I want to argue that the play’s 
concluding negative turn suggests not a simple philosophical epiphany, existential 
mood-swing, or exemplum of the moral-metaphysical destructiveness of evil, as 
older critics argued.61  It is rather the culmination of an interrogation of action that 
runs throughout the play. It is a final claim that, in transgressing social bounds, 
reveals its own ecstatic core: it confronts the human impotence, the weakness of 
human praxis, at the core of political life. This becomes clear if we turn, for a 
moment, back to the passage’s theatrical trope. Earlier in the play, as we have seen, 
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theatricality is associated with action, with the “swelling” of the “Imperial theme.”  
But now it figures disillusionment with action itself. Macbeth’s concluding 
consideration of human being collapses both sorts of action into one, ultimately 
empty category. It makes action a mask for a bleak human ex-istence which is 
always ecstatically outside itself and exposed to the contingency and insecurities of 
an inscrutable world that ultimately means nothing at all.  
 Macbeth’s actual ending, of course, comes not with the bleak realization that 
human action “signifies nothing” but rather in a scene of harmonic social 
reconciliation typical of Shakespeare’s tragedies. After Macduff has slain Macbeth 
and delivered his severed head to Scotland’s new monarch, Malcolm declares: 
 
 We shall not spend a large expense of time 
 Before we reckon with your several loves, 
 And make us even with you. My thanes and kinsmen, 
 Henceforth be earls, the first that ever Scotland 
 In such an honour named. 
     (5.8.60-5) 
 
In Malcolm’s concluding thank-you to the aristocracy that has helped him defeat his 
father’s usurper we see, once again, a reciprocal political ideal where action and 
loyalty exist in a cohesive and coherent balance. But even for the usually-ambivalent 
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conclusions of Shakespeare’s tragedies, the ending of Macbeth seems particularly pro 
forma, sharply undercut by the realization that Macbeth has voiced, on stage, just a 
few minutes earlier. It is in this realization, I would argue, that Macbeth finds its true 
conclusion: while the play ends with an outward show of social harmony, it leaves 
us with a sense of the fragility, insufficiency, and ecstatic alienation of individual 






 It might seem odd to end a dissertation about early modern heroism with 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth. Written in the first decade of the seventeenth century, 
Shakespeare’s play predates a good portion of the heroic literature of the English 
Renaissance. Heroism would continue to occupy an important place on the English 
stage up to the closing of the theaters shortly before the outbreak of the Civil War. 
And beyond this, when the theaters reopened, the heroic would be at the center of 
the late seventeenth-century theatrical boom represented by writers like William 
Davenant and John Dryden. Dryden’s heroic tragedies, particularly, represent a re-
inflation of the heroic ideal, where heroic and chivalric ideas and ideals are used to 
bolster an emergent sense of English identity and the imperial destiny of the late 
seventeenth century’s military-fiscal state.1 And the same is true, in complex ways, 
of the work of various other writers from the period, who agreed with Thomas 
Hobbes’ statement that “there is in Princes and men of conspicuous power, anciently 
called Heroes, a luster and influence upon the rest of men resembling that of the 
Heavens.”2    
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 But whatever their relation to these later events, the writers I have analyzed 
in the foregoing pages represent a distinct phenomenon. They present a distinct 
perspective on collective life—a vision of political experience where a personalized, 
action-oriented concept of politics is increasingly running up against its own 
historical limits. These limits take various imaginative forms in the texts I have 
examined: the aristocratic civil war of Sidney’s Arcadia, the meta-theatrical paralysis 
of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, the baroque language and intellectual askesis of 
Chapman’s French tragedies, and the haunting existential malaise that concludes 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth. But all of these texts share a deeply similar vision of 
individual action failing amidst the emergence of an abstract, alienated, and 
fundamentally state-based paradigm of political life.  
For each of the authors we have examined, however, heroism doesn’t just 
represent political failure and frustration. It also hints at the transformation of this 
negative experience through the very process of poetic representation itself. In 
Sidney and Marlowe and Chapman and Shakespeare heroism represents not just a 
resistance to reality but the embrace of negativity that Sigmund Freud, writing 
centuries later, saw at the center of art in general: 
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An artist is originally a man who turns away from reality because he 
cannot come to terms with the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction 
which it at first demands, and who allows his erotic and ambitious 
wishes full play in the life of phantasy. He finds the way back to 
reality, however, from this world of phantasy by making use of special 
gifts to mold his phantasies into truths of a new kind, which are 
valued by men as precious reflections of reality. Thus in a certain 
fashion he actually becomes the hero, the king, the creator, or the 
favourite he desired to be, without following the long roundabout 
path of making real alterations in the external world. But he can only 
achieve this because other men feel the same dissatisfaction as he does 
with the renunciation demanded by reality, and because that 
dissatisfaction, which results from the replacement of the pleasure 
principle by the reality principle, is itself a part of reality.3 
For Freud, art begins by a turning away from the actual; but this initial negation of 
things as they are is itself negated as the artist finds his way back to a new level of 
actuality: the shared “dissatisfaction” of human beings with their circumstances; a 
dissatisfaction that is, Freud claims, “itself a part of reality.”  Such an understanding 
of art—where the creative imagination begins as a fugitive from reality but is 
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ultimately welcomed home into the “second nature” of inter-subjectivity—would 
later be reified in the modern ideology of aesthetics in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.4  But this dynamic also runs through the heroic writing of Sidney and 
Marlowe and Chapman and Shakespeare. In their own way, these writers 
proleptically map the contours of our own modernity—where subjectivity is 
confined to the realm of art and culture, and where the political sphere is a zone of 
de-personalized abstraction; of man-made constructs like the state, society, and the 
market run amok.5 
This point seems particularly important today. This dissertation was written 
in a moment when justifying and defending literature and its professional study has 
never seemed more pressing.6 Many today argue that literature and the humanities 
more broadly are useless, out of place in a tough globalized world where our 
universities ought to be heeding Thomas Friedman-style injunctions toward 
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economic competitiveness.7 But before this point is conceded—or weakly defended 
with clichés about moral self-cultivation the humanities inspire8—it is important to 
remember that literature as we know it emerged in the early modern period out of 
some of the same experiences that confront us today. For Sidney and Marlowe and 
Chapman and Shakespeare, the world was no less frightening, alien, and aleatory 
than it seems to many of us in the early twenty-first century. The rise of the 
centralized monarchical state was no less bewildering than the chaos of the 
contemporary market or the grim eventualities of our species’ ecological situation. 
Sidney, Marlowe, Chapman and Shakespeare, of course, wrote from within a matrix 
of political and ethical ideas that are alien to us. But in its broad gestures, their work 
points to literature’s vocation as a site for affective resistance to things as they are—
even in a moment when the pressure of what Friedrich Nietzsche once called the 
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